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

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

EVERETT CARL LADD examines voting in the 1994 off-year elections that led to the taking of control of both houses of Congress by the Republican party. He concludes that these elections evince a further maturing of the "postindustrial" party system. The issue of what the proper role of federal government loomed large—to the Republicans' benefit—as the electorate continues to rethink this dimension of politics. At the same time, the weakness of voter ties to political parties continues to contribute a distinctive cast to this contemporary realignment.

ROBERT F. DURANT argues that a "democratic deficit" in America lies at the heart of this nation's distressing descent into what he describes as "anomic democracy" over the past two decades. He chronicles the paradoxical consequences of the democratic deficit in one of this nation's most costly, complex and controversial policy arenas: the Environmental Protection Agency's decisions about risks to public health, safety, and the environment.

ANNETTE BAKER FOX examines how the inclusion of environmental provisions in the NAFTA negotiations broke a rule the United States and Canada regularly observed in their dealings with each other—not to link unrelated issues. By going against tradition, American environmental groups successfully enlarged their role in foreign trade matters.

DONALD ROTHCHILD and ALEXANDER J. GROTH discuss some currently important magnifiers of ethnic conflict. They analyze the settings for pathologically hostile notions of "others" used to promote various ethnic identities.

HERMANN GILIOMEE examines the nature of the democratization process and discusses the prospects for the consolidation of a democracy in South Africa. He argues that the conditions do not exist for a liberal democracy to evolve in South Africa or for a single party to solve unilaterally the major conflicts in society.

FRANK COSTIGLIOLA reexamines the Cuban missile crisis and other issues in the Kennedy administration's relations with Western Europe. From a close reading of primary documents, he concludes that the assumptions of U.S. officials conditioned them to avoid serious consultation with the Europeans.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The 1994 Congressional Elections: The Postindustrial Realignment Continues

EVERETT CARLL LADD

The result of the 8 November 1994 balloting is at one level entirely clear and unequivocal: the Republicans won a major off-year election victory, making a net gain of fifty-two House seats, nine Senate seats, fourteen governorships, and eighteen state legislative houses. The implications of this huge partisan turnaround for the course of public policy, both nationally and at the state level, over the next two years are obviously great.

Just where the 1994 election fits into the longer-term evolution of American partisan competition is far from apparent, however. The thinking of the U.S. electorate in 1994 was thoroughly examined in many hundreds of opinion surveys, including some of the very highest quality. The work of the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, and of the Gallup Organization working for *USA Today* and CNN, deserves special commendation.[1] What's more, the contemporary political system in which last November's balloting took place has assumed increasingly clear and distinct form over the sequence of elections that began in 1968. We are no longer in the position of attempting to describe an abrupt political departure, but instead see the latest electoral display of a fairly mature parties and elections system. We don't have to applaud all the structural features of this system, of course, and we certainly don't need to like any particular election results it delivers. The system itself, nonetheless, should long-since have lost any real capacity to surprise.

[1] Through the courtesy of these organizations, the entire collection of Times Mirror and Gallup surveys taken during 1994 – along with those for earlier years as well – are available through the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, Storrs.

EVERETT CARLL LADD is professor of political science at the University of Connecticut and executive director and president of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. He is the author of ten books on American political life, including *American Political Parties* and *Transformations of the American Party System* (second edition revised with Charles Hadley). He is editor of a just-published volume on the 1994 elections, *America at the Polls, 1994*.

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REALIGNMENT . . . AGAIN

Interpreting the 1994 results brings us once again to the familiar subject of partisan realignment. Is it occurring in the contemporary United States? If it is, to what ends? If U.S. politics is realigning, where are we now in a realignment cycle? If American politics is being realigned, how much that is new in this regard manifested itself in the 1994 voting?

From his vantage point as a respected Republican pollster and electoral analyst, Richard Wirthlin has conducted extensive research on the realignment issue. Though a prominent member of the political team which guided the 1980 and 1984 Reagan campaigns to their victories, Wirthlin has not argued that realignment has been achieved. He pointed out that with Reagan's wins the GOP made major gains in party identification – which took them from a weak second to near parity – and that a permanent shift in the political agenda in the direction of "less intrusive government" had been achieved.[2] These are facets of a realignment, Wirthlin argued, but not realignment in full form. As he saw it, "the final two stages of this 'rolling realignment' were not achieved. The Republican power base remained fractured at both the congressional and the state legislative levels."[3]

For Richard Wirthlin, then, realignment requires the unambiguous emergence of a new majority party – much like the Democrats in the New Deal era. In a sense, it's easy to understand why an experienced campaign strategist and presidential adviser would construe realignment this way. Political power is what matters most for the practical political strategist. If his party gains in party identification and sees the agenda moving its way, as reflected in presidential voting, but still remains in a distinct minority position in the national and state legislatures, it (and he) haven't succeeded in their goals. "Real" realignment hasn't been achieved. Interestingly enough, though, academic political scientists writing on realignment issues have adopted essentially this same standard. Three elements are central to the political science construction of the realignment model: certain elections are of special importance to partisan change; these critical elections occur in a rather precise frequency or periodicity; and with realignment, a decisive, unidirectional shift occurs in partisan control over the agencies of government as a new majority party appears at all levels and relegates its predecessor to the political wilderness.[4]

[2] Richard Wirthlin has written about this in many articles and reports since 1980. See, for example, his "Partisan Change in the 1980s: A Rolling Realignment," *The Public Perspective* 1 (November/December 1989): 13, 15; and two interviews in the same journal, "American Politics and Campaign '90" 1 (September/October 1990): 1; and with Geoffrey Garin "The Bush Presidency and the Political Parties After the Gulf War," 2 (May/June 1991): 6–10. Most recently, see *The Wirthlin Report*, November 1994.

[3] *The Wirthlin Report*, November 1994.

[4] For a review of the literature, see my essay, "Like Waiting for Godot: The Uselessness of Realignment for Understanding Change in Contemporary American Politics." This was first prepared as a paper presented at the 1989 meeting of the American Political Science Association in Atlanta. It was subsequently published in two different forums: *Polity* 22 (Spring 1990): 511–25; and in Byron E.

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My dissatisfaction with this understanding has been that focusing attention on one particular outcome – whether a new majority party results – blocks attention to other transformations of the party and elections system that may be of comparable sweep and consequence, which together produce a new party system distinctly different from its predecessors, even though no new majority party has appeared on the scene. This distinction is of more than minor relevance, because just such a development has occurred over the past twenty-five years. Even with the substantial Republican gains of November 1994, the party is still only at parity with its Democratic opponents in party identification, holds only a minority of state legislative seats, and has won a House of Representatives majority only three times in sixty-four years. Whatever happens in the future, the Republican party today does not hold claim to majority status as the Democratic party did in the New Deal era. What's more, given the relative weakness of voter ties to political parties and the continuing growth of independent voting, it's by no means certain that the United States will ever again have a majority party in the complete sense that the Republicans were a majority from the 1890s through the 1920s and the Democrats from the 1930s through the early 1960s.

Indeed, a central feature of the contemporary party system is the fact of weak voter ties to the institutional parties. The point isn't that the electorate has become in any sense unpredictable. Many Americans have clear ideas about government's role and the general state of the nation, which guide their electoral responses. Still, a very large majority of the electorate is today far from a "my party right or wrong" kind of stance. Party loyalties are, permanently, a lesser element in current politics than they were in previous eras reaching back to the age of Jackson.

All this is by now a very old story. In the first edition of *Transformations of the American Party System*, I described one of the primary elements of the emergent party system this way: "The electorate is far more weakly tied to political parties now than at any time in the past century, and as it has been freed from the 'anchor' of party loyalties it has become vastly more volatile."[5] The realignment that was played out one additional step in 1994 is shaped in significant part by the fact of this weakly aligned or "dealigned" electorate.

From the Industrial to the Post-Industrial Era

Since I began work on *American Political Parties* in the late 1960s, I've believed that the concept of *postindustrialism* is essential for understanding our era and

---

Shafer, ed., *The End of Realignment? Atrophy of a Concept and Death of a Phenomenon* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), chap. 2. I had discussed the literature earlier and at greater length in a convention paper: "Pursuing American Voters: V. O. Key, Jr. and a Modern Political Science Odyssey," delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, 9 November 1974.

[5] Everett Carll Ladd, *Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s* with Charles D. Hadley (New York: Norton, 1975).

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in particular for charting developments in the party system.[6] My best effort at a name for the new setting in that volume was "the technological society." Actually, Daniel Bell, the social theorist who has given the term currency, had used *postindustrialism* somewhat earlier. (Bell has noted that the term was used by sociologist David Riesman in a 1958 essay, though with a somewhat different meaning.)[7] In any case, Bell developed the concept of postindustrial society in a brilliant 1973 volume.[8] He contrasted the postindustrial period with its predecessor, writing that whereas "industrial society is the coordination of machines and men for the production of goods," postindustrial society is "organized around knowledge."[9] The key developments defining postindustrialism, Bell argued, are "the exponential growth and branching of science, the rise of a new intellectual technology, the creation of systematic research through R & D budgets, and . . . the codification of theoretical knowledge."[10] I have found Bell's analysis very useful, and I've applied elements of it in my assessments of the American political system, notably the party system, in a number of works over the years.[11]

The New Deal party system was a creature of the industrial era. Saying this isn't to claim that all of its features grew inevitably from industrial-era social

[6] Ladd, *American Political Parties: Social Change and Political Response* (New York: Norton, 1970). I was reminded of just how long I have been occupied with this question (and inclined to a particular approach) when I looked at the cover of my copy from the first printing: The price is $3.95.

[7] David Riesman, "Leisure and Work in Postindustrial Society" in Riesman, *Mass Leisure* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958).

[8] Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Postindustrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[9] Ibid., 20.

[10] Ibid., 44.

[11] Ladd, *Transformations: Where Have All the Voters Gone?: The Fracturing of America's Political Parties* (New York: Norton, 1978, rev. ed. 1982); Ladd, "The Shifting Party Coalitions: 1932–1976" in S. M. Lipset, ed., *Emerging Coalitions in American Politics* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978), 81–102; "The New Lines Drawn: Class Ideology in America," *Public Opinion* 1 (July/August 1978): 48–53; "Class Ideology, Part II," *Public Opinion* 4 (September/October 1978): 14–20; "The American Party System Today" in S. M. Lipset, ed., *The Third Century: America as a Post Industrial Society* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), 153–182; "The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Election," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (Spring 1981): 1–25; "The Shifting Party Coalitions from the 1930s to the 1970s" in S. M. Lipset, ed., *Party Coalitions in the 1980s* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1981); "Politics in the 1980s: An Electorate at Odds with Itself," *Public Opinion* 6 (December/January 1983): 2–6; "The Reagan Phenomenon and Public Attitudes Towards Government" in Lester M. Salamon and Michael S. Lund, eds., *The Reagan Presidency and the Governing of America* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1984); "On Mandates, Realignments, and the 1984 Presidential Election," *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Spring 1984): 1–25; "Party Reform and the Public Interest" in A. James Reichley, ed., *Elections American Style* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987); "The 1988 Election: Continuation of the Post-New Deal System," *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (Spring 1989): 1–18; "Like Waiting for Godot," *Polity* 23 (Spring 1990): 511–25; "The 1992 Vote for President Clinton: Another Brittle Mandate," *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (Spring 1993): 1–28; "Political Parties and Presidential Elections in the Postindustrial Era" in Harvey Shantz, ed., *Presidential Elections throughout the Years* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995); "We'll Have More Perots and Religion-based Politics," *Cosmos Journal* 4 (April 1994); "On the Argument for Parties Strong and 'Great': A Dissent" in John K. White and John C. Green, eds., *The Politics of Ideas* (Forthcoming, 1995).

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structure. In the first place, of course, industrialism developed in the context of American history, institutions, ideology, and the like. It wasn't a denatured social setting, but rather one that expressed itself concretely in the life of the country. Similarly, noting the importance of industrialism for political change in the United States doesn't deny the influence of other factors—including the role of political leadership. Franklin Roosevelt really was president from March 1933 to April 1945, and he and his administration did many things that were in no sense determined by the social structural setting.

Nonetheless, the New Deal was designed to confront problems that were distinctly part of the industrial era, and it chose approaches that struck responsive cords in the population of that day. The interest groups that came together included some whose entry into the Democratic fold long pre-dated the Depression. For example, the South, which was a key part of the New Deal majority, became solidly Democratic as a result of the Civil War. But the majority assembled under FDR's leadership was in many ways a distinctively industrial-era majority—marked by the prominent place accorded big-city interests and party organizations and by the cementing of the allegiance to the Democratic party of a growing labor movement.

What's even more important, the industrial era shaped the substance of the policy debate. Central among those influences on public policy was the fact that industrialization brought with it vast concentrations of power and activity in large enterprises. This was dramatically evident in the business sphere, where the factory system had transformed work life and, in turn, generated demand for a like development in labor unions. The field of communications evinced clear parallels, including in the American experience a single dominant telephone company and, later, the Big Three networks' ascendancy in broadcasting.

In such an environment, enlargement of the authority and reach of the national government was widely thought—not just by New Deal Democrats—to be appropriately countervailing. There was argument, to be sure, between the major parties over how much government there should be, doing which things. Throughout the long New Deal era, the Democrats were the more committed of the two major parties to new national government programs. Still, Republicans were often a me-too party as governmental expansion took place, something nowhere more fully seen than in Great Society programs. The Great Society originated in Lyndon Johnson's administration, but Richard Nixon's first term saw many extensions of the approach. The Environmental Protection Agency had its birth during Nixon's presidency, for example, with Nixon's strong support; and a major increase in federal environmental regulation ensued. Nixon remarked early in 1971 that "Now I am Keynesian"—referring to the great British economist's thinking about government's role in macroeconomic management and endorsing far more activist government than any Republican president had contemplated previously.

In an age of centralization and concentration brought on by the mature industrial order, the idea of expanded government had broad appeal and legitimacy. In 1909, Herbert Croly had written *The Promise of American Life*, a brilliant

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and far-reaching essay on the American political system.[12] Croly argued that at different stages in its history, the United States confronted different sorts of challenges, requiring different responses. Though a leading Progressive—a movement not particularly friendly to the record of the Federalist party—Croly believed that great credit accrued to the Federalists in America's first epoch. They foresaw, he argued, that the promise of American life required a vigorous national government—and took the lead in devising and seeing the new Constitution through to completion. Then, in the years leading up to the Civil War, Croly saw the nation beset by tragic drift. He celebrated Abraham Lincoln's resolute leadership in finally resolving one large part (though by no means all) of the immense crisis. Slavery was not only a great wrong; it was, in Croly's view, a challenge to American nationality itself. America could not realize the promise stated in the Declaration of Independence, so long as it countenanced an institution that mocked those constitutive claims. Lincoln's "nationalizing" of the slavery issue—rather than leaving it to state's rights ("popular sovereignty" in the language of Stephen Douglas and other politicians who defended it)—rescued American nationality.

The industrial era, Croly observed from his perch in 1909, required new nationalizing impulses—a bold government nationalism. To "make the nation more a nation" in the face of challenges stemming from industrialism, major federal intervention was needed in economic management, regulation, and social welfare. Croly saw leaders in both parties failing to chart the new course. He credited one political figure, Theodore Roosevelt, however, with seeing the necessary future of national government responsibility. TR was not the perfect politician in this regard, Croly reasoned, and the Republican party left much to be desired; but thanks to Roosevelt, the Republicans had become the best hope for reform. It was, of course, another Roosevelt and another party that achieved Croly's vision in the 1930s.

I'm not arguing that the New Deal was a carbon copy of Progressivism; because it wasn't. Whether Croly, had he seen the New Deal come to fruition, would have been among its supporters can't be known. Many of his fellow Progressives objected to elements of the New Deal. Walter Lippmann, an early collaborator of Croly's in founding *The New Republic*, became a strong critic of FDR's approach. This having been acknowledged, I will argue that the fundamentals of the New Deal reflected the spirit of Herbert Croly's call in *The Promise of American Life.*

This doesn't mean that Croly would have seen the fundaments of the New Deal as determinative for all time. New eras breed new requirements. Croly of all people was sensitive to this, having chronicled the implications of era-change for American political development. The industrial era—the setting for Croly's book and for Franklin Roosevelt's administration—has by now long passed. The postindustrial America of 1994 is as decisively different in social structural re-

[12] Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1989, first published 1909).

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gards from industrial America of 1937, as the latter was from the predominantly agricultural America of 1867.

Dispersion and Decentralization

If the dominant impulses of industrialization were centralizing and government enhancing, those of the postindustrial years are the polar opposite. In the economic and technological spheres, dispersion and decentralization have proceeded apace. In this new setting, centering political power in national government bureaucracies has become increasingly anomalous.

The late twentieth century is seeing a quite extraordinary movement against monopolies (and their sisters, oligopolies). A recent issue of the *New York Times* chronicled yet another event in this progression, in a story under the headline, "Electric Utilities Brace for an End to Monopolies."[13] Soon, the account informed readers, consumers will be able to choose which electric utility they buy their power from—will be able in short to "shop" for it.

But, of course, all sorts of monopolies and oligopolies are coming under successful assault. Telephones are an obvious case. Until a few years ago, experts assumed that one monopoly would survive in the telephone business, even as AT&T's historic dominance of the local telephone market ended. However much competition there might be in other sectors of the phone business, people would have to have their homes and offices wired, wouldn't they, and it wouldn't make sense to have two companies wiring one town. Now, developments in cellular technology have brought competition to the level of local service.

Looking to business corporations today, we read much about corporate downsizing and the strains it entails for employees. We read less of the fact that downsizing reflects not only a global marketplace and its greater competitive pressures, but as well the end of the kind of exclusivity and dominance that certain big corporations had experienced. International Business Machines is a prime case here. IBM was never a monopoly, but for a time it so dominated the computer market as to give it extraordinary resources—which among other things sustained a management and employee structure that could not possibly be maintained in a truly competitive marketplace. When the continued unfolding of computer technology eroded IBM's mainframe dominance, this quasi-monopoly and its employment practices had to end.

In general, Fortune 500 firms have for many years been losing ground in their share of United States employment. Job growth, which has been impressive overall in the past fifteen years, continuing now into the Clinton administration, has occurred primarily through a vast expansion of small enterprises. Individual entrepreneurial activity has been flourishing—in part because many features of the postindustrial socioeconomic structure, including developments in computer technology, have encouraged it.

[13] *New York Times*, 8 August 1994.

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In the face of these changes across the social and economic realms, major political shifts were inevitable. The latter have proceeded in stages—centering in a vast transformation of public thinking on the role and place of government. Caught up as we are in this debate, and inevitably choosing sides in ongoing partisan arguments, we easily lose sight of the fact that pressures for decentralization and dispersion are occurring across society and are in no sense limited to the governmental sphere. There's a proper partisan argument over just what government should be doing. Nonetheless, thinking about government's role was bound to be substantially impacted.

The Debate Transformed

The transformation in thinking about government, which I see as social-structurally related to the move into postindustrialism, doesn't posit a certain partisan winner—though in the short-term it has evidently weakened the Democrats' position. Consider U.S. experience during rapid industrialization. For much of the era, Republicans gave leadership to industrial development to the extent that government was engaged. Writing in 1909, Herbert Croly saw the Republicans more likely than the Democrats to lead in the second stage of industrial-era policy reform. An astute observer of American politics, Samuel Beer, has posed a big "what if" question. Beer asked, what if Alfred E. Smith had won the election of 1928 and Herbert Hoover had been able to assume office in 1933 without being seen as the architect of the Great Depression?[14] One need not agree with all of Joan Hoff Wilson's argument in *Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive* to accept, as I do, her portrayal of the thirty-first president in terms starkly different from the imagery of Hoovervilles.[15]

In short, there was nothing inevitable in the social-structural realities of the industrial era requiring a Democratic majority, although centralizing, nationalizing, and government-enhancing tendencies were inevitable in this setting. The latter had manifested themselves in Republican thinking. Today, the question of the partisan custody of the next twenty-five years as a postindustrial society hasn't been fixed. Much of the playing field on which that competition will be fought is, however, well laid out. Both political parties will have to compete on it.

Thus far, the role-of-government argument has played itself out in certain stages—Proposition 13 and the early taxpayers' revolts, then the Reagan Revolution, on to the antigovernment mood of the 1990s and, last month, the GOP's big victories in congressional balloting and in state house contests. The magnitude of this change is at once exaggerated and trivialized by calling present thinking antigovernment. Americans evidently do not want to dismantle the modern state. It's nonsensical to claim that we are against government. It's equally silly, though, to say that our thinking about government has not changed substantially over

[14] Samuel H. Beer, "Liberalism and the National Idea," *The Public Interest* 5 (Fall 1966): 75.
[15] Joan Hoff Wilson, *Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive* (Boston: Little Brown, 1975).

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the last twenty years. Americans continue to want a lot of government. They will continue to want a lot. But they have shifted their views. I have tried to chronicle this evolution.[16]

While not turning against government, Americans have become more skeptical about its efficacy, less inclined to agree when a politician approaches them saying, in effect, "We have a terrible problem, and this new program is what's needed." The new mood of doubt or skepticism about extending the modern state is vastly different from what "antigovernment" connotes. It's also certainly the case that among the many things people want government to continue to do are those that benefit them directly. In a recent interview, John Brennan of the *Los Angeles Times* reminds us, for example, that large segments of the middle class are in no sense eager to see their "middle-class entitlements" gutted.[17]

This acknowledged, more government is a vastly harder sell now than it was from the Depression through the Great Society. The health care debate evinced important elements of the shift. It began centering on one question: Do we have major problems, especially involving escalating costs and, relatedly, coverage? The public's emphatic answer was and is yes. In the later stages, though, the debate focused on a different question: Do you favor extended governmental management of the health care system? Here, the answer was no. The Democrats won the debate when it focused on the first question and lost when it shifted to the second.

Surveys recorded the sharp shift in public opinion as the debate moved from its first to second stage. In January 1994, according to work done by Yankelovich Partners for *Time* and CNN, "President Clinton's health-care reform plan" was supported by a margin of roughly 5 to 3. By the early spring, however, supporters and opponents were evenly divided, and by July, opponents outnumbered supporters by 12 to 15 percentage points.[18] The same configuration of public thinking

[16] See Ladd with S. M. Lipset, "Public Opinion and Public Policy: Trends and the Likely Climate for the 1980s" in P. Duignan and A. Rabushka, eds., *The United States in the World of the 1980s* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1980). See following by Ladd: "Politics in the 1980s: An Electorate at Odds with Itself," *Public Opinion* 5 (December/January 1983); "The Reagan Phenomenon and Public Attitudes Towards Government" in Salamon and Lund, eds., *The Reagan Presidency and the Governing of America*; "Tax Attitudes," *Public Opinion* 8 (February/March 1985): 8–10; "Attitudes Toward Government: What the Public Says," with Karlyn H. Keene, *Government Executive* (January 1988): 11–16; "Public Attitudes on the U.S. Military: A Case Study in Continuity," with Karlyn H. Keene, *Government Executive* 20 (June 1989); "Public Opinion and The 'Congress Problem'," *The Public Interest* 100 (Summer 1990): 1–11.

[17] John Brennan, interviewed in Everett Ladd, ed., *America at the Polls, 1994* (Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1995), 80.

[18] Yankelovich Partners asked the question, "In general, do you favor or oppose President Clinton's health care reform plan?" on a very frequent basis from September 1993 through the summer of 1994. My colleagues and I at the Roper Center have reviewed these and other data bearing on public thinking during this past election year at great length in a recently published book on the 1994 elections. See *America at the Polls, 1994*, esp. chap. 3. See, too, *The Public Perspective* 5 (September/October 1994): 23–28, 109; 5 (July/August 1994): 94–95; 5 (May/June, 1994): 84–90; and 5 (March/April 1994): 74–76.

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was shown in the exit-poll findings as well. In a number of states surveyed by the network consortium, Voter News Service (VNS), only small proportions of voters said the U.S. health care system needed "a complete overhaul," while large majorities opted only for "some changes," and a fifth to a quarter of the electorate actually said the system "works well enough as is" (Figure 1).

The health care issue didn't occur in isolation. The response I have been describing, as debate proceeded on this question, paralleled that seen on other issues. The same concern about expanded government was evident in questions where respondents were asked whether they wanted government that would provide more services while costing more, or that would provide fewer services while costing less. The answers aren't to be taken as any literal verdict, only as a general assessment of the direction in which we should be headed. Throughout 1994, large majorities opted for the "does less/costs less" option. The public has been trending in this direction for well over a decade. The VNS exit poll picked up this same verdict in a number of states. Not surprisingly, "does less/costs less" voters went heavily for Republican candidates (Figure 2). The welfare issue showed the same patterns—low and decreasing confidence in government programs in the areas (Figure 2).

This same mind set is evident when the public is asked about governmental performance. Public assessments of Congress in the 1990s are the lowest in the half-century in which poll data are available.[19] But however the basic question, "Do you have confidence in the way government is handling things?" is asked, public concern has risen (see Figure 3).

THE "CONTRACT WITH AMERICA"

The impact of the House Republicans' "Contract with America" is tied into the question of public attitudes toward government and their role in the 1994 voting. Surveys have shown that most voters had little if any specific knowledge of "Contract" proposals. This does not mean, however, that they did not see the Republicans as more inclined than the Democrats to challenge the efficacy of governmental action. Seven of the ten planks in the contract deal directly with the role of government and call for reductions in national government activity. Did the idea of the contract strengthen public sentiment that the GOP was serious about doing something in this area—even though specific knowledge of the proposals was absent? I know of no survey data that are conclusive here, but that hardly disposes of the question. Survey data do show strong public support for virtually all the "limit government" contract ideas.[20]

[19] See Ladd, "Public Opinion and The 'Congress Problem'" and Ladd and Karlyn Bowman, "Public Opinion Toward Congress: A Historical Look" in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., *Congress, the Press, and the Public* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution/The American Enterprise Institute, 1994), 45–58.

[20] For data on this subject, see "Contract with America, a Gallup Poll Special Report," the Gallup Organization, December 1994. The report drew on Gallup surveys taken throughout 1994 but especially on a survey taken 28–29 November.

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FIGURE 1

Voters Said "No" On the Question of Health Care Overhaul

Question: How did you vote on Proposition 186, which establishes a singlepayer health care system?

California Respondents



■ Yes
□ No

How Respondents Voted

	California Governor (D)Brown	(R)Wilson
Yes	61%	35%
No	31	66

Question: Do you think the health care system in the United States: Works well enough as is, needs some changes, needs a complete overhaul?

■ No change ▩ Some change □ Overhaul

All Respondents

Nebraska



Pennsylvania



Washington



How Respondents Voted

	Nebraska Senate (D) Kerry	(R) Stoney	Pennsylvania Senate (D)Wofford	(R)Santorum	Washington Senate (D)Sims	(R)Gorton
No change	29%	71%	No 23%	73%	No 20%	80%
Some change	55	45	Some 45	50	Some 41	59
Overhaul	76	24	Overhaul 67	29	Overhaul 64	36

Source: State Exit Polls taken by Voter News Service (VNS), November 8, 1994.

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FIGURE 2

Major Doubts About Government Programs

More or Less Government?

Question: ...Would you rather have government provide more services but cost more in taxes, or government cost less in taxes but provide fewer services?

■ (a) Provide more and costs more ☐ (b) Provide less and costs less

All Respondents

Florida



New Jersey



Wisconsin



How Respondents Voted

	Florida Governor (D)Chiles	(R)Bush		New Jersey Senate (D)Lautenberg	(R)Haytaian		Wisconsin Governor (D)Chvala	(R)Thompson
(a) More	68%	32%	(a) More	74%	25%	(a) More	51%	47%
(b) Less	42	58	(b) Less	36	59	(b) Less	24	72

Source: State Exit Polls, taken by VNA, November 8, 1994.

Assessing Welfare Programs

Question: Do you agree or disagree..., **"It is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who can't take care of themselves?"**

■ agree ☐ disagree

1988



1990



1994



Source: Surveys by Princeton Survey Research Associates for the Times Mirror Center, latest that of July 12-27, 1994.

Question: ...Do you think the actions by the federal government in the last twenty years have made this situation (the opportunity for a poor person in this country to get ahead by working hard) better or worse?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for CNN/ *USA Today*, October 22-25, 1994.

Question: Do you think the current welfare system encourages poor people to find work or discourages them?



Source: Survey by Yankelovich Partners. for *Time*/ CNN, May 18-19, 1994.

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FIGURE 3

Public Confidence in Government, Especially the Federal Government, Was Very Low in 1994 . . . And Had Been Declining for Some Time

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?..."

The government is run for benefit of the few and the special interests, not the people.



Government is the problem, not the solution to our problems.



Source: Survey by the Tarrance Group & Mellman, Lazarus & Lake for *U.S. News and World Report*, October 21-23, 1994.

Question: Which comes closer to your view: Government should do more to solve national problems or **government is doing too many things** better left to businesses and individuals?"



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, October 29-November 1, 1994.

Question: How much of the time do you think you can trust the government to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?



Source: University of Michigan National Election Study (NES) for years 1958-1992; 1994 asking from the CBS/*New York Times* Poll, October 1994.

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TABLE 1

A Big Decrease in "Spending Enthusiasm" in the 1990s

Question: If you were making up the federal budget this year, would you increase spending for . . . decrease spending for . . . or keep spending the same for this?

	Increase %	Keep Same %	Decrease %
Environmental Protection			
December 1994	40	40	17
May 1990	71	24	3
Social Security			
December 1994	46	45	7
May 1990	63	32	3
Health Care			
December 1994	52	33	11
August 1990	74	6	18
Farm Subsidies*			
December 1994	27	36	29
May 1990	50	34	13
Military Defense			
December 1994	31	44	23
August 1990	23	31	43

* Stated as "Aid to farmers" in trends.

Source: Surveys by the Times Mirror Center for The People and The Press.

A few additional survey findings help round out this picture of public thinking on government. When Americans are asked whether they want more, less, or about the existing amount of spending for things they strongly favor—such as education and Social Security—they typically have said "spend more." It's against this backdrop that the answers to a December 1994 Times Mirror survey are so striking. Asked whether or not "if you were making up the federal budget this year," you would "increase or decrease spending on various programs and activities," respondents were vastly less inclined to say "spend more" than their counterparts had been in previous surveys (Table 1). Relatedly, I think, the public at election time was more inclined to call the Republican party's conservatism "about right" than previously and, in the same vein, less inclined to endorse the Democrats' liberalism (Table 2). In a survey done by Greenberg Research for the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) on election day and the day following, respondents gave conservatives a far higher "feeling thermometer" endorsement than they did liberals (Table 3).

Short-Term Factors

An American election is not, of course, simply the playing out of broad social-structure-related changes. Many strictly short-term factors influence the results. For one thing in 1994, Bill Clinton was having a rocky presidency. His approval ratings for the first two years of his administration were the lowest of any president

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TABLE 2

Conservatism Was "In" in 1994: Assessing the Republicans' Conservatism and the Democrats' Liberalism

Question: In general, do you think the political views of [the party] are too conservative, too liberal, or about right?

	Too Conservative %	Too Liberal %	About Right %
The Republican Party			
November 28–29, 1994	31	11	54
August 19–20, 1992	39	12	38
The Democratic Party			
November 28–29, 1994	13	50	32
August 19–20, 1992	8	37	46

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for CNN and *USA Today*.

over the same span since polling data became available. Gallup findings on Clinton's approval during 1994 (Figure 4) show that he never got out of the "high doldrums." His average approval—for 1994 alone, and for his presidency—is firmly ensconced in the 40s. Clinton's marks immediately before and after the 1994 vote were notably low—as CBS News/*New York Times* data shown in Table 4 attest. Perhaps the most telling survey commentary on the president's low popular standing around election time comes from a survey taken by Princeton Survey Research Associates for the Times Mirror Center on the People and the Press. The survey asked respondents whether they would "like to see other

TABLE 3

"Liberalism" Was Out of Favor at Election Time 1994

Question: . . . I'd like to rate your feelings toward some people and organizations, with one hundred meaning a "very warm, favorable" feeling; zero meaning a "very cold, unfavorable" feeling; and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from zero to one hundred, the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that person or organization.

	Average Thermometer Score	% "Warm"	% "Cool"
Conservatives (overall rating)	57	47	25
Rated by:			
Independents	55	43	25
Democrats	48	30	35
Republicans	68	68	15
Liberals (overall rating)	41	23	47
Rated by:			
Independents	44	25	44
Democrats	49	32	30
Republicans	30	11	67

Source: Survey by Greenberg Research for the Democratic Leadership Council, November 8–9, 1994.

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FIGURE 4

President Clinton's Approval Scores Languished in the Second Half of 1994



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for *USA Today* and CNN.

candidates challenge President Bill Clinton for the Democratic party's presidential nomination in 1996, or not." The question is surely premature, and it's unlikely a great many respondents had been thinking about it in these terms. Still, it's striking that 66 percent of Democratic respondents said they would like to see such a challenge, while only 30 percent said no. Precise comparative data for other presidents isn't available, but what we do have suggests that the response among Clinton's co-partisans is about as low as any president has gotten in the history of polling.

Clinton's relative unpopularity was evidently a factor in 1994. The Democrats' electoral fate would almost certainly have been more fortunate had their president

TABLE 4

The President's Standing Was Especially Low at Election Time

	12/94 %	*11/94* %	*10/94* %
Overall Clinton Approval:			
Approve	38	40	43
Disapprove	49	50	48
Handling Foreign Policy:			
Approve	36	42	49
Disapprove	50	44	40
Handling Economy:			
Approve	41	39	37
Disapprove	49	52	56

Source: Surveys by CBS News and the *New York Times*.

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been getting good marks. In part, to be sure, the low ratings were not for Clinton himself but involved his administration's approach to public policy—that is, Democratic policy. Nonetheless, other contributing elements to Clinton's low standing derive from things entirely apart from program substance—the so-called character dimension and the sense that he is indecisive and vacillating. The former factor hasn't been measured with precision, but my reading of poll data from the time Clinton became a major national candidate through to the present suggests that *Los Angeles Times* polling director John Brennan's estimate of a ten-percentage-point "character drag" in Clinton's standing is close to the mark.[21]

So, yes, definitely, "things could have been different in 1994," even given the basic unfolding of thinking on government. But short-term factors always shape elections. This doesn't stop us from seeing larger elements at play. We know that partisan developments of the New Deal era were not just products of Franklin Roosevelt's personal charm and skillful leadership. Public thinking about government and what it should do, which had been shifting over several decades, moved sharply following the Depression toward support for a broader federal role. Similarly, I believe, it has been shifting in our own time, though in a different direction. This underlies many of the electoral problems that the Democrats have been having—problems that came into focus first in presidential voting.

The Established View of Congressional Elections Wasn't Wrong

Political scientists and other analysts have explored why the Democratic party enjoyed such dominance in congressional balloting for so long. It's been noted, for example, that incumbents—of whom the Democrats have had more, thanks in part to such Republican calamities as Watergate—have in modern times enjoyed disproportionate advantages over their challengers in campaign resources. Nothing about the 1994 experience challenges this assessment. Michael Malbin, a leading expert on these matters, has examined 1994 campaign finance data and has shown that more challengers in 1994 had "enough" resources, although most were still outspent by incumbents.[22] Malbin has long argued that the goal in campaign finance should be sufficiency for credible challengers, not parity (Table 5). But the fact that there was more sufficiency in 1994 hardly challenges the interpretation that a campaign finance structure favoring incumbents—which has dominated modern congressional electioneering—has contributed much overall to modern results.

Aided by a variety of factors—including better funding for their challengers, wide-spread dissatisfaction with President Clinton, and a very skeptical mood about government—the Republicans did achieve a major gain in House seats in 1994, giving them their first majority in forty years. As Figure 5 shows, the

[21] John Brennan, interviewed in *America at the Polls, 1994*, 81.

[22] Michael J. Malbin, "1994 Vote: The Money Story," *America at the Polls, 1994*, 127–140.

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TABLE 5

Campaign Expenditures for Congressional Candidates, 1992–1994 (net dollars)

House	*1994*	*1992*
Incumbents		
Incumbent average	540,746	594,729
Democratic average	599,490	621,405
Republican average	455,527	553,774
Challengers		
Challenger average	225,503	167,891
Democratic average	169,121	146,732
Republican average	257,806	180,774
All Candidates		
Total expenditures	330,644,138	331,557,602
Average expenditure	420,132	409,836
Democratic average	468,731	463,863
Republican average	372,500	354,311

Source: These data were compiled from Federal Elections Commission reports for *America at the Polls, 1994*, 134.

1994 seat change was about of the same magnitude in the Republican direction as the 1974 shift (Watergate-induced) toward the Democrats had been. Both of these stand out in recent congressional experience, where seat change has been vastly lower than was the historic U.S. experience, a fact clearly shown in the figure.

Similarly, I have argued elsewhere that Americans are ambivalent about aspects of modern government. They are strongly critical of its performance, far more so than they used to be. At the same time, they want a lot of services. This ambivalence is clearly demonstrated in survey findings.[23] I have speculated that it has provided one important underlay of the long experience with divided government—the presidency of one party, Congress of the other. This division has manifested itself most of the time in a Republican presidency and a Democratic Congress, but surely the "cognitive Madisonian" assessment, if valid, need not work out that way. A Democratic presidency and a Republican Congress will do just fine, thank you. Analyst William Schneider quipped some years ago that the Republicans would not win control of Congress until they lost the presidency. It's a clever remark—and also one with substance.[24]

Americans have not resolved their ambivalence about the modern state. Data suggest that skepticism about governmental answers is greater now than at any point since the onset of the New Deal. This hardly means, though, that the tensions in sentiment about the state have been removed. Doubts on government's role and record coexist with high public expectations that large national problems be vigorously addressed. Americans will not be satisfied with the overall record

[23] See Ladd, "The 1988 Election," esp. 3–12.

[24] For a discussion of "cognitive Madisonianism," see ibid., 2–7.

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FIGURE 5

Election to Election Seat Change, U.S. House of Representatives, 1882–1994



as they see it in health care. They believe that much more needs to be done to curb crime. They continue to favor a strong national defense. They endorse free public education, and they want more done to improve its quality. In these and many other areas, they see large governmental responsibility. They are receptive to more nongovernmental answers, but remain insistent that there be answers. The public will continue to be cross-pulled, even while the underlying balance of sentiment has shifted in the postindustrial era.

A Very Fluid Electorate

I have discussed at length in the pages of this magazine another long-term feature of partisan change in the United States, whereby a growing section of the electorate has become relatively weakly tied to political parties and open to change in preference depending upon its reading of current performance.[25] But that fluidity with regard to party preferences and partisan assessment coexists with considerable structure and stability as to policy direction. Despite continuing ambivalence on role-of-government questions, the public has signaled a desire to rein in modern government in taxing, spending, and regulatory reach. The question of which party is best able to carry out the mandate, with all of its limits and complexity, remains open, with judgments varying from one election to the next. In 1994, the edge went decisively to the GOP. In a survey taken 28–29 November 1994, for example, Gallup found the Republicans preferred to the Democrats as the party best able to handle the area by 27 percentage points on taxes, 21 points on the economy, 23 points on crime, 21 points on the budget deficit, 5 points

[25] See my articles on the 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992 elections, which appear in the spring issue of the *Political Science Quarterly* in the year following each of these contests. These articles have been fully cited in note 11 above.

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on health care, 28 points on foreign affairs, 20 points on welfare reform, and 7 points on unemployment. The Democrat's only margin in this long list came on handling the environment, where they out-pointed the Republicans by 14.

But as encouraging as these numbers might appear to Republican leaders, they are in fact extremely soft and volatile. When Gallup asked respondents to assess party performance on these same dimensions just three months earlier, in a mid-August poll, the Republicans did much less well comparatively. On taxes, for example, their margin then was just 8 percentage points, and on handling the economy, just 6 points. The contemporary electorate issues its calls on policy direction without giving deep commitment to one party or the other. Whatever happens in the next few years, it's unlikely that this basic structural feature—an electorate relatively weakly tied to parties—will be greatly altered.

Continuity More Than Change

The Republicans' gaining control of the national legislature for the first time since 1954 is a big change. The aggressive efforts of House Republicans to reframe the national debate and transform their institution deserve the attention they're getting as I write in early January 1995. Nonetheless, the election results of 1994 display important continuities with the past—in many ways far more impressive than the differences.

Writing in the *PSQ* just after the 1992 elections, I observed that the key features of social group voting that had become common features of the political scene since the late 1960s continued in evidence in 1992, even though Bill Clinton regained the presidency for the Democrats. The South continued its long-term move from the Democratic camp, even though African-Americans, South as well as North, were overwhelmingly Democratic. Catholics, along with southern white Protestants a mainstay of earlier Democratic coalitions, continued in 1992 their long drift from decisive Democratic loyalties. Among white Americans, Republicans did far better among the "churched" part of the electorate than among the "unchurched."[26]

These and many other patterns continued in 1994. Once again, there was a large gender gap, with women more Democratic, men more Republican. Again, the relationship of education to the vote forms a U-curve—with the Democrats doing best among those with little formal education and among those with the most years of school. The VNS exit poll showed a particularly large gap between young (18–24, or 18–29) women and men (Table 6). The South continued its long move toward the GOP. In 1994, for the first time, a majority of House members elected from the South were Republicans. In 1952, only 8 percent of Republican House members were from states of the old Confederacy. By 1968 the number was up to 19 percent. Now following the 1994 voting, southern Republicans are 33 percent of the party's House total, making them the largest of

[26] Ladd, "The 1992 Vote for President Clinton," 3–13.

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TABLE 6

The Gender Factor: 1994 House Vote by Sex and Age

	% Voted Democratic		% Voted Republican	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
18–24	40	58	60	42
25–29	46	58	54	42
30–39	42	53	58	47
40–49	42	55	58	45
50–64	42	52	58	47
65+	46	53	54	47

the four regional blocs. The South still has a way to go in its gradual realignment. Democrats hold more than 1,100 of the region's 1800 state legislative seats—about 62 percent (Table 7). This is almost certainly an unsustainable margin, given the current partisan preferences of southerners.

Table 8 compares the 1994 congressional vote of various social groups, using data from both of the national exit polls—VNS, already cited, and a second one done by Mitofsky International for a newspaper consortium including the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. For the most part, the two polls yielded the same picture of group voting. Whites were 56 percent (Mitofsky) or 58 percent (VNS) for Republican House candidates, blacks just 11 percent and 8 percent in the two polls respectively. Both polls showed Hispanic voters roughly 40 percent Republican, Americans of Asian ancestry about 45 percent Republican. Both showed the same U-type curve involving education, with the Democrats doing best among those with the least formal education and among those with

TABLE 7

The Glacial Southern Realignment: The GOP Still Trails Badly in State Legislative Seats

States	Total Seats	No. of R 1994	No. of R (1992)	No. of D 1994	No. of D (1992)	1994 % of R	1994 % of D	Party Control of Senate R	Party Control of Senate D	Party Control of House R	Party Control of House D
VA	140	65 (1-I)	(59)	74	(89)	46	53		D		D
NC	170	92	(53)	78	(117)	54	56		D	R	
SC	170	79	(66)	87 (4-I)	(103)	46	51		D	R	
GA	236	85	(67)	149 (1-V) (1-U)	(169)	36	63		D		D
FL	160	78	(69)	82	(91)	49	51	R			D
TN	132	55	(50)	77	(82)	42	58		D		D
AL	140	43	(30)	97	(110)	31	69		D		D
MS	174	45	(40)	125 (2-I) (2-V)	(132)	26	72		D		D
AR	135	19	(15)	116	(119)	14	86		D		D
LA	144	23	(21)	119 (1-I) (1-V)	(122)	16	83		D		D
TX	181	75	(71)	106	(109)	41	59		D		D
Total South:	1,782	659	(541)	1,110	(1,243)	37	62	1 (R)	10 (D)	2 (R)	9 (D)

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TABLE 8

Voting for the U.S. House of Representatives 1994: The Exit Polls Compared

Actual National Vote: D = 45.5%; R = 52.5%

	1994 VNS		*1994 Mitofsky*			*1994 VNS*		*1994 Mitofsky*	
	D %	*R %*	*D %*	*R %*		*D %*	*R %*	*D %*	*R %*
By Gender					By Ideology				
Men	43	57	45	55	Liberal	82	18	83	17
Women	54	46	53	47	Moderate	58	42	58	42
By Race/Ethnicity					Conservative	20	80	21	79
Whites	42	58	44	56	By Clinton Job Approval				
Blacks	92	8	89	11	Approve	83	17	83	17
Hispanics	60	40	61	39	Disapprove	17	83	19	81
Asians	55	45	53	47	By Other Characteristics (from list where respondent checked if applicable)				
By Education									
Less than HS	60	40	61	39					
HS graduate	48	52	53	47					
Some college	42	58	47	53	Born again/Evangelical Christian			39	61
College graduate	45	55	43	57	Married			46	54
Post-graduate	58	42	53	47	Without health insurance			53	47
By Income					Support the NRA			32	68
Less than $15,000	63	37	57	43	Someone in household in a labor union			64	36
$15,000–$29,999	53	47	53	47	Parent of child under 18			46	54
$30,000–$49,999	46	54	51	49	Attend religious services once a week			44	56
$50,000–$74,999	46	54	44	56	Gay/lesbian/bisexual			66	34
$75,000–$99,999	41	59	45	55	Employed full time			48	52
$100,000+	37	63	41	59					
By Denomination									
Protestant	40	60	43	57					
Catholic	48	52	51	49					
Other Christian	50	50	49	51					
Jewish	78	22	69	31	Currently employed	48	52		
None	63	37	58	42	Currently married	43	57		
By Age					Born-again Christian/ Fundamentalist	31	69		
18–29	51	49	55	45					
30–39	48	52	46	54	Someone in household belongs to a labor union	61	39		
40–49	49	51	47	53					
50–59	47	53*	50	50	Agree with Ross Perot on most issues	32	68		
60–69	—	—	48	52					
70+	49	50**	52	48	Frequently listen to political call-in shows on radio	36	64		
By Party ID									
Democrat	89	11	88	12	Of Hispanic descent	60	40		
Republican	8	92	9	91	Gay/lesbian/bisexual	73	27		
Independent	42	58	45	55	None of the above	62	38		

* In the VNS survey, the coded category was 50–64 years of age.

** In the VNS survey, the coded category was 65 years of age and older.

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TABLE 9

Trying to Track Religious Conservatives

White, Born-Again, Attends Church Weekly		*Considers Self of the Religious Right Political Movement*		*Considers Self a "Born-Again Christian/ Fundamentalist"*		*"Born-Again/ Evangelical Christian"*	
Yes	*House Vote 1994*	*Yes*	*House Vote 1994*	*Yes*	*House Vote 1994*	*Yes*	*House Vote 1994*
13%	80% R	19%	61% R	15%	69% R	27%	61% R
Mitofsky International November 8, 1994		Voter News Service November 8, 1994		Voter News Service November 8, 1994		Mitofsky International November 8, 1994	

the most. Both exit polls showed Catholic voters dividing their vote fairly evenly, but both found for the first time ever a majority of white Catholics backing Republicans in House elections. Both surveys showed independents breaking decisively in favor of Republican congressional candidates (Table 8).

Again in 1994 there was considerable discussion about the political impact of religious conservatives—sometimes discussed in political movement terms as the religious right. Table 9 shows that different efforts made by the two exit polls to locate the group, each using rather crude measures, came up with quite different proportions "belonging" to the group or movement. For example, VNS asked its exit poll respondents whether they considered themselves a "Born-Again Christian/Fundamentalist." Fifteen percent of the sample checked off "yes," and these respondents were 69 percent Republican in the congressional balloting. Using the same check-list approach, Mitofsky International defined the category as "Born-Again/Evangelical Christian" and found—not surprisingly, given any familiarity with the American religious scene—a much greater 27 percent locating themselves in the category. This larger group voted 61 percent Republican, according to the exit poll. What is clear from all the different survey measures is that the religiously participating section of the American population is more Republican than the rest of the electorate, and far more heavily Republican than the section which describes its religious preference as "none."

The United States is somewhere in the middle stages of a major political realignment, one precipitated in large part by the shift from an industrial to a postindustrial setting. Important features of the new party system are clearly defined. Party coalitions are drastically different from those of the New Deal years. Though not discussed here, party organization plays a far lesser role in the current system than in any of its predecessors, and the electronic media are a central instrumentality of the new politics. The Democratic party lost its once-clear majority status in the realignment's early stages. Whether any party will be able to claim firm majority status remains unclear, though we do know that voter ties to parties are weaker today than in times past and, almost certainly, permanently so.

It would take a foolhardy political scientist to predict future election outcomes. It would take an extremely myopic one not to see the vast partisan transformations that left the New Deal era distant history.

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

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The Democratic Deficit in America

ROBERT F. DURANT

Writing in the aftermath of America's Watergate scandal, Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki perceptively argued that "anomic democracy" threatened to sap the strength, vitality, and spirit of democratic governments worldwide.[1] In an era of profound social, economic, and technological change, consensus on fundamental principles was breaking down. What is more, citizens were perceiving their governments with disdain and hostility as either unable, unwilling, or untrustworthy to resolve conflict or to perform effectively. Concomitantly, politics was deteriorating into an arena for promoting and protecting narrow interests, rather than for fostering common purpose within nation states. In effect, anomic democracy was driven by four widespread, dysfunctional, and alarming perceptions: government was incompetent, unresponsive, out of control, and above the law.

As an embattled Clinton presidency passed midterm, as plummeting public approval ratings of Congress swept Republicans to power after a forty-year hiatus, and as radio talk-show personalities make a living pummeling government relentlessly, anomic democracy in the United States is, if anything, on the upsurge.[2] This article argues that a "democratic deficit" lies at the heart of this nation's disastrous slide into anomic democracy. Akin to the budget and trade deficits

[1] Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy* (New York: New York University Press, 1975).

[2] Robert A. Dahl, *The New American Political (Dis)Order* (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, University of California, 1994); Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, *Congress, the Press, and the Public* (Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute and The Brookings Institution, 1994); Hugh Heclo, "The Emerging Regime" in Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis, eds., *Remaking American Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 289–320. It is important to note that similar trends are rampant in other Western democracies.

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so widely recognized and lamented, the democratic deficit in America is arguably just as pernicious because it distorts policy discourse in ways undermining deliberative democracy itself. Wrought in the process is an "anorexic government" whose plight resembles metaphorically the classic fable of the ill tempered farmer and the arthritic nag: the "farmer loads more and more on the nag, the nag becomes weaker and weaker, the angry farmer beats and whips the nag, the battered nag becomes weaker still."[3]

To be sure, reasoned deliberation does occur in the U.S. political system, as congressional debate over entry into the Gulf War demonstrated most vividly. As Kathleen Jamieson observes, such debates are notable for focusing on "argument, statement, and proof" and for eschewing personal and unseemly attacks on the motives or integrity of opponents.[4] Neither do they parse distressingly into winner-take-all jeremiads, as arguments typically do when public discourse deteriorates into public spectacle. In legal terms, argument becomes more probative than prejudicial. Still, instances like the Gulf War debate are notable precisely because they are so rare, displaced in the public's mind by less ennobling images like the Clarence Thomas hearings, the striking increase in cloture votes to break filibusters in the Senate, and internecine bureaucratic warfare that handcuffs drug enforcement more readily than drug lords or drug dealers. The only thing worse, this article argues, is for citizens to fail to appreciate their own contributions to this dilemma.

After defining and examining the sources of the democratic deficit in America, this article illustrates the deficit's perverse consequences in one of this nation's most costly, complex, and controversial policy arenas. Chronicled is the democratic deficit's pernicious impact on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decisions about what constitute serious risks to public health, safety, and the environment. As a recent report by the influential Harvard Center for Risk Analysis suggests, risk policy in this country suffers from the "twin evils of paranoia and neglect."[5] The former "is evident in many policies which result in the expenditure of billions of dollars per year to control minute risks," while the latter is evident in "the concomitant failure to address genuine health and environmental threats, such as violence, worker exposures, and ozone depletion."[6] The article concludes by offering the intellectual foundations of a "tutelary democracy" capable of helping to attenuate the democratic deficit in America.

Whither Deliberative Democracy?

The democratic deficit in America comprises four interrelated and mutually reinforcing trends that show few signs of abating if left unattended. First, a policy-

[3] Jonathan Rauch, *Demosclerosis: The Silent Killer of American Government* (New York: Times Books, 1994), 149.

[4] Kathleen Jamieson, *Dirty Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 203.

[5] "Harvard Project Will Focus on Key Risk Management Reforms," *Risk Policy Report* 1:3, 18 November 1994, 9.

[6] Ibid.

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challenged, vocal, and increasingly impatient citizenry has become energized in America. That citizenry perceives government ineptitude—much more than problem complexity—as the source of its woes, a perspective rooted dysfunctionally in what James A. Morone terms the "democratic wish" in America.[7] Morone writes, the democratic wish is a yearning in the American psyche for citizens to "put aside their government and rule themselves directly."[8] Plebiscitary or direct democracy displaces republican or representative government, common sense and common men replace analysis and expertise, and political amateurs supplant professional politicians. Thus, it's not the complexity of public problems, the insatiable demands of citizens for government succor or protection, or principled disagreements over policy ends and means that plague our nation. Rather, it's a lack of common sense, a surfeit of fuzzy-headed thinkers and greedy special interests, and a paucity of integrity and courage in our leaders.

Importantly, this disgruntled and largely amorphous citizenry coexists with a host of equally vocal, passionately committed, and media-astute single-issue interest groups. They see government as a common pool resource ripe for raiding before others do. As a consequence, they strive less to clarify issues than to promote versions of the "truth" that advance their personal agendas in legislatures, public agencies, courtrooms, and the arena of public opinion. In the process, policy discourse too frequently takes on a polarizing, even demonizing tenor. Policy deliberation, in turn, succumbs to "demosclerosis," the transfer-seeking, subsidy-protecting, and competition-excluding "game" that so brazenly lessens the ability of our democratic institutions to be flexible, adaptive, and contemplative.[9]

Further stoking these demands for redress is a second trend that columnist Richard Harwood terms "commercially correct" news reporting. Put most succinctly, bad news attracts more readers and viewers than does good news. In turn, the more emotionally charged and negative the bad news is, the better for sales and advertising revenues. Thus, to gin up emotions, elements in the media ply with virtuosity what clinical psychologists term the "availability heuristic." That is, they bombard citizens with such messages, knowing that the more persistent the message and the more vivid the account of threatening or titillating events, the more likely a reader or viewer is to react emotionally to them. In the process, citizens overestimate the actual severity or frequency of the events reported, or the statistical likelihood of the venality or dangers these hold for them.[10]

Witness, for example, how the print and electronic media have shifted the frequency, substance, and tenor of their coverage of Congress over the past two decades. As summarized by Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, mounting

[7] James A. Morone, *The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American Government* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

[8] Ibid., 1.

[9] Rauch, *Demosclerosis*.

[10] A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, "Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," *Science* 185 (1974): 1124-1131; E. J. Johnson and A. Tversky, "Affect, Generalization, and the Perception of Risk," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 45 (1983): 20–31.

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empirical evidence suggests that "fewer stories on Congress are being written . . . [and that] those that survive are increasingly negative and driven by events, especially scandals, with very little focus on Congress as an institution."[11] More precisely, the media's coverage of Congress (the average number of stories per month) between 1986 and 1992 decreased to approximately one-third of what it was in the 1972–1978 period.[12]

Concomitantly, while the networks aired thirteen reports on policy issues for every one story focused on scandal between 1972 and 1978, the ratio dwindled to only three to one between 1986 and 1992. In turn, two of every three stories portrayed the issues less in terms of substance than in terms of conflicts among individuals or institutions. Meanwhile, nine of every ten judgments rendered by reporters about policy substance or processes were negative. As Stephen Hess argues so persuasively, the media's more jaundiced eye is attributable to a variety of market realities, including changing corporate ownership, pressures by new corporate owners to cut back news operations, the growing segmentation of news markets, the declining influence of news bureaus relative to corporate home offices, and the blurring of what "news" is with the advent of tabloid journalism.[13] Certainly, the sources of public opprobrium toward the Congress are multiple, complex, and interrelated. Yet, as Mann and Ornstein suggest, "it is hard to come away from [empirical studies on the topic] without believing that the media are making an independent, and destructive, contribution to the public disaffection with Congress."[14]

Exacerbating this media-related diminution of discernment even further is what Cynthia Crossen terms the "manufactured truths," which presently inform reporting and dominate public discourse.[15] This has occurred as public funding for research declined dramatically over the past decade-and-a-half. Using the latest research methodologies, sponsored studies with findings reflecting their sponsor's agendas are too facilely reported as objective science to unwary consumers. In the process, factoids get confused with facts, "affect" (or emotion) drives out "intellect" in evaluating news, and a confused public paradoxically presses further demands for redress upon a federal government it perceives as ineffectual.

Finally, as Kathleen Jamieson argues so cogently, television's multimodal (written, spoken, and music) capacity has created a "grammar of mood" that blocks out the more cognitive processes evoked by single modes of communication

[11] Mann and Ornstein, *Congress*, 5.

[12] Robert S. Lichter and Daniel R. Amundson, "Less News is Worse News: Television News Coverage of Congress, 1972–92" in Mann and Ornstein, eds., *Congress*.

[13] Stephen Hess, "The Decline and Fall of Congressional News" in Mann and Ornstein, eds., *Congress*. See also Neil Postman and Steven Powers, *How to Watch TV News* (New York: Penguin Books, 1992).

[14] Mann and Ornstein, *Congress*, 5.

[15] Cynthia Crossen, *Tainted Truth: The Manipulation of Fact in America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

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(radio and newspapers).[16] Indeed, research suggests that quick cuts, black and white, and stark contrasts can create "oppositional moods" in viewers. As Jamieson puts it, "television's multiple modes of communication and powerful ability to orient attention can invite strong, unthinking negative responses in low-involvement viewers."[17]

The third trend comprising the democratic deficit involves how these misplaced or contrived demands are embraced, abetted, and sometimes demagogued by risk-averse, resource-dependent, and media-conscious politicians. Each overwhelmingly sees scant rewards in a trusteeship model of public service geared toward leavening public understanding, policy discourse, and civic debate. More rewarding, many public officials conclude, is an instructed delegate model of representation. As such, they tend more toward communicating in soundbites in the media, toward jousting with each other in tit-for-tat episodes of micromanaging the bureaucracy, toward embracing simplistic Jacksonian bromides for reforms (for example, defunding and deskilling the career bureaucracy), and toward serving as ombudsmen for their constituents. In William Gormley's evocative prose, Congressmembers become "ferrets, fixers, and freelancers."[18] Meanwhile, the president's emissaries lose sight of the policy "forest" among the "trees" of procedural minutiae they issue,[19] while the courts misprescribe remedies for agency operations they do not understand.[20] Bred, in the process, are judicialized and balkanized decision processes within agencies that seek to guarantee decisions that can pass not only political, but also judicial scrutiny from an increasingly litigious polity.

When optimally applied in a deliberative democracy, the outer check of presidential, congressional, and judicial oversight of the bureaucracy attenuates Max Weber's concerns that politicians, agency clienteles, and citizens can too easily become dilettantes in the policy process. However, an overhead democracy bent solely on compliance accountability can become animated by polarizing, demonizing, and crusading rhetoric. Eschewing performance or capacity accountability, congressional or judicial oversight can deteriorate into meddlesome, priority-distorting, and administratively troublesome bouts of interference, agency malaise or defensiveness, and bureaucratic drift.[21]

Finally, much of the plebiscitary reform agenda proffered under these circumstances is premised on the nation's persistent quest for accountability through the administrative orthodoxy of hierarchy, rules and regulations, and departmentalization by function. If one doesn't like the way bureaucrats are exercising discretion, the solution for presidential, congressional, or judicial micromanagers

[16] Jamieson, *Dirty Politics*.

[17] Ibid., 50.

[18] William T. Gormley, *Taming the Bureaucracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

[19] Richard Pious, *The American Presidency* (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

[20] James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

[21] Paul C. Light, *Monitoring Government: Inspectors General and the Search for Accountability* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993).

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is more bureaucracy, more astutely applied, more penuriously funded, and more professionally understaffed. This plebiscitary agenda, predicated on control and government minimalism rather than accomplishment, produces two things. First, a fragmented and parochial organization develops wherein overly regulated subunits are pitted against each other in a zero-sum conflict over resources, jurisdiction, and influence. Second, a policy implementation structure arises that is too hollow in capacity to nurture either policy goals, public approbation, or a truly deliberative democracy.

Matters such as these should be on the minds of President Bill Clinton and the new Republican-controlled Congress as they interpret the 1994 mid-term election results. Early indications are that one of the lessons they are drawing is that voters want a radically downsized, restructured, and reengineered federal bureaucracy. It appears, however, that their early strategy for effecting these changes is merely to outdo in severity each others' retrenchment proposals in order to better position themselves with voters come the 1996 elections.

The danger in this strategy is not that cuts and reforms of this nature are necessarily bad, but that they may be done in ways that divorce agreed-upon national goals from the administrative capacity to achieve them. Put differently, considerations of policy and program effectiveness may get lost in a pell-mell rush to please voters who are simultaneously insisting on the effective delivery of the public goods, services, and opportunities that they continue to cherish. To disappoint those voters by enervating government's capacity to deliver on its responsibilities could be equally hazardous to politicians' careers, to deliberative democracy, and to the quest to reverse anomic democracy in America. What is more, to disempower public agencies without harnessing Congress's propensity to heap additional responsibilities on that "battered nag" in response to public demands for redress, succor, or privilege can only exacerbate that descent into anomic democracy in the long run. To see how and why this is true, one has only to examine how the democratic deficit has driven the politics of risk assessment at the Environmental Protection Agency.

The Farmer, the Nag, and "Good Science" at the EPA

While the democratic deficit sorely undermines deliberation in any number of policy arenas today, the plight of hazard identification and risk assessment research at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) offers an especially revealing glimpse of its consequences in one of this nation's most complex, vexing, and emotional policy arenas. Arguably, no wider gap exists today between lay citizens and experts in the United States than the profoundly different and often polarizing perspectives they exhibit on what constitute the most severe threats facing public health, safety, and the environment. And perhaps nowhere are the financial, ethical, and moral stakes of the democratic deficit so high, nor its resolution more challenging. Nonetheless, progress has been made in this policy arena that suggests how we might address the democratic deficit more generally.

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Science, "Toxic Populism," and Deliberative Democracy

For scientific epidemiology, "good science" (that is, objective or value-neutral science) involving traditional tests of statistical significance has to drive risk assessment and management. Moreover, even when statistically significant risk factors are identified, scientists are cautious about judging their import, reluctant about interpreting their meaning to the public, and wary about getting involved in the political process. Scientists know that statistics cannot definitively prove causation, but that definitive statements about cause-and-effect are precisely what citizens, politicians, and the media expect from them. Many are also reluctant to come forward because they are all too familiar with instances in which the media have garbled or distorted what scientists have said.[22] Finally, they know that epidemiological and animal studies are fraught with methodological uncertainties.[23]

Epidemiological studies use statistical tests of significance to calculate whether a population exposed to a particular pollutant exhibits a higher incidence of disease than one would expect by chance. Unfortunately, to be accurate, epidemiological studies require extremely large sample sizes. These are expensive and difficult to track over the years. Consequently, many studies informing policy debates (for example, about electromagnetic radiation fields) are based on relatively small samples that produce highly unstable or unreliable results. At the same time, the larger the sample size, the more likely that *something* will exhibit a statistically significant association. Recall bias is also a major problem, since different individuals are more or less likely to remember past behaviors or exposures. Finally, the "multiple comparison effect" causes problems. If an investigator makes enough statistical comparisons in a study, she or he is likely to find a significant association purely by chance.

Overall, however, perhaps the most serious drawback of epidemiological studies is that they lack the advantages of randomized laboratory experiments. Put simply, researchers cannot manipulate and control those factors suspected of causing disease. Consequently, scientists try to complement epidemiology with long-term bioassay studies of animals in laboratory experiments. From these, they first observe the physiological effects produced, and then they extrapolate their findings to humans by using statistical models.

Herein, of course, lies the rub. Animal studies are difficult to interpret when the substances tested are relatively nontoxic or must be administered in massive doses to observe effects. A question of relevancy is also involved, one that many scientists see as problematic but unavoidable. The animal exposure must be similar to common human exposures, and biological similarities must exist be-

[22] Harrison E. Schmitt, "Dissent" in Twentieth Century Fund, *Science in the Streets: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Communication of Scientific Risk* (New York: Priority Press, 1984), 17–20.

[23] Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bernstein, and Peter W. Huber, eds., *Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Laws* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994).

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tween animals and humans. What is more, the natures of the effects measured often vary across different types of cancer, animals, and parts of animal anatomies.[24] Thus, unless both animal *and* epidemiological studies show a statistically significant association between a pollutant and disease, scientists are loath to conclude that a problem exists.

In contrast, local toxic waste activist groups doubt that "good science" is possible, place more credence on lay experiential knowledge of pollutants and health effects surrounding sites, and readily hypothesize a causal connection from these.[25] Fundamentally, they distrust "normal science" as elitist, as uninterested in environmental health effects, as unwilling to legitimate disease clusters identified by laypersons, and as slow to accept new ideas about toxic causality. They point, among other instances, to how even very small case clusters have correctly identified the cause of scrotal cancer among chimney sweeps, the dangers of occupational exposure to vinyl chloride, and the carcinogenicity of diethylstilbestrol (DES) to unborn fetuses.[26]

Similarly, toxic populists say that scientists focus inordinately on the effects of single agents rather than on the interactive (or synergistic) and cumulative effects of multiple agents over time. At the same time, populists complain that the scientific community limits the study of risk to direct (or primary) effects on the present generation while deemphasizing the indirect risks and costs to that generation, as well as to future generations. Too, populists excoriate risk assessment as traditionally practiced for focusing on single rather than multiple pathways for agents to enter the body, and for too readily downplaying low-level exposure. As a consequence, while pathogens such as dioxin from incinerators directly enter the lungs, they also enter the body through bioaccumulation in food supplies. Yet risk assessments too often deemphasize the latter pathways.

Scientists counter that case clusters are useful only when the effect in question (for example, the existence of a particular type of cancer) is extremely rare or uncommon in the general population. What is more, difficulties in interpreting results mount when the size of the population at risk is unknown. If the at-risk population is larger than believed, the prevalence of the risk identified by the case cluster is exaggerated. Likewise, if the sex, age, income, personal habits, or genetic characteristics of the actual at-risk population are unknown, the findings might be overstating or understating prevalence due to an unusual demographic mix in the case cluster. And since at-risk populations are generally unknown, the results of case cluster analyses cannot be conclusive in most instances.

Meanwhile, EPA's own Science Policy Council—established by Administrator Carol Browner in 1994 as part of her "good science" initiative at the agency—

[24] Lester B. Lave, ed., *Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982); Foster, Bernstein, and Huber, *Phantom Risk*.

[25] Phil Brown, "When the Public Knows Better: Popular Epidemiology Challenges the System," *Environment* 35 (October 1993): 16–20, 32–41.

[26] Lave, *Quantitative Risk Assessment*.

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notes how woefully inadequate EPA's understanding is of human exposure levels. Tentative as well are EPA's knowledge concerning multiple exposures to the same chemical agent from multiple sources such as air and water or food, and the relative source contribution (RSC) of each of these pathways. Thus, to regulate on the bases desired by toxic populists would result in regulations that could not pass the inevitable judicial scrutiny they would occasion.

The plebiscitary dimensions of the "toxic populism" movement become most clear, however, when their tactics are examined.[27] Activists substitute "health significance" for statistical significance as their criteria for alarm and start with the scientifically unrebuttable presumption that harm exists until conclusively proven otherwise. They then rush pell-mell to the press to announce their findings and begin the drumbeat for alarm, redress, and compensation. Labeled the "victimage ritual" by populist activists, this tactic is designed to combat the sizeable financial and political advantages typically enjoyed by polluters fighting regulation. Specifically, toxic populists try to create a "tidal wave of frightening speculation" by "turn[ing polluters] into demons" and by "mak[ing] the . . . fight a matter of morality, not science."[28]

Circumvented too often in this rush toward "plebiscitary science" are the peer review processes so critical to verifying the methodological quality of research before presenting findings to wider audiences of laypersons. Instead, a kind of "advocacy review" takes place in the media as reporters try to "balance" their coverage by interviewing individuals with extreme positions on the issue. What is more, this review tends to take place within the *de rigueur* "crisis-emergency-resolution format" of contemporary journalism.[29] Within this soap opera-like plot structure, someone is in trouble, someone heroically intervenes, and public health and safety are restored.

The results of these disparate perspectives on risk are hardly surprising. By EPA's own estimates, there exists a fundamental mismatch between what its own professionals tend to perceive as most threatening to public health, safety, and the environment, and what the general public perceives as most dangerous. More precisely, of the public's five highest ranked risks, only one—exposure to worksite chemicals—is rated high by EPA experts. Industrial pollution of waterways, nuclear accident radiation, and radioactivity are either ranked low or not ranked at all by EPA scientists. What is more, while the public ranks hazardous waste sites as the most serious public health threat facing the nation, EPA staff give them only a medium-to-low ranking.

[27] Daniel Mazmanian and David Morell, "The Elusive Pursuit of Toxics Management," *The Public Interest* 90 (Winter 1988): 81–98.

[28] Michael D'Antonio, *Atomic Harvest: Hanford and the Lethal Toll of America's Nuclear Arsenal* (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1993). D'Antonio looks sympathetically on these techniques and cites an incompletely cited academic research paper by Michael Blain, "Rhetorical Practice in an Anti-Nuclear Weapons Campaign," as the source of the term "victimage ritual."

[29] Paul S. Weaver, *News and the Culture of Lying* (New York: The Free Press, 1994).

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Citizen rankings, most psychologists now conclude, reflect less the actual scientific or numerical risk of harm than they do citizens' perceptions of how dreaded the risk is, how unknowable the sources are, and how involuntary the exposure can be.[30] This mismatch in perception, however, is more than a curiosity. As former EPA Administrator William Reilly argues, serious distortions in priorities and funding result. More precisely, citizen rather than expert perceptions of *mutually* defined problems guide EPA priorities and agendas. This reflects the tendency for the media to focus on threats (real or imagined) and for elected and appointed officials to translate these fears into agency priorities. As a former official in EPA's then Office of Policy Analysis quips sardonically, the "agency's budgets and priorities have been shaped more by 'what the last phone call from Capitol Hill or the last public opinion poll had to say' than by scientific assessment of risk."[31] Adds Stephen Breyer, "public rankings, politics, history, or even chance" are more accurate predictors of agency spending than are experts' rankings of risks.[32]

Equally unsurprising, but no less dysfunctional to policy deliberation, have been the retaliatory tactics that plebiscitary science has stirred among opponents of aggressive regulation. Some use greenwash – the promotion of absurd environmental claims by polluting industries – to distort policy deliberation, to dismiss as "emotionalism" the legitimate concerns of laypersons fearing dreaded events from uncontrollable dangers, and to discredit environmental concerns as countercultural monkey wrenching of the capitalist system. In doing so, they try to marginalize all environmental arguments by cynically touting either extremist views or regulatory snafus as typical of the movement's agenda and prescriptions. Others seek paralysis by analysis. They promote legislation requiring EPA to perform a series of cost/benefit or risk analyses before issuing regulations, but refuse to adequately fund these resource-intensive enterprises.

Still others in the Wise-Use movement want to cripple enforcement by stressing individual rights over civic obligations. They argue that EPA must compensate landowners for the economic losses they sustain when regulations limit economic development beyond a minimal extent on their properties. Wise-Users count on the potential of these costs to have a chilling effect on the regulatory zeal of governments at all levels of our Madisonian system. Lost in the media focus on these more shrill claims are those tendered by more moderate critics, including former Republican EPA Administrators William Ruckelshaus, Lee Thomas, and William Reilly.

They advocate risk analysis and management, external peer review of these studies, *and* adequate funding. What is more, these studies would be based on "plausibly conservative" assumptions rather than upon EPA's historical approach of "compounded conservatism." Here, EPA seeks to counter scientific uncertainty

[30] M. Granger Morgan, "Risk Analysis and Management," *Scientific American*, July 1993, 32–41.
[31] Leslie Roberts, "Counting on Science at EPA," *Science* 249 (1990): 616.
[32] Stephen Breyer, *Breaking the Vicious Circle* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

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by using risk determination formulas that multiply decidedly over-cautious and implausible worst case default assumptions together to produce risk assessments with inordinate margins of safety. Finally, to protect against "compounded conservatism," these critics advocate a much more "transparent" risk assessment and management process.

Among other things, EPA would report risks as ranges of upper- and lower-bound estimates of danger, rather than as a single-risk factor communicated at the worst-case or 95th percentile upper-bound estimate. The agency would also provide more data to support the default assumptions that it uses in assessing and managing risks. Armed with this information, elected officials and the public would be able to discern, compare, and attack risks in more fully informed ways than EPA's opaque process has historically allowed.

Given the opportunity costs involved in environmental regulation, these kinds of disagreements are hardly academic. If events proceed as planned, the United States is embarking on a thirty-year commitment to spend anywhere from $350 to $750 billion to clean up pollution at public and private facilities covered under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, or more popularly, Superfund). More broadly, experts project that the direct annualized costs of meeting all existing regulations under present EPA, state and local government, and private pollution control programs will total 2.83 percent of GNP by the year 2000. Yet, by various calculations, the total effect of EPA's present regulatory programs is to reduce the number of deaths from carcinogens by only three-to-five percent.[33]

This is not to argue that such reductions are trivial or that reducing the number of cancer-related deaths is the only criterion for assessing regulatory success. It *is* to say, however, that better aligning spending with actual risks to health and safety could save even more lives or reduce people's non-life-threatening risks accordingly. As Breyer notes, the scientific literature indicates that significantly greater health, safety, and environmental benefits would accrue if regulatory resources were reallocated to such activities as encouraging changes in diet to avoid natural carcinogens, subsidizing the production of healthier foods, purchasing and installing smoke detectors, and paying for early cancer screenings.[34]

Unfortunately, the minuet of democratic illusion that has plagued "good science" at the EPA since its inception demonstrates how difficult such a reallocation of resources will be. Indeed, the tendency for public apprehension, polarizing debate, congressional action, and regulatory practices to reinforce each other and distort policy deliberation has driven presidential, congressional, and judicial responses to toxics regulation at EPA since the late 1970s. In the process, reports the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, risk reduction expenditures lack cost-effectiveness; low-income and minority populations are saddled disproportion-

[33] Michael Gough, "How Much Cancer Can EPA Regulate Away?" *Risk Analysis* 10 (1990): 1–6.
[34] Breyer, *Breaking the Vicious Circle*.

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ately with the risks and costs of risk reduction; the preoccupation with reducing politically salient risks ignores the substitution risks involved by shifting to other chemicals or pollution receiving bodies; and risk trade-offs and costs are shifted to financially strapped and mandate-mired states, localities, and private industries.

What is more, recent research suggests that these problems might be exacerbated should the Republican party's "Contract with America" be fulfilled in its call for devolving regulatory responsibilities to the states. According to a 1994 National Conference of State Legislatures survey of Midwestern legislators, science and risk issues rank last among the issues legislators deem important when enacting legislation. What is more, respondents were "consistently skeptical of the value of 'expert' knowledge, which they found both politically naive and fundamentally flawed by political or economic bias."[35] Moreover, should a Republican-led Congress fail to drastically revamp federal mandates as promised, comparative risk efforts may die aborning in the states, despite the increasing popularity of these techniques among state environmental managers. As Ohio EPA Deputy Director Kate Bartter points out, state priorities may differ from federal mandates, and states "might have a tough time reorienting [their] budgets toward those priorities if [they] already [are] required to spend money on certain federal programs."[36]

Science, Solons, and the Democratic Deficit at EPA

For the purposes of this article, the mismatch at EPA among statutory responsibilities, implementation resources, and good science began with a series of media-intensive focusing events occurring during 1977 and 1978. Most prominent were the Valley of the Drums scandal in Kentucky and the Love Canal incident in New York, both of which prompted intense public alarm over illegal hazardous waste dumping. Other incidents that further stoked public and congressional angst over the years included, but were not limited to, the dumping of Kepone into the James River in Virginia, the Times Beach dioxin scare in Missouri, and the illegal dumping of toxic wastes into a sewage treatment plant in Kentucky that resulted in tons of untreated raw sewage being dumped into the Ohio River.

Most significantly for the democratic deficit in America, the press routinely referred in incendiary ways to such incidents as "toxic time bombs," "toxic cocktails," "the house that glowed," and "colorless, odorless killers." Noticeably absent in their coverage as well were the opinions of scientists representing the general consensus of the risk assessment community. Whether consciously stoking the "availability heuristic" noted above, seeking "balance" by reporting extreme positions on the issues, or finding their efforts stymied by the reticence of mainstream

[35] "Midwest Study Finds Science Has Minimal Role in Passing Bills," *Risk Policy Report* 1:3, 18 November 1994, 15.

[36] "States: Federal Mandates May Thwart Comparative Risk Efforts," *Risk Policy Report* 1:3, 18 November 1994, 14.

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scientists, the media's approach only further aroused public fears. These fears were decidedly disproportionate to the scientific community's perceptions of the relative risks that sites of this kind more generally posed to public health, safety, and the environment. Produced, in the process, was a toxic populism that proselytized a naive zero-risk approach to regulation. As one former high-ranking EPA official puts it, "This [the toxics issue] was perceived [by EPA] as a huge political issue. . . . We were being pummeled in the press."[37]

The legislative result of this commercially correct journalism was unsurprising. Between 1979 and 1990, Congress enacted at least ten important new pieces of environmental legislation. Many of these were extensions of existing laws that added ambiguity, inconsistency, and complexity to EPA's responsibilities. Further fostering this complexity, the average length of an environmental statute grew during that time period from 50 to over 400 pages. Importantly, however, growth in EPA's institutional capacity lagged sorely behind its spiraling regulatory responsibilities. Measured in constant 1982 dollars, EPA's overall budget increased only 1.6 percent annually between 1979 and 1992. Presently, the agency claims that Congress has underfunded its core tasks and responsibilities by nearly 22 percent. Other respected observers say this figure is actually closer to 50 percent in several program areas.[38]

Simultaneously, congressional micromanagement of the agency has burgeoned over the years. Presently, 110 separate committees and subcommittees claim jurisdiction over parts of EPA's programs, an amount of oversight second only in the federal government to the number of committees overseeing the Defense Department (DOD). This occurs despite EPA's budget being only 3 percent of DOD's. Collectively, these congressional sovereigns had by 1993 earmarked 13 percent of EPA's budget for special or favored projects, thus reducing the agency's flexibility to reallocate resources to more pressing environmental problems. In fact, EPA's own Science Advisory Board (SAB) estimates that the agency allocates only 20 percent of its budget and staff to activities determining and addressing this nations' most serious health, safety, and environmental threats. In 1992, for example, EPA had virtually the same number of workforce hours dedicated to research that it had in 1982, despite now having to make much more complicated scientific decisions than those involved a decade earlier.

As EPA's first deputy assistant for administration, Howard Messner, suggests, EPA is now forced to make decisions predicated upon "science at the margins of our knowledge." Adds former EPA Administrator Lee Thomas, the agency's research resources are stretched so thin that it can only react to Congress's perception of risk rather than identify risk on its own using "good science."[39]

[37] Joel A. Mintz, "Agencies, Congress, and Regulatory Enforcement: A Review of EPA's Hazardous Waste Enforcement Effort, 1970–1987," *Environmental Law* 18 (Summer 1988): 683–759.

[38] Center for Resource Economics, *1993 Annual Review of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: Program Evaluation, Budget Analysis, and Funding* (Washington, DC: Center for Resource Economics, 1993).

[39] Leslie Kaufman, "Cabinet Fever," *Government Executive* 25 (July 1993): 32–35.

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Nor do the chances for improvement in this situation appear promising, even without considering the new House Republican leadership's disinclination to support environmental activism.

EPA's appropriating committees have been decidedly less forthcoming in funding the agency than have its authorizing committees been aggressive in adding to its regulatory responsibilities. What is more, EPA cabinet elevation bills do not include proposals by luminaries such as William Reilly to move the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) formidable scientific component into a Department of the Environment. Many in the business community feel that the more research capacity EPA has, the more problems it will find to regulate. Meanwhile, many environmentalists fear that the more research capacity EPA has, and the more the agency uses risk analyses to inform its decision making, the more likely its opponents will seize upon scientific uncertainties to justify regulatory restraint. Finally, while the Risk Assessment Improvement Act of 1994 enjoyed widespread support among environmentalists and industry for its general provisions, the bill stalled in the 103rd Congress. Environmentalists feared that its provisions for judicial review of EPA's risk assessment decisions would afford too many opportunities for industry to thwart regulatory action.[40]

Clearly, the new Republican leadership in the House will push for passage of this and related risk assessment bills in the next Congress. However, passage of any version remains in doubt, and all versions fail to provide adequate resources. Thus, to the extent that passage of bills of this nature makes risk assessment assumptions and trade-offs more explicit—and thus, more transparent—to the public and its elected representatives, deliberative democracy will benefit. However, to the extent that these bills penuriously fund risk assessment and management activities, the more paralysis by analysis will result.

Equally debilitating has been the pronounced risk-averse and reactive regulatory culture these events have quite understandably fostered at EPA. Consider the agency's approach to hazardous waste cleanups. During both the Bush and Clinton administrations, EPA's Science Advisory Board criticized the agency's emphasis on Superfund and RCRA corrective action activities as distinctly disproportionate to the actual risk they tend to pose to public health, safety, and the environment. Others, including the Office of Technology Assessment, argued that EPA criteria for cleanup were too stringent. More precisely, they were based on much too conservative assumptions about future land use, the need for permanent remedies, exposure levels, simplistic linear dose-response extrapolations, and unrealistic exposure levels.

Finally, EPA's deliberative capacities have suffered immensely from the pathologies occasioned by bureaucratic fragmentation and turf wars in the wake of stagnant funding for research. Since 1980, EPA's research budget—excluding funding for construction grants—has plummeted from 20 percent to 7 percent

[40] "Risk Legislation Snags on Legal Accountability for EPA," *Inside EPA*, 8 July 1994, 4.

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of the agency's total budget.[41] Moreover, while President Clinton's FY95 budget requested a $37.9 million increase in funding, a significant portion of that request was dedicated to developing environmental technology rather than to regulatory or basic research.

Research funding shortfalls would be bad enough were it not that the agency's SAB has recently argued that EPA poorly manages what resources it does have. Most debilitating to this effort is the agency's classic application of the administrative orthodoxy to its operations. Using terms such as "dysfunctional" and "approaching a crisis level," the SAB averred that the agency's focus was on "bean-counting administration rather than mission-achieving management." Too, its "vertical management tracking of projects and human and financial resources [made accountability] nearly impossible," and its data collection mechanisms were so inconsistent among its units (and programs) that they "def[ied] rational analysis."[42] Finally, an integrating unit did not exist in EPA that focused on risk assessment. Such a unit, the SAB argued, would "force the agency into inter-laboratory, multidisciplinary collaboration," and thus move it away from the "discipline-oriented fiefdoms" that have characterized EPA's research effort.

At the same time the SAB has noted how "the steady long-term erosion of [EPA's] research capabilities" (in terms of both full-time equivalent positions and dollars) has wrought internal conflict between EPA's Office of Research and Development (ORD) and several of EPA's program offices.[43] With these units pitted against each other in a widely perceived zero-sum competition for shrinking resources, turf warfare spiraled. So, too, did the number of regulatory decisions challenged in court by polluters or environmentalists. This, in turn, further fueled concerns within the agency that EPA rules and enforcement could not pass judicial scrutiny unless resources were shifted from basic (or strategic) research to research supporting regulatory actions. However, others in the agency feared that basic research addressing more threatening, yet less politically salient risks would be lost in the process.

According to EPA senior science advisers in the media programs, a dramatic decline had ensued since FY92 in the percentage of ORD's "extramural" budget dedicated to regulatory science. This budget funds private contractors and university researchers for studies informing EPA's regulatory mission. Critics claimed that EPA's focus on such basic research initiatives as the Environmental Mapping and Assessment Program (EMAP) and the Global Change Mitigation Program had garnered too large a share of the agency's shrinking resources. To support this argument, the advisers noted that the share of extramural research funding for regulatory support had fallen from 62 percent in FY92, to 59 percent in

[41] "EPA Science Board Highlights Plight of Agency Research Program," *Inside EPA*, 13 May 1994, 11–12.

[42] "EPA Science Advisory Board Says Agency Science Effort Near 'Crisis'," *Inside EPA*, 17 June 1994, 1, 13–14.

[43] Ibid., 13.

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FY93, to an estimated 51 percent in FY94. What is more, the trend would continue under President Clinton's FY95 budget, with funding falling dramatically to 43 percent.[44]

Challenging these computations, ORD scientists, other EPA officials, and the SAB pointed out that significantly less than 50 percent of the average ORD scientists' time was spent on basic as opposed to regulatory research. To help remedy this, the SAB recommended that EPA earmark only 30 percent of its extramural funding for regulatory research, to which opponents wanting more regulatory science replied that the SAB had premised that recommendation on an unrealistic doubling of EPA's research budget. As one EPA official put it, "You don't get too many complaints about inadequacies in the EMAP, but we get our pants sued off and our reputations damaged when we write regulations that are not backed up by good science."[45] Added another, "ORD has already skimmed so many resources off the top you can't get much [regulatory science] done in a timely manner."[46]

One need only look to the remedies proffered by the protagonists to see the high stakes game of bureaucratic politics spawned by this situation. For those promoting regulatory science, the object was to increase the role of program offices in research decisions, with some advocating the creation of separate research divisions in each program. This, of course, would diminish ORD's influence. In contrast, the SAB argued for a centralized organizational unit capable of affording an integrated research focus (both strategic and regulatory) in Washington and in EPA's research laboratories. This, of course, aroused fears in the programs and in some EPA regional offices that their influence would wane even further, while Washington's and the ORD's soared. Organization by function rather than critical work process atomized the program and sorely complicated accomplishment, but enhanced control over it.

Most recently, an EPA subcommittee of the agency's R&D steering committee has recommended a 50-50 funding split between regulatory development and strategic research.[47] Too, Administrator Browner has favorably received a plan for massively restructuring the agency's laboratories into four megalabs designed to streamline and facilitate risk-based ecological and human health decision-making at EPA.[48] Some at the agency have also suggested that EPA's streamlining plan submitted in response to Vice President Al Gore's Reinventing Government initiative will better coordinate research activities within the organization. The wisdom or success of these efforts aside, the crucial point for our purposes is

[44] "Shrinking Research Budget for Rule Support Irks EPA Program Staff," *Inside EPA*, 11 February 1994, 10.

[45] Ibid., 11.

[46] Ibid.

[47] "EPA Panel May Propose ORD Management Changes in Response to Lab Study," *Inside EPA*, 24 June 1994, 16.

[48] "Browner Receives Plans for Implementing 'Megalab' Reorganization," *Risk Policy Report* 1:3, 18 November 1994, 14.

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this: EPA's and the Congress's historical embrace of the administrative orthodoxy as a mechanism for accountability has soured both deliberation and accomplishment.

Clearly, more bureaucracy, more astutely applied, and more penuriously funded has worked to no one's advantage—regardless of views about popular versus scientific epidemiology, about EPA's conservative assumptions, or about the agency's regulatory zeal. To the chagrin of industry, an EPA lacking good science becomes more rather than less conservative in its risk assumptions. To the chagrin of environmentalists, an EPA lacking good science takes longer to make decisions, and it finds those that it does make the subject of lawsuits by polluters. And to the chagrin of citizens worried about the integrity and impartiality of the decisions the agency renders, a resource-strapped EPA has to let industries police themselves to an uncomfortable degree. EPA, for example, presently lacks sufficient staff to determine regularly if tests submitted by these companies meet the agency's specifications of validity.

Toward a Tutelary Democracy?

EPA's dilemma is but the tip of the iceberg in American politics today. For example, a spate of compelling nonsponsored research is now chronicling how so-called tainted truths[49] are driving policy debates over the budget deficit, welfare reform, gender equity, spousal abuse, and crime.[50] Given the realpolitik of American politics, seasoned observers might look at this phenomenon and ask, "What else is new?" After all, haven't partisans always distorted and polarized policy debates to advance their causes? Hasn't an untutored public with fleeting attention spans always passively accepted and been manipulated by such shenanigans? Haven't the purveyors of this mischief typically been rewarded at the polls, in legislative victories, and in program budgets? And despite all this, doesn't the Republic still stand, don't problems get addressed, and haven't many facets of our lives improved as a result?

Perhaps. However, serious students of and participants in policy making now suggest that the process has reached a nadir of tawdry ferocity, responsibility avoidance, and surreal symbolism seldom matched in our history.[51] Moreover, as Christine Sommers suggests, the healthy skepticism that advocacy research has typically garnered from political and media elites when sponsored by private

[49] Crossen, *Tainted Truth*.

[50] Christina Sommers, *Who Stole Feminism? How Women Have Betrayed Women* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); Richard Harwood, "The Good Stuff," *Washington Post*, 4 June 1994; Bradley B. Schiller, "The Myth of the Working Poor," *Washington Post*, 26 June 1994; Richard Morin, "Race, Marriage, and Crime," *Washington Post*, 10 July 1994.

[51] E. J. Dionne, *Why Americans Hate Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991); David S. Broder, "War on Cynicism," *Washington Post*, 6 July 1994; Lichter and Amundson, "Less News is Worse News"; Mark J. Rozell, "Press Coverage of Congress, 1946–92" in Mann and Ornstein, eds., *Congress*, 59–129.

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industry is conspicuously diminished when public interest groups sponsor them.[52] Finally and most normatively important in a democracy, such a Leibnitzian view of the world is cynical and elitist.

Not only does anomic democracy have identifiable causes, but recent exercises in fostering deliberative democracy, in debureaucratizing government, and in enhancing both the self-policing and external scrutiny of political advertising and the media (for example, the work of Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting) suggest that many of these are distinctly amenable to change. As a nation, however, we must become passionate in our assault on those incentives, actors, and institutions who—intentionally or unintentionally—debase our public discourse. There *are* better and worse ways to frame and debate issues in a democracy. When institutions—the Congress, the White House, the press, corporations, public interest groups, or public agencies—intentionally distort that debate, they deserve our opprobrium.

Ultimately, America's distressing descent into anomic democracy can only be reversed by altering the perverse incentives within the system that prompt public officials to behave in ways that collectively reduce deliberative democracy. And most of these incentives originate in perceptions by political and economic elites of what citizens will reward or punish electorally or in the marketplace. Thus, the Archimedean point of leverage for redressing the democratic deficit lies in better informing the expectations that citizens hold and convey to their elected officials and to profit seekers in the private sector. In turn, such a sea change in expectations can come only when power speaks the truth to its citizenry, a development indicative of what this article terms a tutelary democracy.

As John Ralston Saul writes, the primary tool for estranging citizens in our anomic democracy is the propensity of politicians, interest groups, and technocrats to "castrate the public imagination by subjecting language to a complexity which renders it private" and exclusionary.[53] Demystifying that complexity to empower citizens is the primary goal of a tutelary democracy. Importantly, such a democracy does not take as its intellectual or political project the inculcation of particular beliefs or values in its citizens. Nor is it preoccupied with radically transforming apolitical or disinterested citizens into political junkies, policy mavens, or exemplars of civic virtue. To the contrary, a tutelary democracy insists that "living apolitically is a basic human right."[54] Rather, it seeks to advance a policy discourse that stresses the dialogue, rather than the discussion, elements of public deliberation.[55]

[52] Sommers, *Who Stole Feminism*.

[53] John Ralston Saul, *Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 9.

[54] Peter L. Berger, "Between System and Horde: Personal Suggestions to Reluctant Activists" in Peter L. Berger and Richard J. Neuhaus, eds., *Movement and Revolution* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970), 16.

[55] Peter M Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990).

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According to communication theorists, discussion is that aspect of the deliberative process that emphasizes persuasion and thus frames policy debate in ways calculated to produce a given answer. In contrast, dialogue is probative. It emphasizes richer understandings of complex issues and thus seeks to generate new ways of thinking about problems and alternative ways of solving them.[56] To be sure, a truly deliberative democracy requires both dialogue and discussion. Presently, however, a pernicious and most debilitating imbalance exists in our polity, an imbalance strongly favoring persuasion—licit or illicit—over illumination. Finding ways to redress this imbalance is among this nation's most pressing needs.

Shedding light on how this might be done are such exercises in deliberative democracy as the Kettering Foundation's National Issues Forums and Great Britain's recent experiment with deliberative polling. Both have sought to reconcile the Athenian virtues of small-scale democracies with large-scale nation-states, but without the nondeliberative liabilities of contemporary proposals for direct democracy (referenda, public opinion polls, and teledemocracy). The Kettering Foundation has by all accounts enjoyed great success in affording citizen volunteers opportunities to deliberate on a variety of public policy issues.[57]

Similarly, in Great Britain nearly three hundred randomly selected individuals—representing a cross-sampling of the British electorate—met in Manchester, England for three days to study and deliberate about crime.[58] Predicated on James Fishkin's notion of "deliberative polling," the premise (as was Kettering's) was to gather people together, provide them with facts and experts to explain them in laypersons' terms, and then measure their attitudes before and after their deliberations.[59] Observers noted that participants grew increasingly engaged, struggled to come to grips with the opinions of others and the interpretations of the experts, and some opinions shifted. Indeed, the pre-test/post-test results indicated a fluidity of opinions. But as Fishkin notes, "it's not that people changed their minds from very set positions, as much as that those original positions were not that deeply held. . . . Much of the process was their coming to grips with the issues. . . ."[60]

As Daniel Yankelovich and John Immerwahr's extensive research on public opinion posits, participants in both these experiences were effectively moving to the "choice work" stage of what they term informational "engagement."[61] This

[56] Ibid.; Nancy C. Roberts and Robert T. Bradley, "Stakeholder Collaboration and Innovation: A Study of Public Policy Initiation at the State Level," *Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences* 27 (1991): 209–227; Saul, *Voltaire's Bastards*.

[57] Harwood Group, *Citizens and Policymakers in Community Forums: Observations from the National Issues Forums* (Dayton: The Harwood Group for the Kettering Foundation, 1990).

[58] Richard Morin, "Political Talk Therapy," *Washington Post*, 5 June 1994.

[59] James S. Fishkin, *Democracy and Deliberation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

[60] Morin, "Political Talk Therapy."

[61] Daniel Yankelovich and John Immerwahr, "The Rules of Public Engagement" in Daniel Yankelovich and I. M. Destler, eds., *Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), 43–77.

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occurs after first passing through four preliminary stages: being aware of a problem, acquiring a sense of urgency about it, providing a first response to the problem which is typically unstable and given to rapid fluctuation, and then resisting new proposals. Choice work then commences as citizens sort out choices, weigh pros and cons, and begin making explicit trade-offs. Importantly, this process involves two analytically distinct tasks that lead to greater ownership of the ultimate decision made: resolving value conflicts (the emotional or affective component) and weighing pros and cons (the cognitive or analytical task).

Yankelovich and Immerwahr offer two rules of engagement for the choice work stage. First, use the public's terms to frame discussion, not the lexicon of the experts. Second, use indirect and vicarious methods—as well as direct participation—to expand the impact of such efforts to the larger community. As an example, they note that surveys show that citizens perceived the Congress as seriously deliberating and searching for answers during the Gulf War debate in ways that were more probative than prejudicial. Interestingly, the greater the doubts and reservations admitted by Congress members during the debate, the more the public identified with and admired the deliberative exercise, and the more they identified with or supported the decision to go to war. Likewise, by crafting sufficient media attention in Great Britain, the larger viewing audience indirectly and vicariously participated in deliberation in meaningful ways. Importantly, similar dynamics have been discerned in a variety of policy arenas.[62] The lesson should be clear: uncertainty debated publicly and with probity can reap both respect and support from citizens.

Consider how the logic of Yankelovich and Immerwahr's prescriptions has better informed policy deliberation in the management of hazardous waste when combined with a technique known as comparative risk assessment. To demystify risk factors, health, safety, and environmental risks are communicated to citizens by relating them to commonly experienced events. More precisely, citizens are taught how annual risks of dying from various toxic exposures compare to everyday risks by using a "risk ladder" schematic prepared by Robert Cameron Mitchell.[63] They come to appreciate, for example, that reducing the risk of death from cancer to less than one in a million is the same as reducing risk to that incurred by an individual who smokes two cigarettes over an entire lifetime. At the same time, scientists engaged in such a process come to more fully appreciate and cope with the cognitive psychological lenses through which the public perceives risk. In the process, experts are profitably disabused of the notion that the solution to the incongruity between "real" risk (their calculations) and "perceived" risk (the public's perceptions) is more statistics on mortality and disease, more meticulously applied, and more broadly and dogmatically communicated.

[62] See, for example, Rozell, "Press Coverage of Congress."

[63] Robert Cameron Mitchell and Richard T. Carson, *Valuing Drinking Water Reductions Using the Contingent Valuation Method: A Methodological Study of Risks from THM and Giardia* (Washington, DC: A Report Prepared by Resources for the Figure for the Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1986).

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Obviously, one doesn't know how the public will react when provided with risk information in this format. Nor can we be sure what they will do with what John DiIullio terms those "unpleasant facts" about public issues "that are well understood and freely acknowledged by most of those who work in [the] trenches."[64] As Breyer notes in dismissing the prospects of wide-scale public education in risk analysis, even the best efforts in risk communication may be trumped by emotive, political, and cognitive factors.[65] Indeed, some decisions—for example, on nuclear power—may be so ingrained in people that they are fixed decisions, immutable to change.

Likewise, William Ruckelshaus's efforts to communicate arsenic risk at an ASARCO plant in Tacoma, Washington wrought attacks from some quarters that he was trying to pit environmentalists against blue-collar workers. Meanwhile, Sweden's national discussion of nuclear power apparently confused rather than unified Swedish public opinion on the issue.[66] But nuclear power may indeed be unique in its fixedness, the purposes of a tutelary democracy are probative rather than dispositive in nature, and evidence for the educability of Americans is too robust to accept Breyer's pessimism more generally.

All this, of course, requires a sensitivity to the limits of comparative risk assessments. As Terry Davies, director of Resources for the Future's Center for Risk Management, concedes, "risk comparisons are crude and can only achieve a sense of relative risk within an order of magnitude or two."[67] Thus, categories such as "high, medium, and low" risk are the best one can do when conducting broad rankings of agency priorities. Similarly, as the Sierra Club's J. Michael McCloskey—a staunch opponent of comparative risk assessment—warns, one has to be careful about comparing "apples and oranges," ignoring differential impacts on populations, and comparing risks in isolation when citizens are exposed to multiple risks that interact.[68] Yet, precisely because the process is crude, rife with uncertainty, and calls upon policy makers to make moral choices and not just statistical calculations, the need for nonexpert involvement in informed ways is now deemed critical by many involved in the process.[69]

Whose responsibility is it to foster a tutelary democracy? Arguably, both public and private institutions should be evaluated and held accountable for the contributions they make to either enhancing or diminishing the quality of public

[64] John J. DiIullio, Jr., *No Escape: The Future of American Corrections* (New York: Basic Books, 1991).

[65] Breyer, *Breaking the Vicious Circle*.

[66] Baruch Fischoff, "Managing Risk Perceptions," *Issues in Science and Technology* 83 (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1985).

[67] "Panelists Endorse Comparative Risk Approach, Seeing No Options," *Risk Policy Report* 1:3, 18 November 1994, 13.

[68] J. Michael McCloskey (speech at the Conference on Environmental Risk Assessment: Politics and Policymaking, sponsored by *Inside EPA*, Arlington, Virginia, 2 November 1994.

[69] "Panelists Endorse Comparative Risk Approach," *Risk Policy Report*; John A. Hird, *Superfund: The Political Economy of Environmental Risk* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

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discourse. Marc Landy, Marc Roberts, and Stephen Thomas argue that the only institutions meriting praise in a democracy are those that do four things. First, they foster fidelity to the technical merits of the issues involved in a public debate. Second, they promote civic education about those issues. Third, they enhance responsiveness to that tutored citizenry by providing expertise-based solutions to mutually defined problems. Finally, they afford the capacity to meet societal goals defined in this dialectical process.[70]

To these ends, a protean list of reforms has emerged for redressing anomic democracy. These include: revitalizing intermediary institutions such as church and neighborhood associations;[71] increasing citizen participation in agency decision making;[72] requiring the courts to scrutinize statutes both for their fidelity to stated purposes and for the extent to which they afford sufficient resources for implementing those purposes;[73] self-policing by the media;[74] developing a "constitutional journalism" that emphasizes a nonsensationalized presentation of policy issues;[75] conducting Oxford-style debates in the Congress;[76] developing curricula for teaching high school students how to critically analyze the quantitative and qualitative information they are bombarded with in the media;[77] increasing the funding for government research to combat the tawdry influence of corporate- and interest group-sponsored research;[78] and emphasizing flow-of-work rather than functional bases of organization in public agencies.[79]

Their relative merits aside, these reforms rely ultimately for their efficacy on a citizenry awakened to the illusions of the democratic myth in America. More precisely, citizens must come to appreciate that a significant difference exists between lean government and lame government. They must be persuaded that anorexic government—malnourished after cyclical bouts of interest group binges and disgorged institutional capacity—foils the policy goals of liberals, moderates, and conservatives alike. They must understand that tit-for-tat battles for congressional versus presidential control of the bureaucracy do not breed control, accountability, or accomplishment. And most fundamentally, they must

[70] Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts, and Stephen R. Thomas, *The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[71] Amitai Etzioni, *The Spirit of Community: The Reinvention of American Society* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993).

[72] Louis C. Gawthrop, "Civis, Civitas, and Civilitas: A New Focus," *Public Administration Review* 44 (March 1984): 101–107.

[73] Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the American Regulatory State* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

[74] Broder, "War on Cynicism."

[75] Paul H. Weaver, *News and the Culture of Lying: How Journalism Really Works* (New York: The Free Press, 1994).

[76] Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, *Renewing Congress: A First Report* (Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute and The Brookings Institution, 1992).

[77] Crossen, *Tainted Truth*.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Landy, Roberts, and Thomas, *The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions*.

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understand that much of what they find so distressing in American politics today is attributable to what our leadership expects citizens will reward electorally, budgetarily, or in market share. As Arthur Schlesinger contends, democratic politics is ultimately about the "search for remedy." Remedies, however, will elude us until a tutored citizenry alters the perverse felicific calculus that presently energizes the democratic deficit in America.

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ANNETTE BAKER FOX

The excitement of gaining congressional acceptance for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) obscured an otherwise noteworthy development. This "greenest ever" trade agreement linked two hitherto unrelated issues—the environment and foreign trade. Such diplomatic linkage had traditionally been avoided by Canada and the United States in their bilateral deals. The Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement concluded in 1988 had been no exception, even though a conflict over acid rain was raging while the trade negotiations were going on. However, when their countries' representatives met with Mexican counterparts to hammer out NAFTA, the rule against linkage was abandoned; environmental demands became part of the mix of questions to be dealt with in what originally was to be purely a trade agreement. How did this happen and what may be the consequences?

Linking Issues: Pro and Con

Bargaining theorists have frequently been attracted by the apparent usefulness of linking unrelated issues in order to iron out asymmetries, offer attractive alternatives, and reach a mutually satisfactory settlement.[1] For the most part the concept has remained just an abstract theory when rigorously analyzed beyond game theory; actual examples of successful linkage are hard to come by in bilateral

[1] Recent examples are Michael McGinnis, "Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation," *Journal of Conflict and Resolution* 30 (March 1986): 141–63; Bernard M. Hoekman, "Determining the Need for Issue Linkages in Multilateral Trade Negotiations," *International Organization* (Autumn 1989); and Lawrence Susskind, "The Advantages and Disadvantages of Issue Linkage" in his *Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements* (New York: Oxford, 1994), chap. 5.

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negotiations. (Some "package deals" may work in multilateral bargaining among many participants.)

Why did the Canadians and Americans earlier shun this lure?[2] For the weaker partner, there was no advantage in becoming vulnerable to the stronger partner's influence by mixing an issue in an area where it was comparably strong with another where it was weaker, especially if there were many such areas in which it might be at a disadvantage. For both parties there would be no gain if concessions hurt those domestic groups whose interests would be sacrificed in a game in which they were not directly concerned and thus would be mobilized in their opposition to the whole deal. Linkage would unduly complicate the bargaining for those involved in it, make the situation less manageable, and delay consensus. And if the issue were volatile, linkage could excite political passions, confusing or overwhelming the effort to deal with a question on its own merits. Potential losers could recruit still other distinct interests, spreading dissent until damaging the general tone of the governments' relations with each other. Inevitably, two levels of linkage would be joined, international and domestic. To be effectively implemented, a negotiated agreement requires domestic acceptance.

The kind of diplomatic linkage that concerns us here is a negotiated agreement containing concessions made in one issue area in exchange for concessions in another, unrelated issue area. These would be explicit bargains, as contrasted to some ways in which circumstances in one issue area are intrinsically related to some in another. In the very interdependent system in which Canada, the United States, and Mexico are imbedded, everything is eventually related to everything else. A policy in one issue area may have multiple consequences in others that are perilous to its objectives if ignored. The rapid growth of environmental consciousness, not just in the United States, but also in Canada and more recently in Mexico, has inevitably led to an awareness that freer trade would have an impact on the environment. Furthermore, a tendency in international environment agreements to include trade penalties drew attention to the relationship. The older, well-established "liberal" trade specialists were confronted by a challenge from a newly-developed environmental movement.[3]

Economists have increasingly recognized the need to respond to pressure to link trade and environmental issues.[4] Those committed to freer international

[2] Linkage was called a "sin" by one successful Canadian ambassador to the United States, Allan Gotlieb, *I'll Be With You In A Minute, Mr. Ambassador* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 55. Linkage was particularly avoided in its tit-for-tat version.

[3] John Kirton, "Canada's Contribution to a New Trade–Environment Regime" in John Kirton and Sarah Richardson, eds., *Trade, Environment & Competitiveness* (Ottawa: National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 1992), 235–38, explains this well. The dilemmas presented and how they might be met in GATT are examined in detail by John H. Jackson, "World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?" in *Washington and Lee Law Review* 49 (Spring 1994).

[4] As Raymond Vernon and Debora L. Spar have remarked about multilateral organizations, the growing complexity of contention over trade restrictions has increased the problem of realistically grappling with the interaction of different kinds of concern. See their *Beyond Globalism: Remaking*

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trade have tended in the past to inhabit a different universe of discourse from environmentalists. Some from each side may eventually meet. Views on both sides have moderated from more extreme positions in the 1980s; neither side is monolithic. Environmentalists include organizations principally concerned with wildlife preservation, global ecological dangers, and conservation of natural resources as well as with industrial pollution and public health hazards. Whatever their main focus and diverse style, they are likely to be suspicious of the standards of trade economists. "Economic rationality," "cost/benefit analysis," and "balance of risk-taking" repel those who fear that the priority given to unrestrained economic development through free trade will be at the expense of the environment.

Negotiations over NAFTA and its supplementary agreements highlighted the contrast in perspectives but brought about some convergence of outlooks, while registering the enhanced influence of the environmental community. Under its increasing pressure, the United States negotiators included environmental demands in the trade bargaining, at first hesitantly. Overcoming its own reluctance, the Canadian government believed it could not afford to stay out of the continental trade agreement for fear of losing the benefits of its earlier free trade agreement with the United States and of being outcompeted by Mexico in American markets. To participate not only were the Canadians willing to accept the linking of environmental issues with trade issues, but they actively engaged in pressing their own progressive environmental demands. Although Canada and the United States have had many controversies over the use and abuse of shared water and other natural resources, their systems of environmental protection are quite similar; and the differences in conservation were sufficiently few that they could deal together about trade without regard to environmental considerations. Alternative avenues were available and often used to settle these other concerns in a manner appropriate to a binational relationship held together by an historic network of interpersonal ties, private and official.

The Mexican Challenge

When the two North American neighbors with comparably advanced economies turned to trade relations with Mexico, the situation was markedly different. Even though Mexico is ahead of most developing countries, the pollution that has accompanied its industrial progress is notorious. Furthermore, its political culture differs greatly from the relatively similar systems of Canada and the United States, although the governmental elite now shares the same intellectual world with their American and Canadian counterparts. As in the case of the Free Trade

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American Foreign Economic Policy (New York: Free Press, 1989), 10. Over a decade ago, Ernst Haas remarked: "Nowadays, governments recognize complex cause-and-effect linkages between issues they once considered as distinct; but they no longer agree about the norms of conduct that governed collaboration in the past." See his "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics* 32 (April 1980): 358.

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Agreement, NAFTA was sought by the weaker neighbor. President Carlos Salinas de Gotari was heavily committed to a radical reconstruction of the Mexican economy to speed development along free market lines. Intent on the promise of greater access to the United States market in particular, he wanted the agreement as a principal element of his strategy.

When the United States government, and subsequently the Canadian government, proved receptive to the Mexican president's initiative, some of the leading environmental groups saw a golden opportunity to enter the discussions. By seeking to protect the gains they had made in protecting the environment at home, they could also expand their influence on public policy abroad. The proposed trade agreement provided an instrument by which they could also effectively press for improvements, while making a plausible case that freer trade, by fostering unfettered development, could intensify ecological dangers.

Considering conditions in Mexico, the case was easy to make. Previous bilateral environmental agreements had proved relatively ineffective, partly through lack of funds. All sides, including the Mexican government proponents of the trade agreement, agreed that despite impressive environmental legislation modeled on that in the United States, enforcement was lax. Inadequate funding, too little expert staffing, poorly equipped laboratories, deficient reporting—these were some of the reasons for the failure to carry out the law's requirements. Mexico had no equivalent of the Superfund, and proper hazardous waste disposal facilities were in very short supply. Citizens could not bring suit to enforce the law, an important feature of the American environmental protection system.[5] Administrative procedures and the legal system remained "opaque," in the comment of economists Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, whose arguments favoring the agreement were conditioned in part on Mexico's move toward greater transparency in its government proceedings.[6]

Many environmentalists claimed that these conditions would only worsen as Mexico's already burgeoning economy developed further as a result of the trade agreement. They pointed to the appalling sanitary conditions along the border, the world's longest between a developing and a developed country. Here, over 2,000 *maquiladoras*—Mexican enterprises—operated where labor-intensive touches were made to unfinished American products temporarily imported duty-free and then reexported subject only to the value-added duty on the United States side. American cities on the boundary were especially conscious of the pollution arising from these enterprises and the densely populated communities surrounding them. Their very attractiveness to Mexicans eager for employment had long since outpaced the ability of the Mexican communities to provide services necessary for healthy living conditions. Many plants violated Mexican environmental regula-

[5] Justin Ward and Glenn T. Prichett, "Prospects for a Green Trade Agreement," *Environment* 34 (May 1992): 34–45, gives some details.

[6] *North American Free Trade*, (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1992), 36, 37, and 261.

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tions. Far from the border, Mexico City, one of the world's most populated, is also one of the two or three cities with the dirtiest atmosphere.

Reputation counts, and it was very hard for the Salinas government to overcome stereotypes earlier developed, despite making heroic attempts to alleviate the environmental situation in Mexico. The president boldly shut down hundreds of offending enterprises and took strong measures to deal with sources of pollution, especially in Mexico City. Funding has risen very markedly, and Mexico has received much technical help from American experts as well as Canadian assistance. Still, enforcement processes continued to be notoriously impervious to public view.[7] Despite reassurances from both the United States and Canadian governments, suspicion continued. One reforming Mexican administration cannot in a few years alter a political system believed to be rife with corruption, although trade agreement opponents have not often said this out loud.

Not much impressed with ecological improvements in Mexico, environmentalists expressed two basic fears. One was that unfettered economic development would aggravate a bad situation. The other was that weaker environmental regulation of investment and exported products would by unequal price competition endanger advances in protecting the environment already achieved in the United States and Canada. Americans have the toughest environmental rules in the world, and Canadians are not far behind, with regulations often patterned after the United States practice. American environmentalists may be somewhat more confrontational, litigious, and successful in promoting their concerns than their Canadian counterparts, but they have natural collaborators across the border.

Trade Economists vs. Environmentalists

In contrast to the claims of many environmentalists, trade economists have declared that only through increased prosperity can Mexicans acquire the will and capacity to improve their environment.[8] Responding to the disgraceful situation around the *maquiladoras*, many economists have predicted that a trade agreement would bring a great increase in American and Canadian waste management technology entering Mexico. They have also pointed out that the *raison d'etre* for the *maquiladora* system will disappear with the disappearance of customs duties. New investment will be dispersed, not concentrated at the boundary. As to the hoary claim that American and Canadian enterprise will be coming because Mexico would be a pollution haven for those seeking to escape more stringent environmental restraints in their own countries, the economists have observed

[7] Greg M. Block, "One Step Away from Environmental Citizen Suits in Mexico," *Environmental Law Reporter*, June 1993, 10347–52.

[8] Frequently, proponents have cited a study by Gene M. Grossman and Alan B. Krueger to claim that Mexico is just at the point where pollution will level off from the increase due to earlier industrialization common to developing countries, and it will then decline with changed conditions and attitudes. See their "Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade Agreement," Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, November 1991.

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that costs to most enterprises for environmental protection are only a tiny fraction of production expenses, both in the United States and Canada. Usually the expense would not be sufficiently onerous to outweigh other factors keeping companies at home rather than being attracted to Mexico just to evade environmental rules. In any case, industries that might be induced to move would be labor-intensive, seeking lower costs in Mexico; and this type of industry is the least polluting. This contention was small comfort to those environmentalists who were ideologically hostile to big business, which they have seen as behind the whole free trade effort. Their more moderate associates may be less impervious to economic logic and more pragmatic. Yet even those environmentalists have distrusted conditioning legitimate environmental restraints on "sound science."[9]

As to lax enforcement of existing rules, some economists have asserted that developing countries, like Mexico, have a reasonable "comparative advantage" in being willing or able to absorb more pollution, thus making their exports cheaper; it is inappropriate to impose developed countries' standards on them to their trade disadvantage.[10] "Hidden subsidy" and "unfair advantage" is the environmentalists' response.

The argument about developed countries imposing their own environmental rules on weaker countries gets hotter when an import restraint is based not on the quality or price of a product coming from a country of less stringent rules but on its production method or process. Fuel was added by the now notorious GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) panel ruling against the United States, reported in September 1991. When the United States banned tuna imports from Mexico caught by means outlawed for American fishing boats, because they resulted in excessive dolphin deaths, the panel declared this sanction on a process was an unjustifiable barrier to trade, and the unilateral extension of American rules was contrary to GATT obligations. Despite the later accommodation that Mexico and the United States reached with each other, GATT became an ugly term among many environmentalists; scorn for its inaccessible procedures and narrowly concentrated trade outlook spread to attitudes toward NAFTA's potential.

Free trade advocates, following GATT proclivities, have been concerned that environmental restraints on imports may too often be merely disguised protectionist measures favoring a domestic industry. Environmentalists for their part have feared that NAFTA would open up innumerable challenges to Canadian or American environmental rules as illegitimate nontariff barriers. And this might

[9] Hilary F. French, "Reconciling Trade and the Environment" in *State of the World, 1993* (Washington, DC: World Watch Institute, 1993), 171.

[10] See three papers in Patrick Low, ed., *International Trade and the Environment* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1922): Patrick Low and Raed Safadi, "Trade Policy and Pollution," 32, 34, and 37; David Robertson, "Trade and the Environment: Harmonization and Technical Standards," 318; and Piritta Sorsa, "GATT and the Environment: Basic Issues and Some Developing Country Concerns," 327, 332, and 338.

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be applied not only to federal standards but also to state, provincial, and local environmental rules.

The trade economists' bottom line was that a trilateral accord designed to open up exchanges of goods and services between the three countries was not an appropriate way to attack environmental problems. Other, better methods both internal and multilateral, could be more effective.[11] Trade economists did not have to argue very vigorously against linking trade negotiations with, for example, bargaining on drug traffic or illegal migrant workers. As Mexico's Ambassador Andrés Rozental declared in a speech in Cincinnati: "By ensuring that each aspect of the relationship is given its true weight in the overall whole, and compartmentalizing different parts of that whole, we have been extremely successful in decontaminating the relationship: that is, not allowing any one part, no matter how difficult or contentious to automatically poison the rest."[12]

Environmental issues were different. Although these also were volatile, Mexicans were readier to agree with their partners on the connection with trade questions. At the same time, environmentalists were well organized and could attract collaborators. Like organized labor, they viewed the NAFTA negotiations as potentially threatening to their cause. However, they also saw the projected agreement as an opportunity both to advance it and to confirm their right to participate in the decision making. Their environmental interest found ready advocates in Congress, which in the American system has a vital role in implementing trade agreements.

Stages in the Environmentalists' Progress in NAFTA

Step by step, supported by congressional allies, the environmentalists secured acceptance of most of their specific demands. The first step came in a lengthy letter of 1 May 1991 from President Bush. To gain "fast track" permission from Congress to proceed with the negotiations, he felt compelled to respond to the warnings of the three key congressional leaders that passage would hinge on certain environmental and labor reassurances. In the letter, an elaborate "action plan" of considerable length described Mexico's environmental problems and measures already taken to solve them; Mexico and the United States intended to continue their extensive cooperation in this endeavor. Both governments believed that economic growth and sustainable development were complementary and were committed to pursue both of them, among other ways, through the trade agreement. The letter also declared that the United States government would

[11] Jagdish Bhagwati persuasively put the view that in general trade restrictions are not an efficient way to deal with the environmental problems in his study for GATT, "Trade and the Environment," *International Trade, 1990–91*, vol. I (Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1992). See also Steven Globerman and Michael Walker, eds., *Assessing NAFTA: A Trilateral Analysis* (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1993), 293–314.

[12] Andrés Rozental, "Forging a North American Partnership" (Speech at 39th annual conference of the Greater Cincinnati Council on World Affairs, 30 April 1993), typescript, 10.

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aid workers and industries that might lose from the agreement; ban the import of products failing to meet American environmental, health, and safety standards; include environmental representatives on the trade advisory committees; prepare an environmental review of the effects of increased United States–Mexico trade; and work with Mexico to prepare a detailed plan for dealing with environment problems on the border. Further, the administration would work with Mexico to enhance its standards and improve enforcement, while maintaining the integrity of the United States regulatory process, "which is based on available scientific evidence, provides for public participation, and is consistent with non-discrimination." It would discuss with Mexico methods of settling disputes on technical aspects of environmental issues. The message said, "We intend to include environmental issues related to trade in the Free Trade Agreement"; parallel negotiations would deal with "an ambitious program" of environmental cooperation.[13]

Like the United States administration, neither the Mexican nor the Canadian governments initially wanted the trade negotiations to be complicated by including environmental concerns, but each had its own special reasons for wanting the agreement despite the linkage.[14] Without a common border, the Canadians and Mexicans shared two sentiments. They both feared those United States' so-called "fair trade" procedures that employed countervailing and antidumping duties on imports not meeting American estimates of the impact of subsidies and of selling below U.S.–determined cost. Both governments were also afraid that the United States could impose its own particular practices for protecting the environment on others' jurisdiction. A free trade agreement with circumscribed environmental conditions could provide some protection. So they accepted American leadership in framing a trade agreement agenda which, so far as environmental issues were concerned, centered on conditions in Mexico.

The next step came when, as promised, an environmental review of the likely impact of the free trade agreement was made, again concentrating on Mexico. An interagency committee led by the United States Trade Representative's (USTR) office published a preliminary draft of the review in October 1991, which was open to public comment. Following outside reactions, the USTR and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) heads reported the revised version on 25 February 1992, several months prior to completing the negotiations. The document stressed a voluntary approach to solving Mexico's pollution problems and the value of cooperative efforts.

[13] "Response of the Bush Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of a NAFTA, Transmitted to Congress by the President on May 1, 1991," *International Environmental Affairs* 3 (Summer 1991): 219–30; Joseph Greenwald, "The North American Free Trade Agreement: The View from Washington" in Kirton and Richardson, eds., *Trade, Environment and Competitiveness*, 115–17.

[14] They did expect bargaining about other types of concessions directly involving trade, such as percentage of "domestic content," "national treatment" of investors, the timing of tariff removal on particular products, and what services to include.

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After a detailed examination of potential environmental effects, the report concluded that NAFTA would result in improved environmental conditions in Mexico. It reiterated the 1 May 1991 promise to uphold U.S. standards protecting health, safety, and the environment, and identified items for action by an Integrated Environmental Plan for the border. Recommendations to the negotiators would include developing methods of dispute resolution "sensitive to environmental health programs and values." The report stated that the administration had included environmental and health officials on the various policy coordinating and negotiating groups to ensure that the agreement's negotiators "are alert to environmental sensitivities and additional negotiating opportunities."[15]

Two months later, in April 1992, United States Trade Representative Carla Hills appointed a new deputy assistant trade representative for the environment. This was one of the ways her office recognized the concern about NAFTA's impact. The office was unique among trade negotiating agencies.

By August the terms of NAFTA were divulged: its environmental provisions were highly praised by EPA Director William Reilly. They included in the preamble promises to "promote sustainable development" as well as to "strengthen the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations." The parties committed themselves to carry out their trade agreement "in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation." Among the environmental provisions, those rights and obligations of each of the parties to specified international environmental and conservation agreements would take precedence over those in NAFTA if in conflict. Each party can maintain its own level of environmental protection and ban imports in violation of its rules. In doing so, they are not to discriminate between domestic and foreign manufacturers or suppliers, nor create an "unnecessary obstacle" to trade. Environmental measures applying to imports must be for a "legitimate objective," defined in terms which included "environmental protection and sustainable development" (Articles 904 and 915).

The parties promise to cooperate in making their environmental standards compatible and in raising them, but are explicitly forbidden to harmonize them at a level lower than the highest already existing (Articles 904 and 906). When a sanitary or phytosanitary standard is adopted to protect human, animal, and plant health from injurious imports, the required risk assessment shall take account, inter alia, of relevant processes and production methods as well as ecological and other environmental conditions and shall not be discriminatory, arbitrary, or constitute a "disguised restriction on trade" (Article 715). For other types of standards-related measures, including those to protect the environment, assessment of risk is optional and may take account of processes or production methods and environmental conditions among other factors (Article 907). Due notice is

[15] United States Trade Representative, "Review of U.S.–Mexico Environmental Issues," reprinted in Canada, *North American Free Trade Agreement: Canadian Environmental Review* (Ottawa, 1992), annex 9.

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to be given and public comment solicited if a party adopts or changes a technical regulation.

As to investment, the parties are cautioned not to relax their environmental regulations to encourage investors; if such a claim is made, the interested parties must consult to end the alleged practice (Article 1114). On the other hand, parties may adopt environmental measures to ensure that investment be "undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns." The ban on performance requirements for foreign investment exempts environmental measures, provided these "are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner or do not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade or investment" (Article 1106.6).

When disputes arise over the application of an environmental standard, the burden is on the complainant to prove that it is contrary to NAFTA obligations (Articles 723 and 912.4). Dispute settlement procedures give NAFTA precedence over GATT; NAFTA explicitly provides for expert environmental advice and representation in dealing with certain kinds of dispute.

NAFTA was the first international trade agreement to include substantial environmental provisions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) were extensively consulted in the process. Nevertheless, the results still did not reassure all NGOs nor their congressional sponsors. They were concerned about implementation; voluntary cooperation was not enough and teeth were required for observance. They also wanted greater certainty about funding the border cleanup, arguing, inter alia, that those who would profit from increased development should pay their way in meeting environmental costs. They sought measures not just to deter pollution but also to promote better environmental and conservation conditions. To have confidence that commitments would be carried out, the environmental organizations believed that they needed to participate in one way or another in making the relevant decisions.

A meeting of the three governments' environmental officials in September did not deflect the environmentalists' attention from the promised parallel negotiations for supplemental agreements on both the environment and labor. Prior to his election, the new president, Bill Clinton, committed himself to pursue them as a condition of backing NAFTA, which was signed in December by President Bush along with the other two governments' leaders. So, the next step came after several months of negotiation. The government published the supplementary agreement on the environment in August 1993 (simultaneously with one on labor).

The agreement provides extensively and in detail for obligations the environmentalists had sought, committing the parties not only to conserve and protect the environment but also to work toward improvements.[16] Numerous clauses deal with public access and transparency to ensure that procedures are open and

[16] United States Trade Representative, *The NAFTA: Supplemental Agreements* (Washington, DC: 13 September 1993); and *The NAFTA: Report on Environmental Issues* (Washington, DC: November 1993).

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equitable, with elaborate procedural guarantees. References to getting experts' advice are also numerous.

Critical to the satisfaction of environmentalists were the specific arrangements ensuring enforcement of the individual parties' environmental laws. To carry out these and other objectives, a Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) would be established, to be governed by a council composed of the cabinet level environmental officials of the three governments. Over forty duties or proposed activities are specified. Among them, the council is to promote exchanges of relevant information, recommend greater compatibility of environmental standards without lowering existing levels, help to prevent or resolve disputes, and keep a list of experts for advice to the various NAFTA bodies. It is to make recommendations regarding the environmental impact of proposed projects as well as on many kinds of environmental issues. These include methods of compliance and the environmental significance of products throughout their life-cycles, including process of production. The council will serve the NAFTA's Free Trade Commission as the point of inquiry and receipt for comments from those concerned with the environment.

The CEC would be served by a joint secretariat, overseen by the council, and headed by an executive director. The parties agreed to respect its independent character. Among its fact-finding and reporting duties is an annual review to be made public. This will include each party's actions in carrying out the agreement's obligations and "relevant views and information submitted by nongovernmental organizations and persons." Also included is a joint public advisory committee of fifteen members, five from each government. Members may be chosen by the parties' national advisory committee. The agreement provides for these committees and also specifies that members may be representatives from nongovernmental organizations (Articles 16 and 17).

Crucial to the agreement were the arrangements for dispute settlement, especially how they dealt with the controversial question of enforcement through sanctions. The negotiators finally agreed on a convoluted, step-by-step system with specified time limits for each stage. Following is an outline. Any person or nongovernmental organization could submit a complaint to the secretariat that a government of another party was failing to enforce its trade-related environmental laws. Following specified criteria and guidelines, the secretariat would then consider how to proceed. If a persistent pattern were discerned, only the governments could establish a dispute settlement proceeding, starting with consultations. If these failed to resolve the controversy, a trilateral panel of independent experts would be created to examine the alleged pattern of nonenforcement and propose a remedy. The panel of five would be drawn from a roster of forty-five already chosen by the council. Two out of the three parties must request setting up such a panel, which reassured the weaker members that United States companies could not use the system for unwarranted purposes.

If the panel found the complaint justified, the offending government would have a limited time to start enforcement. If no action took place, the panel would

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have another specified period to work out its own enforcement plan and, if warranted, could impose a fine on the offending government of up to $20 million. In the eventuality that this government continued neither to enforce its environmental laws nor pay the fine, it could be subjected to a limited suspension of NAFTA's trade benefits. If the complaint were against Canada, the panel ruling would be taken to its federal courts, which have authority to enforce orders arising from international agreements. If the Canadian government were then found in contempt of court, the country would lose benefits under NAFTA commensurate with the unpaid "monetary enforcement assessment." If the offending party were either the United States or Mexico, the complaining party could withdraw the appropriate NAFTA benefits for the specified time. Regardless of the penalty, domestic law would prevail over a panel decision challenging it, unless the government chose to change the law as a result of the penalty.[17]

Canada's special arrangement grew out of a last-minute hitch, due to the political vulnerability of the new Conservative party prime minister who had succeeded Brian Mulroney shortly before the negotiations ended. There was strong opposition in Canada to putting a new instrument at the disposal of American companies already trying to block Canadian imports through the bilateral free trade agreement procedures.

Two Levels of Linkage

The elaborate provisions for the settlement of environmental disputes exemplify how two levels of linkage are discernible as the environmentalists pressed their case during the negotiations both for NAFTA and the supplementary agreements. One involved bargaining across international borders; the other involved domestic politics. Not long after the original negotiations for NAFTA began, the Bush administration had capitulated to demands to include environmental issues in the trilateral free trade negotiations. The United States did not need this linkage to strengthen its position on trade, but the negotiators' position would have been somewhat weaker if there were vocal domestic opposition to a free trade accord at that time. All three governments, for their own reasons, wanted a trade agreement enough to adjust to the others' sensitivities about how to reach it. They all claimed similar environmental goals, differing only on the appropriate means. Since the United States was by far the strongest trade partner and had the most aggressive and influential environmentalist groups, it did not have to make trade concessions to get environmental issues considered. Although the bargaining was trilateral, it was Mexican action or lack of action, not American or Canadian, which was the crux of the environmental problem. In the government-to-government arena Canada was a wild card; its negotiators occasionally joined their Mexican counterparts in opposition to an American position.

[17] *The NAFTA: Report on Environmental Issues*, 12 and 97.

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A different form of linkage—tactical—occurred on the domestic front in the United States, a kind of informal logrolling, occasioned by the need to agree on the specific environment requirements.[18] Played out by diverse interests in Congress, the stake was the legislation required to implement the main agreement, bolstered by the supplementary accords—in effect, congressional approval. As a trade bill involving revenues it first had to pass the House of Representatives.

The supplementary negotiations took place with Democrats not only in control of both houses of Congress but also the presidency. This situation strengthened the position of the environmentalists; their cause had become a popular one, and they had prominent friends among the administration's leadership—in particular, Vice President Al Gore and Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt. Both spoke out endorsing the inclusion of environmental provisions. With concerned members of Congress and environmental and labor groups looking over their shoulders, the United States bargainers in the supplementary agreement negotiations had to work out just how many concessions to environmental demands would placate congressional advocates while not alienating the business groups, who were the strongest advocates of NAFTA. Simultaneously they had to persuade the other two governments to accept the administration's preferred provisions on trade and investment.

The most ticklish question, and one that combined both levels of linkage, concerned trade sanctions to ensure that environmental terms in the agreement were carried out. On one side were the environmentalists, who usually favored achieving their objectives through government regulation backed up by legal sanctions, including court suits. Their most obvious target has been industry, whether the rules dealt with hazardous waste, Superfund cleanups and other clean air and water issues, or preservation of the wilderness and similar conservation concerns. On the other hand was big business, especially multinational corporations. In Canada and Mexico, corporate interest groups were also the strongest backers of NAFTA, but for diverse reasons the Canadians and Mexicans were content to let their American counterparts carry the ball on environmental issues. In all three countries they were learning that it pays to reduce the polluting effects of their enterprises.

Even when environmentalists recognize the increasing sensitivity of business organizations toward their environmental responsibilities, there remains a controversy over appropriate means.[19] The corporate view, both in the United States and Canada, has tended toward relying on cooperation; the less government regulation the better. Furthermore, they argue, why should an innocent firm be penalized by import restrictions because of the pollution caused by another in the same industry? There is sufficient economic integration already so that, as

[18] Haas, "Why Collaborate?" 371–74.

[19] For some enlightened views, see Lansing Lamont and Dian Cohen, eds., *To Save a Continent: Business Responds to North America's Environmental Needs* (New York: Americas Society/Canadian Affairs, 1990).

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with other transnational interests, American (and Canadian) enterprises currently operating in Mexico could become vulnerable to punitive actions taken in one or another North American country. Both the Mexican and Canadian governments were also opposed to using trade penalties to enforce environmental rules. The Mexicans cited reasons of sovereignty, especially regarding the proposal to open their courts to environmental law suits. From past experience the Canadians feared that as a weaker partner they would more likely be the target than the instigator. As a result of all these cross pressures, the ultimate compromise was the convoluted dispute settlement system. The administration in the United States stressed that the intention was to deter and correct rather than to punish.

Side Payments

The supplementary environment agreement was a kind of side payment for endorsing NAFTA. A further accord responded to the demand to clean up the notorious conditions along the boundary between Mexico and the United States. In a bilateral agreement the two governments decided on still another border plan—there had been two earlier plans in the 1980s. This one has more explicit obligations and has an elaborate method for funding.[20] The two governments agreed to establish a Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BEEC) to coordinate and facilitate the carrying out of environmental infrastructure projects, such as wastewater treatment. Among its responsibilities, it will certify projects for financing by a North American Development Bank. This second body will start with capital of $450 million provided equally by the two countries, and through financial markets and other resources it will raise funds up to about $2 billion through loans and guarantees. In addition, the commission is expected to mobilize other funds for projects through government, international agency, and private sources; servicing the debt is expected to include fees paid by polluters and beneficiaries of improvements. The system envisaged for attacking border conditions was a solution to several financing controversies. These had included proposals to rely on government appropriations and/or border transaction taxes, as well as user fees from new investment.

Significantly, the commission will have on it representatives from a border state and border locality and a member of the public from the border region, in addition to each government's senior environmental official and commissioner on the International Boundary and Water Commission. It must consult with an Advisory Council containing members from the public, including nongovernmental organizations. Addressing concerns about funding ecological needs in Mexico, the United States also promised $20 million to help capitalize a new

[20] For earlier efforts, see Jan Gilbreath and J. Ben Tonra, *Environment: Unwelcome Guest at the Free Trade Party*, vol. iii, Report No. 10 of Center for Strategic & International Studies (Washington, DC: 19 May 1992), 22–30; M. Delal Baer and Sidney Weintraub, eds., *The NAFTA Debate* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 75–77.

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Mexican Conservation Fund. The fund is to aid in preserving the country's watersheds, forests, and biodiversity.[21]

To an unprecedented degree, environmental groups were extensively consulted by the USTR throughout the negotiations for NAFTA and the supplementary agreement. Similarly, congressional committees and staff were briefed from the beginning. Many interagency committees examined specific aspects of the agreements. The Environmental Protection Agency, both in the Bush and the Clinton administrations, collaborated with the USTR on matters within their purview. The successive directors enthusiastically supported the undertakings, and the EPA pushed hard for acceptance of the agreements.

Partly as a result of such collaboration, most of the environmentalists' demands found a response in the provisions of NAFTA and particularly in the supplemental environmental agreement, which made much more explicit the commitments in the principal agreement and also added to them. A comparison of what they said they wanted and what they got shows few failures. The powers are somewhat more circumscribed than some groups wished; for example, investigations by its secretariat do not include an independent right to inspect alleged failures to enforce a party's environmental rules. A number of clauses say "may" rather than "shall," thus qualifying legal obligations. There remain some ambiguous words feared by environmentalists because of the potential for adverse interpretation if a standard were challenged, such as "necessary." One objectionable phrase was purposely omitted: "least disruptive of trade" as applied to sanitary and phytosanitary standards.[22] The right to ban imports on the basis of their method of production was fudged, leaving the question to the future.[23]

The international environmental agreements given priority over NAFTA were limited to three specified by name, but in seeking environmental group support, the U.S. administration added to the list the Migratory Bird Treaty and promised to include others. In the required Statement of Administrative Action which accompanied the submission to Congress of the implementing legislation, the administration promised to make the fullest possible use of experts on the panels in the environmental cases and on scientific review boards. The statement also reiterated that state environmental laws will not be preempted by the federal government.[24]

The dispute settlement arrangements include the right of the public to be informed or to participate in all but the panel members' deliberations. In fact, throughout the supplementary agreement there are references to public access and consultation with nongovernmental organizations, in addition to public reporting. Thus this agreement provides extraordinarily for transparency. This had been

[21] *The NAFTA: Report on Environmental Issues*, 22–24 and 65; *International Trade Reporter*, 15 September 1993, 1502, and 3 November 1993, 1832.

[22] *The NAFTA: Report on Environmental Issues*, 94.

[23] Ibid., 98.

[24] Ibid., 20 and 95–96; *International Trade Reporter*, 10 November 1993, 1890–91.

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listed as an objective, along with "public participation in the development of environmental laws, regulations and policies." In addition, the USTR promised the maximum openness in its procedures.[25]

In view of the Canadian and particularly Mexican distaste for adversarial methods of implementing their environmental rules, the supplementary agreement does not specifically refer to court suits. Instead, Article 5.2 states that "Each party shall ensure that judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative enforcement proceedings are available under its law to sanction or remedy violations of its environmental law and regulations." Further, they are to be "fair, open, and equitable" (Article 7). Article 10.9 provides that the council consider and develop recommendations about reciprocal rights and remedies before a party's courts and administrative agencies for those in other parties who may have suffered from pollution arising in its territory. Article 37 specifically states that the agreement in no way empowers one party's authorities to enforce environmental law in another party's territory.

Environmentalists Split

Although not all of their preferences were included, the supplementary agreement satisfied most of the prestigious environmental organizations, which rallied in support of its acceptance. They agreed with other NAFTA proponents that regardless of the agreement's future aid in protecting the environment, without it conditions would certainly worsen from unrestrained development. Understood but not underscored, the United States was also bound by the environmental provisions in NAFTA and the supplementary agreement. Two dissidents were the Sierra Club (although it had participated in the lengthy consultations leading up to the agreement) and Friends of the Earth.[26]

These latter two associations joined a consumer organization, Public Citizen, in a court suit to require the United States government to conduct an environmental impact study, an elaborate proceeding that would have perhaps fatally delayed a congressional vote. They lost in the court of appeals. Nevertheless, the USTR did publish a very elaborate report on the environmental issues prior to the House of Representatives vote. (The Canadian government had made its own environmental impact review of NAFTA in October 1992, prior to the supplementary agreement.)

The dissidents, along with Greenpeace and some other so-called grassroots environmentalists and animal rights groups linked their campaign with the much more influential labor organizations to oppose congressional acceptance of the

[25] *The NAFTA: Report on Environmental Issues*, 12 and 21.

[26] The pro-NAFTA organizations included the National Audubon Society, National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense Fund, World Wildlife Federation, and Conservation International. Two prominent experts on the Sierra Club's economics committee publicly repudiated that organization's stand in opposition. See *NAFTA Notes*, 28 September 1993.

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agreement. This informal coalition seemed ironic, since the two interests have often clashed over whether or not environmental regulations cost jobs. However, the dissident environmental associations still had an ideological bond with labor unions despite the incongruity of their domestic objectives. Although for different reasons, both groups feared the flight of industry to Mexico if NAFTA went into effect. Collaboration between the two groups might achieve what otherwise was unobtainable.

The environmental issue soon was smothered by the strident resistance to NAFTA by organized labor. The latter had only perfunctorily participated in working out the supplementary agreement on labor, and immediately on its conclusion they angrily denounced it as well as NAFTA itself.

For the mainstream environmental groups to counter by linking up with big business in their common desire to get NAFTA's acceptance in Congress was not feasible, given their traditional arms-length posture toward each other. Nor did those industries provide useful allies to the opponents of the agreements. Both pro and anti-NAFTA environmental associations received transnational support. Also upholding NAFTA, American and Mexican businesses and their associations publicized their cooperative activities to improve Mexico's environment.[27] Some Canadian groups, still hostile to any free trade agreement with the United States, came to lobby in Washington against the proposed trilateral accord. Mexican groups opposed to their own government also campaigned in the United States, but the Mexican government itself went to unprecedented lengths and spent huge sums of money to bring about NAFTA's acceptance in the United States. However, environmental issues took second place to economic concerns in their appeals.

Nor did environmental questions play a crucial role in the fate of NAFTA in Canada, despite occasional reference to them by opponents. Prior to the supplementary agreements, the House of Commons, then under control of Mulroney's Conservatives, approved NAFTA, but its proclamation awaited the results of the national election. When his party, led by Kim Campbell, went down to disastrous defeat in October 1993, NAFTA was only one among a great many sources of voter dissatisfaction. Although the victorious Liberals included their dislike of the agreement in their campaign and their leader, Jean Chrétien, declared his intention to try to renegotiate NAFTA, he gave up his opposition on assuming office. He gave as one reason that the supplemental agreement satisfied his environmental concerns. By December 1993, after the United States Congress had approved the agreements, he proclaimed them in effect, the final step in the Canadian system. He had meanwhile secured the promise of the Clinton administration to negotiate a long-desired code of subsidies and dumping and also obtained a trilateral statement that Canada's water resources were not covered

[27] For example, *Statement* of the United States Council for International Business; Updated Statement of the Cooperative Efforts of the U.S. and Mexican Business Communities to Address Labor and Environment Issues in the NAFTA, New York, April, 1993.

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by the agreement.[28] Prior to the congressional vote, the Canadian Liberals' stand did provide some ammunition to American opponents of NAFTA.

The split among the American environmental associations and the linking by some of them to organized labor, with its different concerns, might have been fatal to promoting ecological objectives through the free trade agreement and a bigger role for their organizations in achieving them. Very influential in the Democratic party, the labor unions were able to arouse fierce political passion, attract a populist following (led by Ross Perot), and threaten to torpedo the whole undertaking by forcefully claiming immediate and concentrated loss. Those who are determined to prevent action usually have more influence with vulnerable members of Congress than those wanting to initiate a policy for a more generalized gain and a voice in the process.

At the last stage, the labor ally's clamor over potential job losses if NAFTA were to go into effect almost completely eclipsed the environmental issues. Also obliterated were rational argument and a sober examination of the issues. An almost unprecedented campaign of misinformation and emotional appeal was waged prior to the vote in the House of Representatives on what for a while seemed a doomed cause. Not so unprecedented was the administration's successful arm-twisting of fence-sitting representatives, which resulted in acceptance of the agreements with votes to spare. Apparently none of the traded concessions to achieve this result involved an environmental claim; votes did not turn on ecological concerns.

Conclusions

In the congressional struggle, those environmentalists who tactically linked their claims with labor demands produced some of the harmful consequences noted in the beginning. The combination complicated bargaining, delayed consensus, and ended up so politicizing environmental questions that they could no longer be dealt with on their own merits. At earlier stages, however, prior to the split among environmentalists, their organizations were very successful in influencing the course of the negotiations for both NAFTA and the supplementary agreement. With the indispensable aid of congressional allies, they linked support of the trade agreement to their demand for specific environmental provisions. This linkage on the domestic level was facilitated by the absence of bureaucratic rivalry, the presence of strong sympathizers in the administration, the sensitivity of the trade officials to the various interests, and the lack of strong opposition to their demands from some potential adversaries. Also favoring the linkage, the region most vulnerable to environmental damage emanating from Mexico—the Southwest and California—also had the greatest economic stake in a successful trade agreement.

[28] *New York Times*, 22 November and 3 December 1993; Toronto *Globe and Mail*, 3 December 1993.

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On the international level, the successful linking of environmental demands with trade claims proved to be easier, at least so far as putting them on the agenda. Probably linkage was more acceptable because there were more than two parties to the negotiation. The Canadian and Mexican governments had stakes too high to object strenuously, and in any case they claimed sympathy with the objective at which they were aimed. Since the agreements extended the right to be heard to all three countries' environmental interests, Mexicans and Canadians could not charge the United States with unilateral extraterritorial conduct. Whatever objections they had to the American proposal for environmental provisions were more or less assuaged by successfully qualifying the touchy inclusion of trade sanctions. Both governments were unwilling to open the door to possible application in their own country of American environmental rules.[29] Other than this, their acquiescence in other environmental provisions was made easier because the only likely losers would be potential polluters who were unlikely to raise public objection.

The side deals, necessary to persuade those who might lose otherwise from linkage, were made at every stage.[30] On the domestic level, the most important were the supplementary agreement on the environment and the border plans. Though less critical, on the international level were the United States administration's promises made to the new Canadian prime minister to overcome his reluctance to proclaim NAFTA and the Mexican government's stepped up environmental efforts prior to the agreement. The latter action was only implicitly a sweetener for the much desired trade arrangements. Similarly indirect were the Clinton administration's promises to members of Congress wavering on accepting NAFTA as a whole.

Whether or not NAFTA and the supplementary agreement on the environment actually result in ecological gains remains in the future. Meanwhile, the three countries are committed to "promote the use of economic instruments for the efficient achievement of environmental goals" (Article 2 of the supplemental agreement). Furthermore, the United States government has underscored that "transparency is the hallmark of the agreement."[31] Environmentalists had clearly won a larger role in deciding policy when they succeeded in linking environmental issues with trade questions. They did so in a way that integrated two kinds of concern so that they were no longer regarded as unrelated in how they should be handled.

Signing an international agreement and having it approved by the constitutional authorities do not end the bargaining but are only stages in a continuum. The numerous clauses in NAFTA and the supplementary agreement providing

[29] Note the Canadian government's exposition on extraterritoriality in its *Canadian Environmental Review*, 11–12.

[30] See Frederick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations; The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments," *International Organization* 46 (Autumn 1992): 796–816.

[31] Department of State, *Dispatch*, vol. 4, no. 34, 23 August 1993, 591.

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for nongovernmental organizations to have a voice in implementation may not ensure that the environmentalists will be heeded, but they certainly will have to be heard. Some experts among them are already serving in the government; they are likely to be followed by others. Many questions about protecting the environment remain, including fleshing out the agreements. A particularly important future task for which the environmentalists' NAFTA experience emboldens them is to make GATT more sensitive to the environmental effects of its actions.[32] Since Mexico is now a member and is bound by NAFTA's provisions, it may affect such negotiations, although the NAFTA partnership differentiates Mexico from all other kinds of less developed countries.

The environmental provisions in the NAFTA agreements give precedence over confrontation and punitive methods to procedures for information, disclosure, discussion of joint problems, and cooperative programs. This course is in line with the newer approach of the so-called mainstream environmental associations as well as with the preferences of the two less powerful partners of the United States. Such procedures could also increase the influence of the environmental organizations, especially through transnational ties. Yet the cooperative approach requires willingness to compromise, which some nongovernmental organizations find difficult to do. Nevertheless, they might all agree that the price of the partners' products traded in each other's markets should absorb the cost of protecting the environment. By internalizing what was formerly an external cost, unfair competition and the lowering of environmental standards could be avoided. If NAFTA's provisions for promoting enforcement of mutually accepted rules produce this effect, the result may be the ultimate linkage.

[32] See Hilary F. French, "The GATT: Menace or Ally?" in *World Watch*, September–October 1993, 17–19.

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Pathological Dimensions of Domestic and International Ethnicity

DONALD ROTHCHILD
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Ethnic identity represents one of the well established political fault lines of the modern world. In various combinations of common language, religion, race, and culture, it may be taken as one of the givens of twentieth-century politics. Our concern in this article is with certain pathological aspects of ethnicity, especially as they affect the relationships of divided minorities—that is, the problems of ethnic enclaves surrounded by or commingled with other ethnic entities.

Pathology may be defined as a pervasive sense of anxiety, hostility, and estrangement projected onto other surrounding ethnic groups, as opposed to a more neutral sense of one's own identity and distinctiveness. Anxiety, as Donald Horowitz maintains, "flows from a diffuse danger of exaggerated dimensions; it limits and modifies perceptions, producing extreme reactions to modest threats."[1]

To be sure, ethnonationalism, as such, involves the complex cultivation of ambiguous and complex identity. The identity is as frequently based on myth as on fact, and one of the main means of its preservation is through the principles of exclusion. Karl Deutsch ruefully defines nationalism: "A nation is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors."[2]

[1] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 179.

[2] See Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*. (New York: Knopf, 1969), 3. Note also A. W. Orridge, "Separatist and Autonomist Nationalisms: The Structure of Regional Loyalties in the

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Notwithstanding certain differences among ethnonationalist entities, one can recognize a range of routine activities in which they engage that are designed to strengthen various aspects of their basic identity. These may involve the teaching, learning, and dissemination of a language; the cultivation of a particular religion; the diffusion of distinctive symbols; the celebration of persons and achievements associated with the group's history; the attempt to achieve cultural, economic, and political recognition for the group, with claims to equity, equality, primacy, autonomy, or independence depending on particular situations.

The Enemy Idea

Beyond these primary functions (all of which can usually be related to concisely defined, negotiable claims),[3] ethnonationalist groups also frequently cultivate a certain traditional and largely negative ethos of confrontational militancy through formal and informal means. This ethos strengthens the sense of identity and mutual belonging among ethnonationalist group members by its emphasis upon past sufferings and present or future threats at the hands of outsiders to the group. In emotional terms, this ethos taps the dimensions of grief, fear, and, to a lesser or greater degree, animosity, anger, and contempt.[4]

Clearly, the most extreme example of modern ethnonationalism was that of Nazi Germany (1933–1945). To be German, one had to be "Aryan" in the definition of Nazi ideology and law. The participation and even the presence of non-Aryans, especially Jews, in the German body politics was viewed as corrosive and destructive of the quality of the German people. The logical implications of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* were clearly in line with the two most terrible alternatives for ethnic interaction: mass emigration or genocide for the non-Aryans.[5]

Hitler's perception of the ultimate malevolence of the Jews was expressed in the following lines in *Mein Kampf*: "If the Jew, with the help of the Marxian

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Modern State" in C. H. Williams, ed., *National Separatism* (Cardiff; University of Wales Press, 1982), 47: ". . . There is no one indispensable basis of community, a variety of social differences can play this role." Compare Benjamin Aksin, *States and Nations* (New York: Doubleday, 1964), 141–143.

[3] See Alexander J. Groth, "Dmowski, Pilsudski, and Ethnic Conflict in Pre-1939 Poland," *Canadian Slavic Studies* 3 (Spring 1969): 69–91; and his article "The Politics of Xenophobia and the Salience of Antisemitism," *Comparative Politics* 2 (October 1971): 89–108.

[4] On the distinction between negotiable and non-negotiable demands, see Donald Rothchild, "An Interactive Model for State-Ethnic Relations" in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, eds., *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991), 197–205. Note also Ted Robert Gurr, "The Revolution-Social Change Nexus," *Comparative Politics* 5 (April 1973): 381: "Value theorists attribute some . . . positive kinds of social change to conflict. Conflict among groups is proposed to strengthen group cohesiveness and separateness; . . . reduce tension and deviation within the group; . . . clarify group objectives; . . . help establish group norms."

[5] Arend Lijphart, *Power-Sharing in South Africa* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1985), 31.

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creed, conquers the nations of the world, his crown will be the funeral wreath of the human race . . . by fighting against the Jews I am doing the Lord's work."[6]

Many, if not all, of the present-day varieties of ethnonationalism are grounded in two analogous, usually less violently expressed principles: the exclusiveness of the national group's definition based upon particular criteria; and the maintenance of internal cohesion and loyalty to the group on the basis of perceived threats from those outside its confines. At the height of the terror in Algeria around 1960, the European terrorist organization, Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS), engaged in savage forms of repression to demonstrate its independent power and to unite the European community behind it.[7] The bestiality of the Muslim-European encounter left little room for a third force of moderation and possible compromise.

Virtually all nationalist ideologies, whether majoritarian or minoritarian, seek to develop, enhance, and maintain a sense of identity and unity among their followers through an interpretative version of history. This "history" frequently emphasizes, sometimes ritualistically observes, and continuously recalls the oppression, persecution, exploitation, and sundry misdeeds suffered by the target group at the hands of other malevolent and unscrupulous entities. It celebrates the struggles, the victories, and sometimes the martyrdom of those active in the national cause.

Implicitly, if not always explicitly, it creates an image of "others," which is characterized by hostility, malevolence, suspicion, and mistrust. It also castigates those members of one's own national core group who either have betrayed it by cooperating with the enemy "other," or have shown a selfish indifference to the national cause. Needless to say, such "essentialist" interpretations and uses of history may be grounded in all sorts of "real-life" experiences and events;[8] they produce situations in which facts, myths, and distortions may become strongly and credibly linked over long periods of time in group consciousness.[9]

[6] See F. T. S. Dugdale, trans. and ed., *My Battle* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1933), 25.

[7] Leo Kuper, *The Pity Of It All: Polarization of Racial and Ethnic Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 75–76.

[8] On essentialist perceptions, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Noel Kaplowitz, "Psychopolitical Dimensions of International Relations: The Reciprocal Effects of Conflict Strategies," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (December 1984): 377–383; and Donald Rothchild, "Hegemonial Exchange: An Alternative Model for Managing Conflict in Middle Africa" in Dennis L. Thompson and Dov Ronen, eds., *Ethnicity, Politics, and Development* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986), 87–89.

[9] See Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 62–64, for the peculiarly survival-oriented aspects of ethnonationalist identifications. Robert Reich in "What Is A Nation?" *Political Science Quarterly* 106 (Summer 1991): 193–209, observes that "Unbridled nationalism can cause civic values to degenerate at home. Nations grow paranoid about foreign agents in their midst; civil liberties are restricted on ground of national security. Neighbors begin to distrust one another. Tribal allegiances can even tear nation-states apart. The violence that periodically erupts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Albanians and Serbs, Flamands and Walloon, Vietnamese and Cambodians, Israelis and Palestinians, Sikhs and other Indians, Tamils and Sinhalese, and Lebanon's Christian and Moslem sects is grim evidence of the costs of tribal loyalty."

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Joseph Rothschild notes:

> . . . this, in turn, entails the likely danger of stereotyping one's own and the competing ethnic group(s) into starkly polarized images of virtue and menace, images that telescope past conflicts and misproject their oversimplified recollection into the present context such as to exacerbate it. This exacerbation flows in part from the tendency of the several stereotyping actors to behave toward their stereotyped "targets" in a manner that elicits from these latter actors reactive behavior corroborating the initial stereotypes. Stereotyping thus interacts in a vicious cycle with the above-mentioned frequent anxiety of ethnic groups that their differences with competing groups are not really over the discrete questions that are seemingly on the agenda but actually over hidden ultimates, indeed over their very survival. The resulting complex of emotional intensity, inappropriate stereotyping, and eschatological anxiety can lend a malign quality to ethnic conflict, rendering it peculiarly recalcitrant to political therapy.[10]

Among the nationalisms of Europe, one can identify these patterns in virtually all of the contemporary crisis situations. What Slovenians and Croatians share with Basques[11] and the Roman Catholic nationalists of Northern Ireland is a historically nurtured ethos that identifies the dominant ethnic groups (Serbs, Spaniards, or Northern Ireland protestants and Britons) with suppression and exploitation of the given minority.[12] Similarly, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf R. Denktash wrote of his minority community's "vulnerable position"—a target in the late 1950s of "EOKA terrorists."[13]

While to most Britons and most foreigners, the United Kingdom may seem to be a traditional bastion of the rule of law, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) view is very different. In Northern Ireland, the Catholic minority generally views British rule as a harsh imposition of power upon a captive population. The history of British government in Northern Ireland is seen as a period of oppression, discrimination, exploitation, and terror, which is thinly veiled by public relations

[10] Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics*, 63.

[11] See Jean Grugel "The Basques" in Michael Watson, ed., *Contemporary Minority Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1990), 101–102. He observes that "hostility toward Madrid was . . . transformed into a distrust of the Spanish. The nationalists coined the word 'malceto' which was used in a derogatory sense to describe the Spanish 'foreigners.'" Sabino Arana, founder of the Basque Nationalist Party in 1893, saw "'the maintenance of Basque ethnic purity' as a paramount issue." Arana rejected industrialization and urbanization precisely because he identified those phenomena with an influx of Spaniards and an erosion of Basque identity.

[12] In this recent work, *Zionism and History: The Rise of a New Jewish Consciousness* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 16–17, Shmuel Almog observes that early Zionists "perceived life as an arena of constant struggle between various contenders, so that the Jews, like all the others, had to fight for their position. . . . The event they repeatedly cited as the paragon of Jewish self-esteem was the Maccabean revolt, which they portrayed as the valiant war of a small people fighting for cultural and political independence. In this war Zionism found a symbol that not only invited identification with the glorious past but also implied struggle with the outside world. More than being the emblem of an idealized past, it became the paradigm of a fight for national self-expression."

[13] Rauf R. Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle* (London: K. Rustem and George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 23.

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campaigns and hypocritical claims of successive British administrations about justice and fair play. Obviously, to the militant nationalists of Slovenia and Croatia, the shared citizenship in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been little more than a disguise for dominant Serbian interests exploiting and subjugating their non-Serbian fellow citizens.

Internal Magnifiers of Enemy Idea

Looking at domestic political contexts, it appears that nationalism's pathological tendencies are augmented by pressures assignable to three basic areas. We view these as causative, independent variables. What the variables of all three types have in common is that they induce a sense of malaise among people. These are combinations of deprivation and uncertainty about one's fate. Social situations become suffused with a sense of loss, threat of potentially additional and/or greater losses, and very importantly a sense of the fluidity in the sociopolitical context of people's lives, a sense of vulnerability as well as opportunity. The internal magnifiers may operate separately as well as jointly.

The first of our magnifiers is modernization. Rapid, discontinuous, and disruptive change occurs in the organization, structure, and values of a society. This often includes rapid and traumatic urbanization; the displacement of old industries by new ones; technological and cultural innovations bringing old and new social elements into conflict; break up in traditional linkages and associations. We also see increasing physical and social mobility, transiency, and heightened demands and expectations as inducing societal stress.[14] New social interests emerge and make extensive claims upon the state, leading in turn to increased competition, conflict for political power and scarce state-controlled resources. For Karl Deutsch, the tensions unleashed in divided societies by this competition "may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life."[15] And where

[14] See Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 268, 274, on the enduring nature of ethnicity confounding those interpreters of modernization for whom it has always been a "passing fad. . . . Loss of a sense of boundaries, not just territorial but social and psychological, may be at the core of the current outbreak of communal versus nation-state tensions. The fact that the struggle to establish new boundaries for meaningful political action is going on in countries at several different stages of modernization warns against relying on the inevitability of the nation-state or assuming that political development leads to modernity. The mobilization of ethnic groups may reflect the traumas of casting off tradition, but it may also portend innovative political forms for the future, beyond modernity." See Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics*, 120 and 255. Compare also Jeffrey A. Ross, "The Mobilization of Collective Identity: An Analytical Overview" in J. A. Ross and A. B. Cottrell, eds., *The Mobilization of Collective Identity: Comparative Perspectives* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 1–30. See also Uri Ra'anan, Maria Mesner, Keith Armes, and Kate Martin, *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1991).

[15] Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 55 (September 1961): 501.

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communal identity coincides with differential rates of modernization—a consequence in many instances of the nature of the colonial experience—a conflict-producing situation of considerable magnitude may well be in the making.

The second internal magnifier is economic. Here we confront such phenomena as inequitable regional allocations; loss of jobs and livelihoods; inflation; stagnant or declining living standards; burdensome taxes, debts, and other economic obligations; displacement of native industries by foreign ones and equivalent marketplace changes. The tensions unleashed by a general contraction of the economy are apparent, for economic downturns bring on intense competition by various ethnic and other interests for the remaining resources in state hands. What is not normally recognized is the extent of ethnic competition produced by economic expansion. "From the perspective of the dominants," notes Joseph Rothschild, "economic expansion, by opening up potential new chances for upward mobility by the subordinates, embeds the risk of the dominants' being challenged and possibly leap-frogged for skilled, prestigious, and powerful positions."[16] Either way, then, economic contraction or expansion can act as a magnifier, exacerbating potential tensions among rival interests on the political scene.

The third type of internal magnifier is political. Because state institutions are fragile and lacking in effectiveness and legitimacy, they are at a poor vantage point to mediate the struggle between competing groups for the benefits of modernity. "A society with weak political institutions," warns Samuel P. Huntington, "lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires."[17] Unable to channel participation along predetermined lines, the overloaded state becomes isolated and aloof from society, unable to structure the relations between social interests or between these interests and itself.[18] Related to this crisis in state-society relations are a number of other phenomena of a political nature that act to sharpen intergroup tensions, including the displacement of one regime by another, the creation of new states, and the changes in frontiers and jurisdictions of political bodies that create new and untested relationships among groups and individuals.[19]

These dynamic variables, usually clustered and intertwined, are likely to provoke psychological displacement effects among the populations involved. Individuals understandably fear the loss of jobs, status, or property. They dread an uncertain future and the less tangible, but psychologically quite real, needs for massive readjustments in terms of new values, outlooks, and orientations—even new modal personalities, as seems clear from the recent experiences of former communist systems. Under such circumstances, ethnic identities are likely

[16] Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics*, 116.

[17] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 24.

[18] Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 16.

[19] See Patrick Brogan, *The Fighting Never Stopped* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 394–399 on the linkage between Gorbachev's *glasnost* and the 1988 outbreak of massive demonstrations in Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh question. As Patrick Brogan points out, among Basques, ETA violence "has greatly accelerated . . . *since* the restoration of [Spanish] democracy." Ibid., 523. (Emphasis added).

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to become suffused with hostile, enemy stereotypes. These may be directed by majorities against minorities, by minorities against majorities, and by various ethnic fragments against one another. Anxiety and stress are likely to be channeled toward scapegoat objects. They are also likely to be grossly exaggerated in relation to the objective world of observable and empirically verifiable phenomena.

The ethnic "alien" becomes an outlet for anguish, despair, confusion, and fear. The alien is likely to acquire oddly demonic characteristics. As the process of psychological displacement continues and intensifies, stereotypic perceptions may come to dominate and overwhelm the orderly coexistence of ethnic entities. Specific and otherwise manageable problems may fall victim to an atmosphere of ethnic hysteria. Violence, terrorism, and overt forms of aggression—organized and/or anomic—are likely to develop and multiply.

This sort of atmosphere, quintessentially irrational, is paradoxically compatible with a perfectly rational exploitation of mass psychosis by communal brokers or entrepreneurs. These political intermediaries may, quite correctly, perceive an opportunity for themselves in exploiting the underlying popular orientations in order to achieve and benefit from leadership roles and various personal perquisites. Paradoxically, ethnic psychosis may create rational opportunities for some people. In the long term, however, it is likely to be destructive of the welfare and interests of all major parties to the conflict, much in the sense in which some wars are likely to be destructive and costly both to the ostensible winners and the ostensible losers.

Effects of Internal Magnifiers

In terms of the ethnic-conflict dependent variables, one can speak of two kinds of effects produced by the independent variables.[20] One effect may be described as quantitative, the other as qualitative. More people in the population are likely to embrace the largely negative versions of ethnonationalism. Within that group, more people are also likely to engage in or simply support extreme forms of

[20] For some early experimental and small group literature linking anxiety with intolerance see Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, and Ralph K. White, "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates,'" *The Journal of Social Psychology* 10 (May 1939): 271–299. These authors, in an experiment with groups of children, discovered that tension and frustration were related to aggressive behavior, with considerable contribution to tension and frustration from uncertainty introduced into the organizational pattern. See also, Nevitt Sanford, "Individual and Social Change in Community Under Pressure: The Oath Controversy" *The Journal of Social Issues* 9 (July 1953): 25–42. "As pressure [mounts] and frustration [increases] . . . as one's identity [is] threatened . . . perceptions of the scene tend increasingly to be influenced by unconscious fantasies." Milton Rokeach, "Dogmatism and Opinionation on the Left and the Right" *The American Psychologist* 7 (July 1952): 310–311. "Dogmatism correlates significantly with anxiety. . . ." See also Milton Rokeach "The Nature and Meaning of Dogmatism," *Psychological Review* 61 (January 1954): 194–204. Rokeach says that "dogmatism and authoritarianism correlate over .60 when ethnocentrism or political-economic conservatism is held constant." But "dogmatic intolerance and ethnic intolerance are . . . related to each other to a significant degree."

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behavior manifesting ethnic hostility. In consequence of the Great Depression of 1929, Hitler and the Nazis were able to mobilize a far larger proportion of the German public in behalf of their program and activities than was the case during the relatively prosperous years of 1925, 1926, 1927 and 1928.

The Great Depression produced similar mobilizational consequences for ethnic extremism in east central Europe in the 1930s. The collapse of Soviet communism in this part of the world in the late 1980s, combined with a grave economic crisis—a painful transition from a collective, centrally-planned economy to a market economy—created a fertile ground for the revival of acute ethnic conflict.

The problem of psychological displacement of deprivation, frustration, and uncertainty is likely to be most acute among the so-called divided nationalities. For those groups classified as majoritarian within a particular area, the minority entities are easily identifiable, visible, and tangible targets for this displacement. The psychologically "helpful" enemy does not need to be invented. He is there for all to see. The fact that such minorities are, at least in some way, different from the rest of us need not be artificially manufactured. The differences are likely to be well imbedded in local consciousness—even (and so much the "better," of course) if they may be somewhat distorted in the perceptions of the "other" or "others."

Among groups classified as minorities, the sense of isolation from and vulnerability to a surrounding entity with apparently superior numbers and resources is likewise conducive to psychologically paranoid reactions. A great disproportion in power capabilities is likely to stimulate fear among those who feel challenged or threatened by the more powerful. This, too, provides a good breeding ground for hatred and distrust, although great power disproportions may also mute some expressions of antagonism among minority populations.

The External Magnifier

As suggested by the analysis in the previous sections, the breakup of European empires and nations in contemporary times has led to new internal stresses and uncertainties. National and ethnic groups, long suppressed by the heavy hand of Soviet hegemony, lived side by side in a largely frozen association. But this seemingly tranquil alliance only masked an underlying instability and incoherence. The authoritarian regime, making little use of its precious opportunity for conflict engineering, proved ineffective in building linkages between elites or in establishing recognized rules of political exchange among state and communal spokespersons.[21] As a consequence, political memories of threat and passionate hostility remained barely submerged beneath the surface, to rise again once the scaffolding of imposed institutions had been removed.

[21] Two cases where the military did make use of its hegemonic position to act creatively in structuring ethnic relations are President Gaafar el-Nimeiry's leadership in negotiating the Addis Ababa agreement, providing for a decentralized constitutional arrangement, with southern forces in 1972; and the moves by various Nigerian military regimes to establish additional states from above.

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Inevitably the end of European empire brought with it a transformation in the nature of ethnic and national encounters. In Manfred Halpern's words, "Incoherence create[d] the risk and opportunity of human choice,"[22] opening up new possibilities for internal connections within the communal group and for external disconnection between groups. The process of self-determination was a polarizing experience, reuniting ethnic kinsmen while at the same time shattering the frail economic and political ties between groups. And those group members left at the margins of the newly emerged succession states—the Serbs in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani in Nakhichevan, and so forth—represented a new exposed and vulnerable element that did not fit nicely into the new emerging state order. In certain instances, of course, creative statecraft—norms on inclusiveness in the cabinet, an ethnic balance in civil service recruitment, and proportionality in the allocation of resources among regions—has been in evidence and has facilitated internal accommodations of groups and peoples. In other cases, however, the transformation of country or empire has revealed basic incoherences, which have resisted normal conflict management strategies. The result in these instances is to expose latent animosities and to leave a wide distance between antagonistic groups.

In light of the difficulties in overcoming the gaps between rival groups in the new Eastern European political order, it is not surprising that the incoherence marking internal intergroup relations has spilled over into the international area. Unable to regularize their norms of encounter and lacking a shared sense of common fate and community, new nationalist leaders have emerged determined to transform the political system in fundamental ways. Citing such events as the atrocities against civilians and the ethnic purification drive by the Serbs in Bosnia, one diplomat described the situation in the spring of 1992 as "a defining moment on what kind of European security system we are going to have."[23] In various crises, the thresholds between internal and international affairs had become obscure.

An important fourth magnifier of contemporary intergroup struggles concerns the changes in the international environment. Given the considerable propinquity and interdependence of the modern societies in economic, environmental, and political relationships, drastic world changes may have deep domestic impacts. With changes in communications ensuring a ready flow of news across state boundaries, ideas on national self-determination, racial equity, intergroup conflict, and political liberalization are readily diffused to an international audience. Such a diffusion (or contagion) effect spreads information on domestic political demands and conflict relations to an international audience by example rather than by deliberate action, initiating an international learning process with enormous

[22] Manfred Halpern, "Changing Connections to Multiple Worlds" in Helen Kitchen, ed., *Africa: From Mystery to Maze* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1976), 12.

[23] David Binder, "The Yugoslav Crisis: Why U.S. Is Bearing Down on Belgrade," *New York Times*, 27 May 1992.

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potential for conflict creation.[24] Moreover, long-held norms of international interaction are currently being reassessed. Thus the traditional notion of sovereign statehood, widely regarded as a given in international politics, is now looked upon with some skepticism; this leads to an increasing acceptance of what J. Bryan Hehir describes as the human rights "revolution"—the "reshap[ing of] the conception of who is to be recognized as a subject of rights (now it is states *and* individuals) and the scope of the legal responsibility of states."[25] The emphasis upon the universal applicability of human rights principles leads directly to the acceptance of new international commitments to assure the basic rights of beleaguered minority peoples, including international sanctions and humanitarian interventions. Changes in alliance and world trade patterns, as well as the gravitational effects exerted by international organizations, also have important implications for domestic intergroup relations.

The actual intervention of external actors (states, international organizations, private interests) in an internal conflict situation in another state may have either negative or positive implications. Whether a matter of state policy or a response to domestic pressures, such a process of state intervention in the affairs of another can in certain circumstances allow a confrontation to fester and worsen or inflame local ethnic and nationality conflicts. External interventions of the conflict-creating variety normally assume three forms: foreign political and military alignment with domestic state authorities leading to an intensification of a civil war, external nonmilitary protest and pressure, and direct military involvement in an internal confrontation. U.S. political support for "the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia" in the early stages of the crisis seemed passive in the face of the widening confrontation taking place in Croatia and may well have contributed to a widening war.[26] Similarly, United States political and military backing strengthened the regimes of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia in the 1950s and 1960s and Sadiq al-Mahdi in Sudan in the 1980s, resulting in increased resentment as well as expanded and intensified struggles by their Eritrean, Tigrayan, and Southern Sudanese oppositions.[27] The use of external pressure for destructive ends became evident in the 1930s as the Nazis backed the Sudeten German demand for self-determination from Czechoslovakia to undermine the existence of the Czechoslovak state itself. Commenting on the destructive use of the self-determination issue in these circumstances, Edward Beneš wrote that "it was via these problems that the first and foremost attack would be launched

[24] On the international diffusion process, see Stuart Hill and Donald Rothchild, "The Contagion of Political Conflict in Africa and the World," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30 (December 1986): 716–722.

[25] J. Bryan Hehir, "The United States and Human Rights: Policy for the 1990s in Light of the Past" in K. Oye, R. Lieber, and D. Rothchild, eds., *Eagle in A New World* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 235.

[26] Dennison Rusinow, "Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup?" *Foreign Policy* 83 (Summer 1991): 144.

[27] Donald Rothchild, "Africa's Ethnic Conflicts and Their Implications for U.S. Policy" in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., *Africa in the 1990s and Beyond* (Algonac, MI: Reference Publications, 1988), 272–274.

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against our independence and existence and *against our state as a whole*."[28] Finally, direct or indirect military interventions have also led to an intensification of local encounters. Thus Yugoslav government support for the Serbian irregulars in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopian safe sanctuary and military backing of the insurgents in the Southern Sudan, South African assistance to the Renamo movement in Mozambique, and Libyan arms shipments to the IRA have all fueled ethnic-related conflicts, complicating the processes of effective governance and making it difficult to encourage moderate politics and negotiated outcomes.

However, external interventions in domestic struggles clearly have a positive dimension as well. Diplomatic protests of human rights violations are increasingly common and involve a limited concern on the part of external actors to ensure the security or well-being of exposed minorities in another country. Formal protests against violence directed against Croatians and Bosnians by Serbian irregulars, the application of South Africa's apartheid laws, the harassment of Uganda's Asians, the destructive actions of Sri Lanka's militant Tamil minority, the repression of Iran's Baha'i community, or the deportation of Palestinians from Israel all represented rather low-cost forms of intervening into internal ethnic encounters. Such protests draw attention to the violations allegedly taking place and may even attempt to establish appropriate standards of behavior under the circumstances. However, because they do not necessarily involve any significant political, economic, or military commitment, they may be resisted by determined governments.

A more active form of international intervention into domestic conflicts takes place as states or international organizations seek to change the course of an internal conflict by using nonmilitary means to raise the costs of current policies in target countries. Powerful countries such as the United States can exert a wide array of pressures to alter the behavior of other states toward their minority communities. For example, the United States put pressure on authorities in Belgrade when it placed sanctions on trade and international flights; closed the embassy, terminated aid projects, and imposed an embargo on trade and investment in Uganda in the latter phase of Idi Amin's rule; invoked sanctions against Rhodesia, South Africa and Iraq; and suspended loan guarantees to Israel to alter that country's policies on housing and settlements in the West Bank. Trade, aid, and normal diplomatic intercourse were used as levers to push other governments toward altering their treatment of ethnic outgroups. Similarly, regional organizations and international bodies have employed a variety of coercive incentives to pressure European and Middle Eastern governments to resolve their differences with communal interests in their midst.

A further commitment by an external actor to resolve an internal conflict in another state involves the extension of military assistance or the dispatch of

[28] *Memoirs of Dr. Edward Beneš*, Godfrey Lias, trans. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1954), 211. (Emphasis added.)

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combat troops. "Perhaps the most common activity," writes Marvin Weinbaum, "has an outside power identifying itself with one or more of the combatants—with the implied threat to act on its behalf. In a more tangible form, support may vary from turning a blind eye at borders to shipping arms in a massive, if clandestine, arms supply program sometimes accompanied by military advisers."[29] Here the line between defensive and offensive engagements is anything but clear. Iranian aid to the Shiites and Israeli assistance to the Maronites in Lebanon could be interpreted in various ways; the technical support and material assistance advances the ambitions of the supplier, while at the same time it increases the capacity of the recipient to protect itself and, paradoxically, to make claims on its benefactor.[30] The same ambiguities, moreover, are in evidence where combat troops are sent to the assistance of an internal combatant. On different occasions South African forces came to the defense of Jonas Savimbi's largely Ovimbundu-based National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, partly to prevent it from being overwhelmed by Angolan government forces and partly to ensure against a total communist onslaught launched from Angolan territory.[31] In another instance of mixed motives, the U.S. military intervention in Lebanon on the side of the pro-Western and Christian-led regime of Camille Chamoun in 1958 had both its strategic implications (to uphold the Eisenhower Doctrine) and its humanitarian implications (to halt the movement toward a perceived intercommunal massacre).[32]

Finally, foreign states and other international actors can function as third-party intervenors in disputes involving ethnic and nationality interests. As the costs of conflict mount and are perceived by the various antagonists as "a mutually hurting stalemate"—described by I. W. Zartman as "a flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future, providing no later possibilities for decisive escalation or for graceful escape"—the rivals may be prepared to explore the basis for a settlement of their differences.[33] The decision by a public or private external actor to intervene as conciliator, mediator, or arbitrator involves a major commitment on its part, for it often entails becoming embroiled in a bitter internal dispute. On various occasions, however, states, private actors, and international organizations have stepped into these internal conflicts with varying consequences. Reflecting the intensity of these encounters, Stephen Stedman shows that in the

[29] Marvin G. Weinbaum, "The Internationalization of Domestic Conflict in the Middle East," *Middle East Review* 20 (Fall 1987): 36.

[30] Shai Feldman writes that in making commitments to the Maronites, "Israel lost its capacity to maintain complete control over the level of its involvement in Lebanon." See Feldman, "Israel's Involvement in Lebanon: 1975–1985" in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson, and Larry Berman, eds., *Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 139.

[31] On South Africa's motivations for intervening in Angola, see Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, "The Case of Angola: Four Power Intervention and Disengagement" in ibid., 170.

[32] See Rothchild, "Africa's Ethnic Conflicts," 280.

[33] I. William Zartman. *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, updated ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 268.

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period from 1900 to 1989, forty-one out of sixty-eight civil wars ended in the elimination or capitulation of one side or the other. Of the negotiated settlements, moreover, seven are categorized as unstable, relapsing shortly afterward in renewed fighting.[34] Mediation, then, is a somewhat difficult and uncertain undertaking. If it proved successful in regularizing relationships in such divided societies as Zimbabwe and Angola, it has been unable to surmount conflicts in Cyprus, Israel and the Arab countries, Nigeria-Biafra, and the Iraqi-Kurdish confrontation. In Sudan, the World Council of Churches, backed at critical junctures by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, managed to preside over a settlement in 1972 between the Sudanese government and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, only to see the carefully drafted agreement fall apart and a renewal of fighting in the early 1980s. In the 1990s, the United Nations has stepped cautiously into the role of mediator in the struggle between Serbia and Croatia and then again in the confrontation between Bosnian Serb forces and the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina; after working out numerous cease-fires and other agreements with these contending forces, the world community has watched with growing horror and disappointment as ethnic tensions overwhelmed the best laid plans of these rational third-party actors.

Coping Mechanisms

If states in the 1990s may be said to have an interest, all other things being equal, in domestic peace and stability; in economic efficiency; in being perceived as attractive outlets for foreign investment; in acting as legitimate participants in the international and regional organizations promoting economic, environmental, and security cooperation, then they must also be seen as having an important stake in dampening or defusing ethnic conflicts within their borders. And this will require, in many instances, considerable institutional attention to the psychological manifestations of such conflicts and to their apparently secondary consequences. These, if untreated, may turn out to be far more important than the ostensible causes of why it is that, allegedly, Serbs do (and need to) fear Croatians and Bosnians; or why Armenians need to struggle against the Azerbaijanis, and likewise Ukranians living in Russia, Russians living in the Ukraine, or Hungarians living in Romania and Slovakia.

Looking at the problem in terms of its psychological or even psychoanalytic analogy (in the political science tradition of Harold Lasswell) one needs to recognize the necessity of having the patient confront both the nature and the origins or causes of his problems.[35] In psychiatric practice, this might involve the use of clinical techniques. Psychosis needs to be addressed and treated. It cannot be ignored. Given the challenge of large groups, the techniques required by modern societies can only be anchored in the appropriate use of educational systems and

[34] Stephen John Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974–1980* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 5.

[35] Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

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mass communication media. There needs to be a serious concern with a socially therapeutic role in struggling against vicious and irrational stereotypes, empathizing with the legitimate concerns of other groups, and in promoting universalistic norms of legal-rational behavior and equal forms of citizenship. This is an obviously difficult task, because the short-term rational incentives of important political actors, including media leaders, in periods of widespread anxiety point toward acquiescence in and/or exploitation of mass moods. The task obviously requires very high-minded leadership.

Important as they are, such therapeutic or confidence-building measures may nonetheless prove insufficient to build bridges between communities that are deeply suspicious and hostile. We recognize that not all relationships can be subsumed under this description, with some groups continuing to compete according to well understood rules for distributable goods. But in those cases where ethnicity displays "intractable" qualities, policy innovation, as Donald Horowitz stresses, is clearly limited from the outset.[36]

Hence if internal bargaining and policy mechanisms are not adequate to change perceptions among belligerent groups, then it may well become necessary to transform these relationships and attempt to link internal with external strategies. This entails making use of the potential in the international environment for restructuring the encounter—providing inducements to promote cooperative behavior and to create new institutions that will "coordinate the participants' expectations and actions."[37] International actors, who respond to their own competing internal and external influences, may nonetheless be prepared to intercede in a domestic situation in order to alter bellicose attitudes, moving the interaction among internal interests along more constructive lines. Well established regional organizations, such as the European Community, may be willing to embrace many small succession states and to help reunite divided minorities with their ethnic kinsmen across borders, thereby linking modern economic imperatives of multilateralism with the narrower, parochial concerns of ethnonationalism.

In some cases, strong and determined mediators have used the resources at their disposal to provide the necessary incentives to encourage state and ethnic leaders to agree to new institutions and coalitional and alliance arrangements. But the inclusive potential of regional organization and the possibilities of mediation by capable and determined third-party intermediaries are not to be taken for granted, nor is the willingness of belligerents to accept integration into a broader Europe or to move toward moderate positions recommended by third-party intermediaries. Realism requires a continuing search to manage pathological ethnicity, while recognizing that the global political environment of the twenty-first century is likely to contain new variants of ethnonationalism, as well as the potential of identity-related politics for destructive behavior.*

[36] Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 564.

[37] Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," *International Security* 14 (Spring 1990): 29.

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Democratization in South Africa

HERMANN GILIOMEE

South Africa has long been considered one of the countries where a transition to democracy is least likely. Yet in the beginning of 1990 the ruling National party (NP) did the unthinkable: it deliberately embarked on a process that would end white minority rule. The comparative context in which South Africa previously found itself was that of Northern Ireland and Greater Israel with their intractable communal conflicts in which an inclusive democracy is an unlikely outcome.[1] Recently, however, several analyses have argued that South Africa was less divided and the prospects for democracy brighter than had been generally assumed. Van Zyl Slabbert states bluntly: "There is no single or inherent reason why South Africa could not become a stable, functioning democracy."[2] Sammy Smooha and Theodor Hanf declare that "an individually-based liberal democracy is the only option for settling permanently the conflict in the country."[3] Heribert Adam proclaims boldly: "In South Africa, unlike in other divided societies, a vast majority of both sides agrees theoretically on a secular multiparty democracy in a unified state. Could it be that South Africa with an advanced, interdependent economy constitutes far more of a common than a plural society?"[4]

[1] Hermann Giliomee and Jannie Gagiano, eds., *The Elusive Search For Peace: South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990); Donald Harman Akenson, *God's Peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel and Ulster* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).

[2] F. van Zyl Slabbert, "Hope after Happy Hour," *Sunday Times*, 3 January 1993. For a more considered analysis see his *The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in Transition* (Johannesburg: Penguin Forum Series, 1992), 99.

[3] Sammy Smooha and Theodor Hanf, "The Diverse Modes of Conflict – Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 33 (1992): 41–42.

[4] Heribert Adam, Book review, *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 27 (Fall 1991): 295–96. For a more qualified statement see Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, *The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 35–36.

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This article takes a different view. It argues that South Africa lacks the social requisites associated with the consolidation of liberal democracies: broad-based economic development and national homogeneity. The process of democratization has in some respects been undetermined, but in other ways South Africa's history as a racial oligarchy continues to have a powerful impact on it. The fact that neither the ruling NP nor the main liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), was decisively defeated at the end of the 1980s is likely to weigh heavily on the first postapartheid government. For all these reasons, an orthodox liberal democracy is an unlikely outcome of the power struggle in which the country will be engaged for most of the 1990s.

Pressures For Liberalization

In their influential comparative analysis of democratic transitions, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter observe that regimes often miss golden opportunities to liberalize during economic booms and only do so when they are going through some serious crisis. From this one can infer that political liberalization in this analytical framework is an elite response rather than an elite initiative.[5] A perceptive 1981 analysis of South Africa by Samuel Huntington foreshadowed this perspective. Stability in the racial oligarchy, it concluded, rested on ruling group cohesion, the superior coercive power of the state, and black political divisions. However, it added an important rider: white domination would be difficult to maintain if revolutionary violence created sufficient trouble to cause divisions among the dominant group over ways to deal with it.[6]

In 1981 neither Huntington nor South Africa-based analysts expected negotiations for a democracy to start within ten years. Neither was it clear whether the marginal liberalization that was occurring during the 1970s and 1980s was an elite initiative or an elite response. There was indeed abundant evidence to adduce for both views. An elite initiative perspective would argue that the process was triggered by the high economic growth of the 1960s, which created severe skilled labor shortages only blacks could meet. From the beginning of the 1970s, the regime embarked on clumsy and haphazard reform of the system of labor segregation and some other forms of apartheid with a view to promoting greater growth and stability. There was much debate over whether all the reforms were a sham, but the state was being transformed from a *Boereplaas*[7] (literally the homestead

[5] Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa" (paper presented to the 88th meeting of the American Sociological Association, Miami, Florida, 1993); Guilermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), 17.

[6] Samuel P. Huntington, "Reform and Stability in a Modernizing Multi-Ethnic Society," *Politikon* (December 1981): 11.

[7] Jannie Gagiano, "Meanwhile back on the 'Boereplaas,'" *Politikon* 13 (December 1986): 3–21; see also Hermann Giliomee, "Afrikaner Politics, 1977–87: From Afrikaner Nationalist Rule to Central State Hegemony" in John D. Brewer, ed., *Can South Africa Survive?: Five Minutes to Midnight* (Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, 1988), 108–135.

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of the Boers or Afrikaners) to an inclusive, multiracial state. This modernization process shifted the terms of the negotiations with the extraparliamentary movement that would start at the end of the 1980s: it was not over replacing the state or the wholesale substitution of its personnel but giving blacks equitable access to power and to the resources of a state that was already multiracial and committed to narrowing racial disparities.[8]

A quite different interpretation sees the reform process as an elite response to black struggles, which from the early 1970s eroded the very foundations on which white power rested. Economic stagnation since 1974 further limited the scope for repression. By the end of the 1980s the anti-apartheid struggle had produced such a political transformation that the regime was forced to embark on negotiations to replace minority rule with a form of government based upon the previously disenfranchised minority.[9] Yet no convincing case can be made that the regime at the end of the 1980s was forced to embark on substantial liberalization and on negotiations with leaders of the extraparliamentary movement for an inclusive democracy. The nation-wide State of Emergency imposed in mid-1986 dealt a severe setback to the extraparliamentary movement. Even a regime like John Vorster's or Pieter Willem Botha's South Africa remained quite stable, because the coercive organization (the security forces and civil bureaucracy) remained coherent and effective, and were in harmony with the state apparatus as a whole and the dominant class forces. Intrablack divisions soon reappeared, especially between the ANC and the Zulu-based Inkatha movement (IFP), over the use of ethnicity for political mobilization and over international sanctions against South Africa. With blacks overwhelmingly dependent on white-controlled jobs there was no stratum or class, except students, ready for an open and extended confrontation with the regime.

Frederik W. de Klerk's government's decision at the end of 1989 to open negotiations with the ANC over a democracy was a bold initiative that took both its own constituency and the black extraparliamentary movement by surprise. To be sure, the government was under some pressure. In the general election of September 1989 the ruling NP lost support to both left-wing and the right-wing opponents and was facing a pincer threat to its forty-year dominance of white politics.[10] The economy was stagnating, and there was little chance of sanctions being rolled back. Negotiations with black leaders within an apartheid framework had come to a dead end. On the other hand, it was generally believed that white supremacy was under no immediate threat. Furthermore, there was no serious internal division in the ruling elite, which is the starting-point of the O'Donnell-

[8] Among the numerous studies of apartheid reform are Heribert Adam, *Modernizing Racial Domination* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); and Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, *From Apartheid to Nation-building* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[9] For a study from this perspective, see Robert M. Price, *The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975–1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[10] Lawrence Schlemmer, "The Turn in the Road" in Robin Lee and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., *Transition to Democracy* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991), 14–23.

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Schmitter analysis.[11] President Botha, who had been resisting further reform and lifting the State of Emergency, was forced to retire in mid-1989, mainly on account of ill health; but De Klerk was a centrist in the party who easily managed to straddle the not too serious divisions between reformists and stand-patters in his party. He had opposed the free hand Botha had given to the security forces in the late 1980s to combat the insurgency, but the army and police generals quickly accepted the new civilian leadership and its prerogative to follow a different approach to political and security matters. De Klerk's sharp break with the past was made possible by the context in which he operated. If there is something exceptional about a democratically organized ethnic oligarchy like that of the Afrikaners it is, first, the prerogative of the inner circle of government to decide on major policy shifts in order to advance or protect ethnic group interests and, second, the working of the consensus principle that prompts elites in the ruling party and its cultural and economic support organizations to accept and propagate these shifts as the product of rational decisions by informed and trusted political leaders.[12] In the 1980s some 30 percent of the Afrikaners left the NP to support rightwing parties, but the NP continued to function in the fashion described above.[13]

De Klerk's fundamental shift to unban the liberation organizations and negotiate an inclusive democracy was the product of an Afrikaner group debate of the late 1980s in which political, bureaucratic, cultural, and economic elites considered the forces impacting upon the projects for survival of Afrikaner and the larger white community in the 1990s and beyond. Three forces received special consideration: a weakening demographic base, a dramatically different external environment, and economic stagnation.

A Weakening Demographic Base

Perhaps the most important fact in South African history is that from 1700 to 1960 the proportion of whites to the overall population of South Africa was always sufficient to man all the strategic positions in the political, economic, and administrative systems of the country. Whites owned almost all the land, did all the skilled and most of the semiskilled jobs in the mines and factories, and staffed the top and medium-level positions in the civil service, army, and police. Unlike Brazil, South Africa never needed to produce a relatively free and more privileged mulatto class to occupy the intermediate positions in the

[11] For an analysis of the transition in South Africa within the O'Donnell-Schmitter framework, see Andre du Toit, *South Africa as Another Case of Transition from Authoritarian Rule* (Cape Town: Idasa, 1990).

[12] Heribert Adam, "Perspectives in the Literature" in Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 27. For an elaboration of the point, see my chapter in the same study, "How the System Works," 196–257.

[13] See Hermann Giliomee, "'Broedertwis': Intra-Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid," *African Affairs* 91 (July 1992): 339–364.

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economy, thus forming a bridge between the poor and the rich, and between blacks and whites. By 1960, however, a vital change began to make itself felt. Between 1910 and 1960 whites constituted 20 percent of the total population, but from 1960 the white demographic base started to shrink. By 1985 the proportion of whites to the total population had fallen to 15 percent, and it is projected to fall to 11 percent by 2010. An acute shortage of white manpower developed in both the public and private sectors.

The 1950s and 1960s saw the apartheid state greatly increasing the number of whites employed to staff the apartheid bureaucracies and to implement the myriad of apartheid laws. By the mid-1970s these bureaucracies had come up against their own limits. The state had overreached itself in its own spending and administrative capacities, and there were simply not enough whites available to staff the top and medium levels of both the private and public sectors. The mammoth Department of Bantu Administration and Development found itself more and more incapable of stemming the flow of Africans to the cities. As a result of much expanded provision of education, the urban African population of the 1980s was far better educated and trained—and much more radicalized politically than was the case in the first three decades of apartheid. Surveys consistently showed that the higher the level of education of Africans, the more acute their political discontent and the more pressing their political and status demands.

De Klerk was an unlikely candidate for transformative leadership. As Transvaal leader of the party he constantly tried to shore up its conservative base. In 1984 he tried to persuade Alan Hendrickse, one of the first black members of the cabinet, to prolong the life of the racial sex laws to give the NP more chance to prepare whites for their abolition. Yet De Klerk was of a different mold compared to Botha. He was twenty years younger, much better educated, and more in touch with the outside world. A formative experience was his membership in a special cabinet committee established in 1984 to discuss political rights for Africans. Specialists presented future scenarios and demographic data to the committee that pointed to a steady weakening of the white demographic and political base. De Klerk became convinced that continued coercion was not the solution: only a new political strategy could ensure stability and Afrikaner and larger white survival.[14]

Within the Afrikaner cultural elite, a similar fundamental reevaluation of strategy was occurring. A document of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond circulating in mid-1986 illuminates the new thinking. Headed "Political Values for the Survival of the Afrikaner," it argued that ultimately the most important prerequisite for Afrikaner survival was the acceptability of a new constitution for the majority of the population. In a concluding passage the document stated bluntly: "The greatest risk that we are taking today is not taking any risks. The will

[14] Interviews by author with civil servants attending the special cabinet committee meetings.

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to survive as Afrikaners and our faith and energy will serve as our greatest guarantee."[15]

For De Klerk the choice for whites lay between being driven back into a corner over the next ten or fifteen years and staging an outflanking movement that could yield to him and his party a strategic position in a democratic government. He knew that the Afrikaners and the larger white group had a much better chance of striking a bargain now than if they waited a further ten years. He put this succinctly in a speech shortly after legalizing the liberation movements: "We have not waited until the position of power dominance turned against us before we decided to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The initiative is in our hands. We have the means to ensure that the process develops peacefully and in an orderly way."[16] For De Klerk the lesson of Rhodesia was that the Smith regime "waited too long before engaging in fundamental negotiation. We must not make that mistake, and we are determined not to repeat that mistake."[17]

Economic Pressure

The government's decision to negotiate was also influenced by economic pressures among which foreign sanctions played a definite, if complex, role. In 1988 and 1989 cabinet ministers both in public and in private interviews insisted that sanctions made it more difficult for the cabinet to break finally with apartheid, lest it appeared vulnerable to the electorate to foreign pressure. However, in arguing for a yes vote in the 1992 white referendum on negotiations, senior party spokespeople acknowledged the contributing role of sanctions in the government's decision to negotiate, adding that the economy had been bled white.

In assessing the impact of sanctions, three categories must be distinguished: disinvestment, trade restrictions, and bans on long-term credit. Disinvestment by itself did not affect the functioning of the economy, but it set a process in train which would culminate in the U.S. Congress adoption in 1986 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which virtually ensured that no apartheid government could roll back sanctions in the industrialized world. The most serious were financial sanctions triggered by the refusal of Chase Manhattan and other international banks in 1985 to roll over loans. These sanctions continued to act as a major constraint on economic growth as the government was forced to run a surplus on the current account of the balance of payments. Trade sanctions were circumvented, albeit at a cost, and exports increased substantially in real terms in the second half of the 1980s as new markets outside Western Europe and the United States opened up.

[15] "Political Values for the Survival of the Afrikaner" (unpublished document of the Afrikaner Broederbond, ca. July 1986).

[16] *Die Burger*, 31 March 1990.

[17] Cited by Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 155.

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Since there was nearly enough investment capital in South Africa, the country could have weathered sanctions if there was a secure enough environment for local business to invest and the economy to grow. Since the mid-1970s, however, the framework in which business had to operate deteriorated. The white-ruled states on its borders collapsed and the Soweto uprising of 1976 hit investor confidence. Increases in the gross domestic product (GDP) declined from 5.7 percent in the 1960s to 3.4 percent in the 1970s and 1.5 percent in the 1980s. Some of the causes were not related to apartheid, like an initial steep rise in the oil price, the declining value of the mineral exports, and drought. Other causes were, however, intimately interwoven with the mounting political crisis. They had to do with the costs of the apartheid system itself, with the declining prospects for economic profitability as a result of an increasingly unstable political environment, and the rise of tough black trade unions. During the 1980s gross fixed investment plummeted from 26 percent of GDP in 1983 to 16 percent in 1991. An investment level of 16 percent of GDP meant that it was impossible for the South African economy to grow, since the economy needed 14 percent investment simply to replace capital equipment that was wearing out. Because of the steep fall in private investment, the number of new jobs created in the industrial sector dwindled from 448,000 in the 1960s to a mere 28,000 in the late 1980s. By 1990 only one in ten new entrants to the job market could get work. This in turn exacerbated the security situation.

In stark contrast to the sinking investment rate, government consumer spending rose sharply from 15 percent in 1983 to 21 percent in 1991. At this point spending as a proportion of GDP was twice that of comparable states like Chile and Hungary.[18] This was primarily due to two factors. On the one hand, the government spent a growing part of its budget to mollify an important part of its constituency—that third of the white population who worked for the public sector. On the other hand, there was a sharp increase of both white and black civil servants, particularly police, teachers, and nurses, as the state tried to cope with the administrative demands of the fast-growing black population. Between 1980 and 1991 the level of employment in the central government rose by 75 percent. To pay for this, the state not only increased the tax burden, resting as it did on a fairly narrow base, but also increasingly borrowed money. In 1975, interest on public debt was only 5 percent of government expenditure; by 1992 it had spurted to 19 percent, making it the largest single item of government expenditure.

Thus sanctions worked in tandem with internal pressures to create a pervasive sense of business pessimism. Only by negotiating a stable political framework attractive to new investment could the government hope to address the country's fundamental economic problems, particularly the grave crisis of unemployment among blacks.

[18] Calculations on consumer and investment spending by Rudolf Gouws of Rand Merchant Bank, which were used by Minister of Finance Derek Keys in presentations to the cabinet and ANC economic planners and to audiences in Washington in September 1992.

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A Changing Ideological and External Environment

Representing a mixed bag of penalties and opportunities and of sticks and carrots, the external environment greatly facilitated negotiations. An argument can be made that ideological and diplomatic sanctions were more effective than economic sanctions. The majority of whites continued to desire acceptance in the Western world. If apartheid satisfied their material desires, it increasingly left unrequited the yearning of people for recognition of their own worth, individually and collectively, and the hope to invest the self with a certain value.[19] Whites knew all too well that a democracy had become the price of admission to the Western world. Here the leadership variable was crucial: President Botha was not prepared to pay that price and could impose his views on the party; De Klerk, by contrast, was willing to explore the possibility of negotiating a settlement supported by both the West and his own constituency.

During the 1980s the international ostracization of South Africa had begun to bite, with South Africa increasingly excluded from sporting, scientific, and academic circles. For any system to function well it needs legitimacy in the eyes of its own close supporters.[20] Apartheid as a specific system of rule was now being seriously questioned by Afrikaner church leaders and academics, two key support groups. In 1982 the main Afrikaner church, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), was expelled from the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. Its "sister" church in the colored community, the *Sendingkerk* (Mission Church), refused to meet with it before it confessed its guilt about providing the moral and theological foundations of apartheid. In 1986 the DRC finally declared that apartheid was incompatible with Christian ethics and distanced itself from the old close identification with the state and with the Afrikaner people. Afrikaner academics attacked apartheid in ever stronger terms. By the end of the 1980s no prominent Afrikaner academic in the social sciences, humanities, or law publicly defended apartheid any longer. The effects on the NP were momentous. John Kane-Berman, an experienced liberal analyst, expressed his conviction in 1992 that apartheid began to collapse when the NP intellectuals and the DRC withdrew their support.[21]

The war in Angola, in which South African troops backed Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement, represented the mixture of constraints and opportunities generated by a changing external environment at its most acute. By the mid-1980s the rising costs of the war, the unanticipated escalation by the Cubans, and the increasing unpopularity of the war at home had made Angola an albatross, which South Africa needed to sever from its body. It had to be done in a way that South Africa could claim that it had secured its stated objective—to remove foreign troops from the region before it allowed Namibia to become independent. Negotia-

[19] For a general discussion borne out by the South African case, see Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992); Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 316.

[20] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 16.

[21] Stanley Uys, "The Deadly Silence of Church Leaders on Violence," *The Star International Weekly*, 15–21 October 1992.

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tions in which both the United States and the Soviet Union acted as honest brokers achieved this objective in a way that made all sides appear as winners.[22] In government ranks it inevitably raised the question of whether negotiations could not resolve the South African conflict in the same way.

Yet De Klerk would not have moved toward negotiations with the ANC as long as it was strongly backed by the Soviet Union. As late as September 1989, De Klerk sent word to his brother to stop talking to the ANC. In his view, this movement could never have a role in negotiations. Informal talks with the ANC by South Africans hoping to act as third parties, in De Klerk's words, "played into the hands of forces who are geared toward destabilizing South Africa and destroying the good order."[23] De Klerk was also concerned that when negotiations started the United States might only pressurize the government and not the liberation movements as well.

In the last months of 1989 the external environment improved dramatically from the government's point of view. For the first time it considered negotiations a viable option. The crucial development was the severe internal troubles experienced by the Soviet Union. Moscow told the ANC that it was up to the South Africans themselves to reach a political accommodation. At the same time Pretoria believed that without Soviet backing it had a much better chance to contain a legalized ANC. It was heartened by a clear statement of the Bush administration that it would put as much pressure on the black majority as on the white power structure to engage in fruitful negotiations and that it would criticize the first party to move away from these negotiations.

For the ANC the late 1980s also represented a watershed. It had long favoured the nationalization of large sectors of the economy, but it was now confronted with mounting evidence of the malperformance of economies under centralized control in Eastern Europe and Africa. With the South African economy already in trouble, the leadership saw the need for negotiating functional political and economic structures that could deliver on the greatly raised expectations of its followers. Even more important in its decision to begin negotiations were the two major setbacks it received in the form of the New York Accords of 1988 and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Accords, which provided for the independence of Namibia and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, compelled the ANC to evacuate camps in Angola—its last remaining sanctuary within reach of South Africa. Although the ANC had achieved a diplomatic breakthrough in getting its leader Oliver Tambo to meet with the U.S. secretary of state, the reigning power balance in South Africa left no room for any illusions. As Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker expressed it: "The reality was that the white government and the opposition had check-mated each other. Neither could move unilaterally: the black resistance had no hope of forcing the govern-

[22] Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood* (New York: Norton, 1992).

[23] Willem de Klerk, *F. W. de Klerk: Die Man en sy Tyd* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1991), 62–63.

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ment to capitulate, but the government could no longer hope to regain the legitimacy it lost in the 1980s."[24]

If there was a decisive factor in the ANC's abandonment of the revolutionary struggle, it was the collapse of the communist states in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which deprived the ANC of its most important sources of funding. The pressure by the Soviet Union and neighboring African states to negotiate, the limitations of the strategies of armed struggle and mass insurrection, and the scattered successes in town-level negotiations by allied organizations inside the country—all pushed the ANC in the direction of the negotiations option. In sum, complex interrelated factors combined to bring about the demise of statutory apartheid.

The ANC made it clear that it was no supplicant in any negotiations. Pre-negotiations had started in July 1986, when Nelson Mandela, by then incarcerated a quarter of a century, requested a meeting with President Botha. Confronted with a set of preconditions for such a meeting, Mandela refused and sent the message that he intended to discuss the future of South Africa only "as equals."[25] In the final months of his term in jail he suggested the formula on which formal negotiations could begin. A settlement would necessitate meeting two demands: that of blacks for majority rule and that of whites that this would not mean domination of the white minority by blacks.[26]

At the outset of the negotiations, the government was convinced that it could not concede the demand for conventional majority rule and retain its constituency. As Donald Horowitz pointed out, in divided societies elections assume the form of a racial or ethnic census. An essential ingredient of a democracy is lacking: "the possibility of shifting majorities, of oppositions becoming governments, of an alterable public opinion."[27] In the immediate aftermath of the legalization of the ANC on 2 February 1990, polls showed that under both a constituency-based and conventional proportional representation electoral system the ANC could confidently expect to win more than 60 percent of the seats. This would relegate the NP to a perpetual minority, giving the ANC the victory it could not achieve in the revolutionary struggle. This was what De Klerk's constituency expected him to prevent. Polls showed that white elites by the end of 1989 accepted the idea of negotiations with the ANC, but they were convinced that negotiations did not entail bargaining only about the transfer of power.[28]

[24] Crocker, *High Noon*, 491.

[25] Interview by author with Nelson Mandela, 12 March 1992. For a full discussion of pre-negotiations, see Johannes Rantete and Hermann Giliomee; "Transition to Democracy through Transaction?" *African Affairs* 91 (October 1992): 505–542.

[26] Nelson Mandela, *The Struggle is My Life* (London: IDAF Publications, 1990), 28, 63.

[27] Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 86.

[28] E. G. Lombard, "Elite-houdings oor onderhandeling in Suid-Afrika" (M. A. Dissertation, University of Stellenbosch, 1991).

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Liberalization and Democratization

Liberalization and democratization are two analytically distinct processes driven by different considerations and objectives. As comparative analyses point out, it is usually the regime that takes the initiative for liberalization, which involves the extension of civil rights. By contrast, the opposition exerts the most pressure for a liberal democracy. If the democratic opposition is unable to apply enough pressure, the process may stop well short of that.[29]

The NP under De Klerk also had a constricted vision of negotiations and of the degree of democratization that was required. Huntington's comparative statement holds very true for South Africa: liberalizers tend to see liberalization as a way of defusing opposition without fully democratizing.[30] To be specific: while quite prepared to abolish apartheid and remove other obstacles to negotiations, De Klerk did not envisage competitive elections and a system that could reduce the NP to a perpetual opposition party. He made his view clear that this "would sound the death knell to South Africa."[31] Thus for him negotiations would only be about power-sharing. While Botha had been prepared to dominate to ensure Afrikaner and larger white survival, De Klerk demanded something less—a constitutional settlement in which members of the group he represented would not be dominated by nonmembers.[32]

But if De Klerk was far from the classic liberal democrat, neither was the ANC when the negotiations started. It was very similar to African liberation movements from the independence of Ghana to that of Zimbabwe, which produced single-party systems, not democracies.[33] The tendency in such movements is to identify the movement, its ideology, and its leaders with the corporate will of the entire nation, which is seen as an undifferentiated community. The movement as the expression of the national will becomes the rationale for eliminating political competitors. In a similar way Nelson Mandela depicts the ANC not as a political party but "a parliament of the African people." It had no ideology because this "would split the organization from the top to bottom."[34] As an analyst concluded: "Transition to democracy requires the breaking-up of that movement into a variety of organizations, representing the different interests and conflicts of a real country rather than of an idealized oppressed nation."[35]

[29] O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 61–62.

[30] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 129.

[31] Transcript of TV interview, 14 May 1989; see also his speech in *House of Assembly Debates*, 23 May 1989.

[32] Walker Connor stresses in a comparative context that this often is what an ethno-national group wants—autonomy, not independence. See his "Ethno-nationalism and Political Instability" in *The Elusive Search for Peace*, 27.

[33] Marina Ottaway, "Liberation Movements and Transition to Democracy: The Case of the ANC," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 29 (March 1991): 61–82.

[34] Cited in ibid., 68.

[35] Ibid., 82.

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The Character of the Transition

In the discussion about the transition to democracy that the world has witnessed since the mid-1970s, three categorical distinctions are drawn: transition through transformation; transition after regime breakdown; transition through transplacement.[36]

Transition Through Transformation

The NP government set out to push through a transition through transformation. In such transitions, of which Spain and Brazil are models, the regime largely maintained the initiative in changing the system into a democracy. It forced the democratic opposition to accept that regime capitulation was out of the question and that it had better work within the limits the regime imposed on the process. Ultimately, the regime was successful in securing procedural continuity. Samuel Huntington introduced the term "backward legitimacy" to describe attempts of democratizing governments to legitimize a preexisting authoritarian order by insisting that the latter gave birth to the new order. "It legitimated the new order because it was a product of the old, and it retrospectively legitimated the old order because it had produced the new."[37]

In South Africa, the government continued to insist on procedural continuity and backward legitimacy. One of its main negotiators, Gerrit Viljoen, declared that "a complete cut, a complete break in history would be unacceptable." The intention was not to put "our existence as a nation at stake," but to broaden democracy in spite of the risks.[38] De Klerk expressed his regret about apartheid, but he also claimed backward legitimacy when he said that change would take place without endangering the "values and achievements of communities and individuals of the past and our dreams and future plans."[39]

De Klerk would never have got the white electorate's support in the early stages of the negotiations unless he had presented the process as one of controlled transformation. He succeeded particularly well in sequencing the process in such a way that he could retain majority white support. It was a year after his legalization of the liberation organizations before he announced the abolition of all the remaining forms of apartheid, another ten months before he proposed an elected interim body to serve as both a constituent assembly and government, and another three months before he held a whites-only referendum in which he received a strong endorsement of negotiations. In general, the government succeeded in

[36] Slightly different names for the categories are suggested by Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 114; and Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, "Transitions through Transactions: Democratization in Brazil and Spain" in Wayne A. Selcher, *Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas and Future Prospects* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 177–79. I am using Huntington's categories.

[37] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 138.

[38] *Sunday Star*, 17 March 1990.

[39] *Die Burger*, 22 November 1991.

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presenting the transition as a fail-safe affair: even if a future ANC government would entertain radical measures, whites would retain sufficient power to block such moves.

The government, however, was unable to control the process to a similar extent as did the authoritarian regimes in Spain and Brazil. In the 1980s blacks had become intensely politicized, a development that could not be turned around. While the state itself remained stable, the security forces could not control all the violence that erupted in African townships, marginalize the radical faction in the ANC, keep nationalization off the agenda, and curb mass mobilization in the form of marches and political strikes. It succeeded in getting the ANC to accept the position that only the existing parliament could put the new constitution into effect, but the ANC continued to strongly contest the view that the new order would be merely the old order transformed.

Transition after Regime Breakdown

In exile the ANC commonly thought that the transition to black rule would follow after the complete breakdown of the apartheid regime. The dominant tenet in its ideology spoke of South Africa as representing "colonialism of a special type." Hence, the ending of oppression would take the form of decolonization. Even after talks with the De Klerk government had begun, the ANC leadership still contended that negotiations and revolutionary transformation were not incompatible.[40]

The situation in South Africa was, however, quite different from that in the transitions of Greece, Romania, and Argentina, where there was a comprehensive breakdown of the authority of the regime. Essentially, these regimes were military juntas without a major social base in society, and their breakdown was to an important extent due to the disaffection of a part of the military. In South Africa, by contrast, the security forces remained united behind the government. No significant defections to the ANC occurred. Moreover, the government rested on the social base of the white community. By the middle of 1993, white support for the ANC in this community remained below 5 percent.

Transition as Transplacement

In Poland, Uruguay, Korea, and Chile democratization occurred as a result of combined actions of government and opposition. The process is characterized by some rough equality of strength, with both learning in the course of events that they are incapable of unilaterally determining the future political system. While the opposition discovers that it is unable to overthrow the regime, the

[40] Ottaway, "Liberation Movements," 80. For a further discussion of the NP's and the ANC's negotiating positions, see also Rantete and Giliomee, "Transition to Democracy," 525–35.

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government finds that the opposition can sufficiently increase the costs of a deadlock.[41] By and large, South Africa followed this pattern.

During the first three years after the legalization of the ANC, most of the negotiations focused on disputes over the cessation of the armed struggle, ensuring the neutrality of the security forces, and controlling the escalating violence in the townships. There was also some progress towards a political settlement as the main antagonists ditched indefensible positions. Abandoning its demand for a white minority veto and a system based on group representation, the NP accepted a system based on individuals. This meant that whites and other minorities would have to articulate values and interests through a party or an alliance. It was conceded that the greater support at the polls an alliance attracted, the more effective it would be. The ANC accepted constitutional continuity, proportional representation, and the idea that a future constituent assembly would not have complete freedom to draw up a constitution but would have to adhere to broad principles negotiated beforehand.

Formal negotiations started in December 1991 in an all-party Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa). In mid-1992 Codesa collapsed, and the ANC withdrew from the negotiations to launch a campaign of rolling mass action. The conflicting goals of the main parties were starkly revealed. The NP and Inkatha essentially wanted substantial agreement over a constitution before a constituent assembly was elected and a protracted transition of at least ten years. The ANC, on the other hand, was fearful of being locked into an interim government of indefinite duration. It wanted a constituent assembly, a relatively free hand to write the constitution, and it was setting its sights on controlling the future government.[42]

In the second half of 1992 the major parties learned the costs of nonnegotiation. The state of the economy worsened, and violence increased. Hit by allegations of police complicity in the Boipatong massacre and other outbreaks of black township violence, the NP's support among Africans dwindled to insignificance, while growing numbers of whites turned away from it because they saw the government as crumbling under ANC pressure. As a result the NP's support among all prospective voters in the republic (excluding the independent homelands) dwindled from 25 percent in July 1992 to 14 percent in April 1993. The ANC made some gains, most importantly by forcing the relegation of Inkatha to the position of a minor player. While its poll support rose from 54 percent to 60 percent in the same period, ANC leaders admitted that few ANC branches were established during its campaign of mass mobilization. Those leaders contemplating a seizure of power had to recognize that the goal was as elusive as ever. On 18 November the ANC National Working Committee issued a statement in which it declared that the movement "suffers many organizational weaknesses

[41] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 152–53.

[42] For a comprehensive discussion of the negotiations until mid-1992, see Steven Friedman, ed., *The Long Journey: South Africa's Quest for a Negotiated Settlement* (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1993).

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. . . does not command significant military and financial resources [and] is unable to militarily defeat the counter-revolutionary movement or adequately defend the people." One of its main strategists, Joe Slovo, put it even more bluntly: "Clearly the enemy is not defeated. . . . We need a package that, while not compromising the interests of the people, will also adequately address the interests of the minorities."[43]

Negotiations now took the form of secret bilateral talks between the government and the ANC. By the end of 1992 the ANC finally accepted a deal, which was bitterly denounced by Inkatha as a betrayal by the NP of the negotiating strategy they had shared. Both the government and the ANC made major concessions. There would be power-sharing for a demarcated period of five years. The starting point of the process would be the drafting by all parties of both an interim constitution and bill of rights (an NP demand) formulating the general constitutional principles on which the final constitution had to rest. Elections would then be held for a constituent assembly (an ANC demand), which would also serve as an interim government (a NP demand) for five years. The final constitution would be drafted during this period. Both parties made large concessions. The NP abandoned the idea of a rotating troika presidency and other extraordinary devices to counteract the will of the majority. The ANC accepted a power-sharing system for five years in which all parties receiving more than 5 percent in the elections would be given seats in cabinet in proportion to their strength, and a substantial devolution of power to the provinces. While the NP agreed that the president would be elected by the majority party, the ANC would later accept the introduction of two vice-president posts to be filled by the main minority parties. While they could not veto executive decisions, the president would be obliged to consult with them in the development and execution of policy. It was also decided that the government would remain the highest authority in the period between the adoption of the constitution and the holding of an election but would have to consult closely with an all-party authority. In the latter half of 1993 all these decisions were endorsed by a multiparty negotiating council, which was boycotted by the IFP and the white right-wing parties.

The economic counterpart of the power-sharing deal was sketched only in broad brushstrokes. In general, the ANC was prepared to downplay, if not completely discard, nationalization in return for pledges to promote black advancement through affirmative action and the restitution of some of the losses sustained under apartheid.

Prospects for Democratic Consolidation

This article argues that a liberal democracy is unlikely to be inaugurated in South Africa soon. It also takes issue with the view that South Africa represents enough of a common society to provide a sufficiently stable base for a well-functioning

[43] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Radio South Africa, 20 November 1992, 9.

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liberal democracy. In the debate over democratization, the requisites of broad-based economic development and national homogeneity have been stressed. This article will review them with reference to South Africa before turning to the O'Donnell-Schmitter framework as an alternative interpretation.

Broad-based Economic Development as Requisite

In the academic debate about democratization, it is generally accepted that while economic factors are not determinative, an overall correlation appears to exist between the level of economic development and democracy. Seymour Martin Lipset formulated the thesis originally: "Democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."[44] Of all the countries that have democratized after 1974, the great majority were in the range of per capita income of 1976 U.S. $1,000–$3,000. Broadly based economic development is conducive to a democracy, because it usually leads to urbanization and the unionization of workers. Educational levels rise with a sharp growth in the proportion of pupils in secondary school; the middle class expands to the point where the division between a small, wealthy oligarchy and impoverished masses is broken down. Democratic ideas prevailing in industrialized countries begin to permeate society.[45] All this militates against authoritarian rule.

An improvement in the physical quality and dignity of people's lives is crucial: "Access to potable water, safe and sanitary neighborhoods, and basic health care; literacy and advanced . . . education; sufficient income to provide at least minimally adequate food and clothing for one's family; and sufficient skills to obtain a job that provides that income."[46]

At a first glance it looks as if South Africa since the high economic growth of the 1960s was also demonstrating the link between broad-based economic development and the rise of a democratic form of government. In 1988 the World Bank recorded a per capita GNP of $2,290 for South Africa, which groups it with upper-middle-income Latin American countries and an Eastern European country like Hungary. It is well within the per capita GNP zone where transitions to democracy could be expected.[47]

By 1990 South Africa was indeed quite a different country from the one of the first decade after World War II, when the NP implemented its apartheid program, drawing on solid Afrikaner support. In 1946 more than half of the Afrikaners were struggling farmers or workers in blue collar and other manual

[44] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960), 31.

[45] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 59–72.

[46] Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," *American Behavioural Scientist* 35 (1992): 486.

[47] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 312.

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occupations; they were dependent on government protection. By 1992 by contrast, more than 80 percent of Afrikaners were in high or middle-income categories, and the group as a whole was more open to the liberalization of the political order.

When apartheid was introduced in the 1950s, most Africans were still not urbanized and the greatest part of the urban workers were unskilled and illiterate or functionally illiterate. Between 1960 and 1985 the number of Africans in secondary school jumped from 54,598 to 1,192,932; those in the final year in school from 717 to 34,733, and those at university from 1,871 to 49,164. The racial wage gap narrowed. In 1980 black skilled and semiskilled workers earned little more than half the wages of their white counterparts; by 1990 this had risen to 70 percent. The black share of the disposable income rose from 32.3 percent in 1972 to 44.5 percent in 1985.

Several other indicators, however, point to a lack of broad-based development among Africans and serious racial socioeconomic disparities that raise major questions about the viability of a democratic system. The yearly income per head of the African section of the population in 1990 was U.S. $670, which is well below the zone in which democratization can normally be expected. By 1985 only 5 percent of African households had an annual income of above R16,000 (roughly U.S. $5,000). Only 1.8 percent ran their own business operations. In stark contrast to this thin upper stratum there is a great pool of impoverished people. The income of 70 percent of Africans and of 57 percent of the total South African population falls below the minimum subsistence level. More than 40 percent of the labor force, the vast majority of them black, is out of work. More than half of Africans in urban areas live in backyard shacks or squatter settlements, where the living area is four square meters per person against nine for Africans in formal housing and thirty-three for whites. Infant mortality and life expectancy for Africans are almost 10 points lower than the average for upper-middle income countries. Both Botswana and Zimbabwe outperform South Africa on health, and Botswana does much better on per capita income. There are in South Africa two nations—a white "nation" well within the zone where a democracy limited to itself can be supported and an African nation well below that zone.

The absence of many of these democratic requisites does not rule out a democracy. As has often been pointed out, literacy, political tolerance, a healthy civic culture, and a strong middle class may be an effect rather than a cause of democracy. Yet without the return of vigorous economic growth, it is unlikely that the social conditions would arise in which a democracy can take root. Only after decades of sustained economic advance of the entire population can new democratic structures be effective.[48]

[48] Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Seong, and John Charles Torres, "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy," *International Social Science Journal* 136 (1993): 155–175.

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National Unity

In his seminal article, Dankwart Rustow argued that issues of community are far more troublesome for democracies to handle than social and economic issues. As a result, national unity is "the single background condition" that must be present before democratization can start. He adds: "The hardest struggles in a democracy are those against the birth defects of the political community."[49] In South Africa there has been a curious reluctance among academic analyses to come to grips with this issue. There is the implicit assumption that because the apartheid government manipulated ethnicity, any interpretation that stresses the ethnic issue in contemporary South Africa is either objectionable or anachronistic. This is reinforced by the well known scholarly preference for materialist explanations above those which stress ethnicity as a potent force.[50] As a result, analysts have been almost eager to argue that Afrikaner nationalism, which has been the force behind the NP government for forty years, is a spent force or fatally contaminated by racial privilege[51] and that intra-African ethnic cleavages are either engineered by the regime or exaggerated by scholars.[52]

In this vein, the argument is advanced by Smooha and Hanf that an orthodox liberal democracy is the only appropriate way for regulating the conflict in South Africa. They argue that consociationalism or power-sharing between leaders of ethnic groups is inadvisable because "ethnicity has become for blacks an euphemism for apartheid and hence lacks any legitimacy" and because this form of government has been discredited by the Tricameral Parliament, which excluded Africans. Furthermore, whites form too small a minority in numerical terms and any veto by them would look unfair to the black majority. Once whites lose control over the state they would lose the capability to block decisions hurting their vital interests.[53]

This case lacks conviction, resting as it does on the implicit assumption that politicized racial and ethnic cleavages will quickly dissipate. Afrikaners form a clearly defined group whose ethnonationalism can be mobilized powerfully in conditions of cultural threat. Although not mobilized in nationalist terms, the larger white community displays a powerful group consciousness based partly on race and partly on maintaining European standards and a European identity. While no longer intent on keeping blacks in an inferior position, whites see themselves as Europeans who have become indigenous with a strong stake in the country and an undeniable claim to be represented in government. In concrete

[49] Dankwart Rustow, "Transition to Democracy," *Comparative Politics* 2 (October 1970): 360.

[50] Walker Connor, "Ethno-Nationalism and Political Instability," *The Elusive Search for Peace*, 10.

[51] For an example, see Heribert Adam, "Cohesion and Coercion," *The Elusive Search for Peace*, 227–242.

[52] See, for example, Rupert Taylor, "The Myth of Ethnic Division: Township Conflict on the Reef," *Race and Class* 33 (October–December 1991).

[53] Smooha and Hanf, "The Diverse Modes of Conflict-regulation," 26–47.

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terms, whites demand a substantial share of power to mediate the entry into government of a much larger third-world majority with high expectations.[54]

Potentially serious ethnic divisions exist among Africans. Using a comparative perspective and drawing on almost all opinion surveys done in South Africa in the 1980s, Donald Horowitz concluded that the differences "are very much in the order of the cleavages that in some countries translated into serious post-independence conflict and violence."[55] It is not empirically correct to state that Africans reject power-sharing. Surveys show that blacks prefer a multiparty government in which both blacks and whites are represented in a system in which a single party rules along the lines of the Westminster system. Moreover, it is strange to judge the strength of the white group only in numerical terms if members of this group will continue to dominate the officer corps of the security forces for quite some time, own more than 90 percent of the productive resources, pay almost four-fifths of income tax, and have the capacity to engage in tax strikes. Finally Hanf and Smooha beg the question of how, in the current stalemate of power, whites will lose all control over the state.

Strategic Interaction between Elites

The framework originally developed by O'Donnell and Schmitter in their *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* opts for a process-oriented emphasis on contingent choice expressing itself in the forming of foundational pacts as a clear alternative to structural analyses of the kind Lipset and Rustow advance. Subsequently Terry Karl, coauthor of articles with Schmitter has called for the former type of approach to evolve toward relating structural constraints to the shaping of contingent choice.[56]

In South Africa the original study of O'Donnell and Schmitter, with its suggestion of a dynamic, open-ended process, has been particularly influential despite the fact that it deals with societies whose political leadership is ethnically and racially homogeneous and whose forms of authoritarian rule differed markedly from racial oligarchies like the South African one. While similarities do exist, they do not point to a liberal democracy. First, in both Latin America and South Africa progress towards a democracy has occurred in the form of compromises by contending elites unable to impose their will unilaterally. Second, in both continents the new structures—called "new democracies" by Weffort—entail the

[54] Lawrence Schlemmer, "Between Race, Class and Culture: Social Divisions in South Africa's Political Transition and their Policy Implications" in Uri Ra'anan, et al., eds., *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies: The Break-up of Multi-National States* (Manchester, England: University of Manchester Press, 1991), 195.

[55] Donald Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 85. This study is by far the most rigorous and comprehensive examination of the ethnic issue.

[56] Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (1990): 1–21.

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blending of democratic institutions with those from a recent authoritarian past. In the South Africa case, parties like the NP and Inkatha, which were part of the apartheid state, are represented in the cabinet; and any radical transformation of the top echelons of the civil service and security forces may have to be postponed for quite some time. The key question in both continents is whether actors in such "hybrid situations" will regard these compromises with the past as a potential liability for democracy or as a potential strength.[57]

Finally, the socioeconomic inequalities between the richest 10 percent and the poorest 50 percent are about on the same level in South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico. The inability to substantially ameliorate acute poverty and reduce inequalities puts democratic consolidation in serious jeopardy. With reference to Brazil and other Latin American countries, Weffort argues that it is not possible to consolidate a political democracy if there is a contradiction between an institutional system based on the political equality of citizens and a society characterized by extreme inequalities or a process of growing social inequality. Tensions, instability, institutional distortions, and recurrent violence are the likely result.[58]

This points to the limits of an interpretation that sees an analysis of elite behavior in constructing pacts as mutually exclusive from the study of democratic requisites. As Lipset remarks in a recent restatement of his thesis: "Pacts are means towards institutionalizing democracy, whether they emerge or hold is linked to probabilities associated with the presence or absence of these requisites. It is not necessary to make an 'either/or' choice between the study of democratic conditions and pact-building as they are complementary."[59]

Alternatives to Liberal Democracy

A Durable Racial Power-sharing Pact

This is a system in which government is based on consensus rather than the principle that the strongest party can impose its will. The main premise would be that neither the ANC nor the NP can prevail over the other. They have quite different sources of strength and vulnerabilities: the NP commands the confidence of those with scarce skills and capital, the senior levels of the bureaucracy and security forces, and of local and international investors; the ANC draws on the workers, a mass-based democratic legitimacy, and international public solidarity. This will not change soon: the two parties are locked into a power relationship of mutual dependence. Together they can govern the country; at loggerheads they can make the country ungovernable for each other.[60]

[57] Francisco C. Weffort, "What Is a 'New Democracy'?" *International Social Science Journal*, 136 (May 1993): 248.

[58] Francisco Weffort, "New Democracies, Which Democracies?" (Working Paper of the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 1992), 21–22.

[59] Lipset et al., "A Comparative Analysis," 158.

[60] Pierre du Toit, *Power Plays: Bargaining Tactics for Transforming South Africa* (Johannesburg: Southern Books, 1991), 5–8, 129.

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A power-sharing system succeeding a racial oligarchy accepts that for quite some time its politics will resemble that of competing nations on the world scene rather than a liberal democracy. In both the competitive international states system and communally structured collectivities, the main actors seek to maintain their interests (both symbolic and substantive) through employing the techniques of persuasion, boycott, bargaining, threat, even force.[61] In such systems there does not exist overall sovereignty, and decisions are taken collectively and by unit representatives separately. Accountability is within the discrete units. Bernard Crick has written that in the context of systems like those in South Africa and Northern Ireland peace has a high price: the acceptance that victory is impossible, power has limits, and compromises have to be between communities.[62]

In the April 1994 election, more than 90 percent of both whites and Africans voted their "color"—that is, for parties that are historically white or historically African. The influence of the NP in the new Government of National Unity is determined more by the skills and capital of its constituency than on the 20 percent of the vote it drew.

To be successful the Government of National Unity will have to follow a conscious strategy of risk avoidance. As in the Thucydidean theory of hegemonic war and serious political conflict, South Africa will erupt when fundamental changes threaten the vital interests of either the ANC or NP (or that of Inkatha in the Natal province).[63] Post-apartheid governments, like states in the international system, will have to learn to cooperate under conditions of anarchy—that is, without the sovereign temporary majority that is the essence of a liberal democracy. A radical redistribution policy, the sacking of large numbers of senior military or police officers or civil servants, and the infringement of cultural rights could so destabilize South Africa that economic collapse and political fragmentation could ensue. Zero-sum situations will have to be scrupulously avoided, and conflicts of interests between the majority and minority will have to be carefully negotiated.

A One-Party-Dominant System

In the April 1994 elections, Africans formed three-quarters of the electorate. Of this vote, the ANC captured 90 percent while about 10 percent abstained. Large-scale intimidation made it nearly impossible for rival parties to campaign in the African townships. During the campaign but even more so in power, the ANC has managed to construct an almost unbeatable maximal coalition containing class, ethnic, and regional cleavages. Business prefers to lobby in the ANC's court and to operate within the ANC's policy parameters rather than offer clear-cut

[61] Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution," *World Politics* 22 (1970): 597–599.

[62] Bernard Crick, "The High Price of Peace," *The Elusive Search for Peace*, 261–275.

[63] Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War" in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 15–39.

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alternatives. The line between ruling party, government, and the state is becoming blurred as is the case in one-party-dominant states like Taiwan and Mexico.

No country that became democratic since the mid-1970s labored under the same ethnic and racial divisions and lack of broad-based economic development as South Africa. The ruling group has not been defeated and presently considers power-sharing as an instrument for protecting group interests and values. The consolidation of a democracy will depend on the common perception by the major parties that the underlying conflict is far too serious to attempt to solve unilaterally.

Nevertheless, the crushing victory of the ANC in the April 1994 election, which gave it control of 62 percent of the seats in both Parliament and cabinet, has provided a powerful incentive for the organization to free itself from the formal and informal commitments to govern in a spirit of national unity. In January 1995, ANC members in cabinet prevailed by majority decision over the NP members on the important issue of indemnity to members of the security forces who might be guilty of human rights violations. Opinion polls indicate that the ANC is consolidating its electoral strength, while that of the NP and other opposition parties appears to be waning. If these trends continue, South Africa may be heading for a one-party dominant system, along Mexican and Taiwanese lines, sooner than most analysts expected. Whatever the outcome, the basic point of this article stands: the evolution of a liberal democracy is most unlikely, and tensions within and between ethnic groups will be managed only with great difficulty by a single dominant party.

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Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to Consult

FRANK COSTIGLIOLA

The reality of American predominance has long contradicted the obligatory public rhetoric about the Western alliance's democratic operation. Although Article 4 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty pledges the signatories to "consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened," such consultation in the form of meaningful, shared decision making in serious crises has usually not taken place.[1] If the alliance is to become more of a genuine partnership in the post-cold war era, it is essential to confront significant past failures at consultation.[2] Among the most serious of such lapses was the Cuban missile

[1] Widely available, the NATO treaty can be found in NATO Information Service, *NATO Facts About the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Utrecht: NATO Information Service, 1965), 210–12. To explain this discrepancy between the promise and the performance of the alliance, NATO defenders usually discuss consultation in the language of becoming rather than of being; diplomats are always striving for meaningful consultation without quite attaining it. In 1951, for example, a NATO committee of "Three Wise Men" urged more "effective consultation at an early stage of current problems." In 1956, a similar group noted the nonobservance of the 1951 recommendation and then, making the assumption that the major NATO powers did intend to consult, the Three Wise Men outlined methods for more meaningful discussions. (See NATO Information Service, *NATO Facts About the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 277–78.) Nearly two decades later, after numerous other NATO reports and communiques promising better sharing of decision making, the 1974 Declaration on Atlantic Relations predictably announced that the allies "are firmly resolved to . . . strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations." (*Department of State Bulletin* 71 [8 July 1974]: 44.) One can point to many other pledges undertaken since then.

[2] In the literature on NATO and the Western alliance there is a paucity of discussion about why there has been little serious consultation among the allies. Almost all writers take as a given the assumption prevalent among Washington policy makers that, of course, the United States does and should exercise a near monopoly on significant decision making. Rarely do analysts confront the gap

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crisis, during which Americans and Western Europeans both faced nuclear annihilation, but the Europeans were shut out of the decision making.

Despite the vast literature on the Cuban missile crisis, historians and political scientists have passed lightly over the issue of Western Europe's lack of participation in the crucial decision making.[3] This neglect is largely because analysts have made the same assumptions and have remained confined by the same discourses that informed the officials of the John F. Kennedy administration. As Kennedy and his advisers explained, it was crucial to maintain secrecy during the crisis and to keep the confrontation from spreading to the European continent. Accepting these indisputably important arguments as a wholly adequate explanation for the lack of significant consultation with the Western Europeans, analysts since October 1962 have focused on other, more overtly controversial aspects of the crisis.

But U.S. worry that the European allies would leak information about the discovery of the missiles in Cuba, the planned American responses to this Soviet threat, and U.S. concern that the Soviets might assault West Berlin do not sufficiently explain why Kennedy's Executive Committee (ExComm) summarily dis-

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between the rhetoric and reality of the alliance or consider alternate, more democratic modes of alliance governance. For studies which focus on the issue of consultation, see Richard Neff, "NATO Political Consultation – Fact or Myth?" *NATO Review* 23 (1975): 7–9; Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., "NATO Consultation as a Component of National Decisionmaking," *American Journal of International Law* 73 (July 1979): 372–406; Fred Barry Chernoff, "Consultation and Cooperation in NATO: Nuclear Planning, 1975–1987," (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1987); Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, "'I don't need your handkerchiefs': Holland's Experience of Crisis Consultation in NATO," *International Affairs* 66 (January 1990): 91–113.

[3] Recent works on the Cuban missile crisis deal only tangentially with the consultation issue and with the role and perspective of the NATO allies. Analysts have not systematically considered what the crisis demonstrates about the way that power was shared and not shared and the way decisions were made within the Western alliance. The lack of attention to the consultation issue is reflected in the fact that there were no Western Europeans among the historians and former policy makers invited to the 1987–1989 conferences on the missile crisis that were held in Florida, Massachusetts, and Moscow. For the most important new literature, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey" in James A. Nathan, *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* (New York: St. Martins, 1992), 55–129; Philip Nash, "Nuisance of Decision: Jupiter Missiles and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 14 (March 1991): 1–26; James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1990); David A. Welch and James G. Blight, "The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Introduction to the ExComm Transcripts," *International Security* 12 (Winter 1987/88): 5–29; Thomas G. Paterson, "Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Castro" in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 123–55; Richard Ned Lebow, "Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Diplomatic History* 14 (Fall 1990): 471–492; Marc Trachtenberg, *History & Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 241–44, 248. For published, abridged transcripts of ExComm meetings, see "White House Tapes and Minutes of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security* 10 (Summer 1985): 164–203 (for 16 October 1962); "October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm," ibid., 12 (Winter 1987/88). The full transcripts are available in the President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA.

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missed any idea of sharing with the allies decisions that could have led to the nuclear destruction of Western Europe as well as North America. A fuller explanation requires an examination of the Kennedy administration's previous efforts to monopolize the West's decision making and—a more subtle task—a close reading of the language privately used by Kennedy and his advisers to refer to the Western Europeans and to discussions with them. This language reveals the implicit judgments and unquestioned prejudices that made it easy for these American leaders to assume that they could and should decide questions of nuclear life and death without significant participation by the allies. Words and phrases used by Kennedy, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and other ExComm members to refer to the Western Europeans connoted the allies as the shaky, often impractical and emotional "others" of the NATO family, unequal and inexperienced partners who were too ready to compromise with the Soviets (or, conversely, prone to resist the compromises decided upon by Americans) and who, therefore, had to be manipulated rather than consulted by the hard-headed, responsible officials of Washington. Confident of their superior ability to manage crises large and small, Kennedy administration officials were unwilling or perhaps unable to perceive the value and possible wisdom in the views of allied leaders. Instead, these officials tried to centralize decision making in Washington and to tether uniting Western Europe more firmly to the United States.

The Problem of Consultation

European resentment of those who assumed themselves to be the best and the brightest helps explain why Washington's official relations with Western Europe cooled during the Kennedy years in spite of JFK's personal popularity among Western European peoples. "The European governments were more unhappy with the Kennedy administration than with any other administration since the war," recalled a top British diplomat.[4] Maurice Couve de Murville, the French foreign minister, testified that during the Kennedy years "Franco-American relations . . . had really deteriorated."[5] Frederick E. Nolting, who served as a top diplomat in both the Kennedy and Dwight Eisenhower administrations, observed that Europeans felt that JFK "was less willing to consult . . . was less reliable as an ally" than was Eisenhower.[6] "In matters of primary importance," explained close adviser Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy did not feel "that approval of the Alliance was a condition that pressed on him."[7]

[4] Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., *The Kennedy Presidency* (New York: University Press of America, 1985), 234.

[5] Maurice Couve de Murville oral history interview, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library [hereafter JFKL].

[6] Thompson, *Kennedy Presidency*, 228.

[7] Theodore Sorensen oral history interview, JFKL.

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American and European officials differed even over the meaning of "consultation." The Kennedy administration readily discussed issues such as the Berlin crisis with the allies, informed them of American thinking, considered modifications of policy, invited European comments and suggestions, and sought allied unity. This is what the Americans meant by "consultation." If, however, some of the allies remained unpersuaded by the main thrust of U.S. policy, the Americans usually went ahead anyway. For example, in August 1961 when the French and Germans remained opposed to negotiations with the Soviets over Berlin, Kennedy told Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the allies "must come along or stay behind. . . . [W]e cannot accept a veto from any other power."[8] Many Europeans defined "consultation" far differently—to mean an influential voice in actual decision making. "Consultation should take place before a position is rigid," explained Hervé Alphand, the French ambassador to the United States.[9]

Of course, the failure to consult did not stem solely from American attitudes. The European allies remained weaker than the Americans and ambivalent and divided on fundamental political and strategic issues. Apprehensive about the prospect of either serious cooperation or serious conflict between Moscow and Washington, European leaders also desired nuclear weapons on their continent for deterrence while dreading the possibility of a nuclear war on their soil. From the U.S. view, the complicated and often contradictory nature of European viewpoints amounted to another reason to make the basic decisions in Washington first and only then to consult the allies by informing them of the new U.S. policy while perhaps inviting them to suggest slight modifications of the American stance.

U.S. leaders often justified their treatment of individual allies as subordinates by pledging that once Western Europe united, Washington would make the new Europe an equal partner. In keeping with this promise, American policy makers encouraged integration on the continent, believing that a supranational Western Europe would anchor West Germany, contain the Soviets, create a larger market for U.S. business, and generate European resources that Washington could tap for the battle against communism and poverty in the Third World. But even as they pushed for European unity, some Kennedy officials, like their predecessors, also feared that a unified Europe might prove too powerful and too independent of the United States.

At Kennedy's request, David Bruce, the highly respected, veteran diplomat, examined the problem of rising anti-Americanism in Western Europe. In his thoughtful analysis, widely read within the administration, Bruce inadvertently demonstrated the difficulty that Americans had in accepting real equality and serious consultation with a more independent Europe. He blamed much of the

[8] Kennedy to the secretary of state, 21 August 1961, box 82–98, National Security File [hereafter NSF], JFKL.

[9] McGeorge Bundy, "Memorandum of conversation with Ambassador Alphand, Mr. Nitze, and Mr. Pelen, French Counselor," 8 May 1961, box 70, NSF, JFKL.

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"considerable anti-Americanism in Europe" on the "growing fear that we may want to control a strong and united Europe by smothering it in the Atlantic Community." To break the vicious cycle of "European dependence" and "U.S. predominance," Bruce urged that Washington "treat a uniting Europe as an equal partner," entitled to meaningful consultation. Yet even this sophisticated diplomat expected the "equal partner" to follow America's lead and support "Atlantic Community" tasks and policies determined by the United States. Bruce saw "dangers" if Europe "struck off on its own, seeking to play a role independent of the United States." "We must have a voice and play a stabilizing role in European affairs," he emphasized.[10]

This determination to keep Western Europe within Washington's orbit clashed with the aspirations of French President Charles de Gaulle, who sought a significant, independent voice for France in the basic decision making of the Western alliance. When that effort failed, de Gaulle tried to unite Western Europe under French leadership and make it more independent of the United States. To further both these goals de Gaulle insisted, to American dismay, on building a French nuclear force free from any integration with or control by Washington. The Kennedy administration's monopoly on decision making during the Cuban missile crisis took place, then, in the context of de Gaulle's repeated challenges to Washington's leadership in questions over: a possible directorate for the Western alliance, the importance and structure of NATO, the admission of Great Britain to the Common Market, the proposed Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), and the strategic doctrine of flexible response.

When Kennedy became president, de Gaulle renewed his bid, first made to Eisenhower in September 1958, for an American-British-French directorate for the Western alliance. On 10 March 1961, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, president of the French national assembly, arrived in Washington on a "personal mission" from de Gaulle. A "fundamental reconstruction" of the Atlantic alliance had become essential, Chaban-Delmas argued to Kennedy. France wanted "intimate coordinat[ion]" through "decisions taken beforehand at the level of the conception of policies and not belatedly at . . . their implementation." Chaban-Delmas urged that the United States recognize that Paris's ties with Bonn and with other neighbors made France the "natural channel for the coordination of policies on the [European] continent."[11] In short, de Gaulle wanted two things the U.S. government opposed: equality with Washington in the decision making of the Western alliance and a general deference to France (largely at the expense of West Germany) on Western European issues. De Gaulle pressed on despite Washington's coolness to his ideas. France had little interest in long, airy discussions within

[10] Memorandum by David Bruce, 9 February 1963, box 49–56, Theodore Sorensen papers, JFKL: for the memorandum's impact, see Arthur Schlesinger, "Background for 1000 Days," n.d., box W-13, Arthur M, Schlesinger, Jr. papers, JFKL.

[11] Chaban-Delmas in "Tripartite Consultation between France, the United States and the United Kingdom," 10 March 1961, box 70, NSF, JFKL.

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the NATO council, de Gaulle told former Secretary of State Dean Acheson; instead Paris wanted "to discuss matters together" with Washington and London "and then together attempt to influence the course of events."[12]

In contrast to France, which wanted privileged, shared decision making among an intimate big three, the United States preferred to keep most of the power itself, while allowing the allies to vent their ambitions, objections, and resentments within the innocuous, multilateral frameworks of NATO and the proposed MLF. This multinational context helped institutionalize, facilitate, and legitimize U.S. leadership. American officials appreciated that NATO operated as much more than a military grouping directed by the United States; it served also as an arena in which the European allies contained each other through what one State Department analyst termed a "sub-balance of power" rivalry. Although such rivalry could threaten Washington's long-held goal of European unity if it became too intense, Europe's quarreling also "offers certain advantages to the United States," for "as one state moves into disagreement with specific American policies . . . the others tend to move nearer the U.S."[13] NATO meetings operated, then, as assemblies for venting—and diluting—what Americans perceived as the narrow, nationalist concerns of the European allies. NATO also served as a friendly forum in which Washington put forth its broader, alliance-wide interests, which generally prevailed because of America's superior power, Western Europe's divisions, and the North Atlantic consensus on the Soviet threat. NATO offered a final advantage to the United States, according to Dean Acheson, who had done so much to set up the organization: the NATO council offered a place where "national policies . . . could be more easily harmonized by men who knew one another and were accustomed to working together."[14] Of course, that pattern of fraternal and accustomed harmony presumed U.S. leadership. De Gaulle commented acidly on all this by observing that "the U.S. had a curious tendency to wish always to act as a member of some sort of group."[15] Meanwhile he continued to pull French units out of NATO's integrated military command.

De Gaulle both exacerbated intra-European differences and excited in Western Europe visions of a united continent more independent of the United States. He sparked resentment in West Germany, Italy, and elsewhere by pressing Washington for a privileged French role in alliance decision making. Yet the fact that de Gaulle was demanding a significant voice for Europe in Western councils (even though that say would be uttered by France) held "considerable attraction for some Europeans," observed Thomas Hughes, deputy director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Hughes pointed out that

[12] Dean Acheson to the president and secretary in James Gavin to the secretary of state, 21 April 1961, ibid.

[13] Thomas L. Hughes to secretary of state, "Possibilities and Limitations in Dealing with de Gaulle," 6 April 1963, box 72, NSF, JFKL.

[14] Dean Acheson to the President and Secretary in James Gavin to the Secretary of State, 21 April 1961, box 70, NSF, JFKL.

[15] Ibid.

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Western Europe's prosperity stimulated a craving for "enhanced status—a desire which is likely to grow and to take unwelcome political forms, of which de Gaulle is only the first." He feared that a united Europe "would present us with a more formidable challenge than the present divided Europe."[16] Such fears did not weaken the State Department's strong support for European unity, but the worries did underscore the necessity of keeping Western Europe—whether it was united or fragmented—securely in Washington's orbit.

The Kennedy administration developed what it sometimes called a Grand Design for orienting booming Western Europe toward the United States. The administration pushed through Congress the 1962 Trade Expansion Act designed to lower tariff barriers and increase America's business with the growing Common Market. Kennedy officials lobbied the Common Market to admit Washington's close ally, Great Britain. "We hoped that if England went into Europe, it would take a sense of 'special relationship' with it, and that we would then have a 'special relationship' with Europe," a top U.S. official explained.[17] De Gaulle opposed such expansion of American influence in the Common Market, and in January 1963 he vetoed British admission. Kennedy responded in part by pushing harder for strengthened military ties with Western Europe through the MLF.

The MLF offered the allies the illusion of participation in controlling the West's nuclear deterrent, just as token discussions or informational meetings—which had little or no impact on Washington's decision making—offered the illusion of consultation in NATO. The MLF was a proposal for a fleet of surface ships, manned by a mix of NATO nationalities, armed with nuclear missiles, and under NATO command. Its American backers hoped that the MLF would enable European participants to feel that they had a significant share in the West's nuclear deterrent. However, since each partner would have a veto over firing the MLF weapons, Washington could block any use of the MLF—while preserving the option of launching the many nuclear weapons under exclusive U.S. control. The MLF "will increase our influence in Europe and provide a way to guide NATO and keep it strong," Kennedy told the National Security Council. He determined to "push for a multilateral force which will weaken de Gaulle's control of the [Common Market] Six."[18]

Kennedy officials, particularly those in the State Department, valued the proposed MLF as a face-saving means to phase out the national deterrents of Britain and France and to head off any nuclear ambitions by West Germany or Italy. The mere prospect of German nuclear weaponry "would shake NATO to its foundations" and inflame East-West tensions, Rusk feared.[19] De Gaulle's

[16] Thomas L. Hughes to Secretary of State, "Possibilities and Limitations in Dealing with De Gaulle," 6 April 1963, box 72, NSF, JFKL.

[17] David Nunnerly, *President Kennedy and Britain* (London: Bodley Head, 1972), 11.

[18] "Remarks of President Kennedy to the National Security Council Meeting of January 22, 1963," no. 1986/2274, Declassified Documents Reference Service [hereafter DDRS].

[19] Rusk to James Gavin, 5 May 1961, box 70, NSF, JFKL.

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insistence on an independent nuclear force and his opposition to the MLF challenged American policies. The autonomous French nuclear deterrent was opposed particularly by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, whose strategic doctrine of flexible response required centralized direction (in Washington, of course) of the West's nuclear weapons. Elbridge Durbrow, the deputy U.S. representative to NATO, explained that *any* truly "independent" nuclear deterrent—British, French, or European—was "dangerous." "We simply have to be in it."[20]

Consultation during the Cuban Missile Crisis

Regarding European independence, particularly in nuclear matters, as threatening, Kennedy administration officials were naturally little inclined to share decision making in the nuclear crisis over the missiles in Cuba. Acting almost alone, Kennedy and his advisers made the strategic determinations for the alliance. Consultation remained an empty promise, even though the European allies shared America's vulnerability to nuclear destruction. On 22 October 1962, President Kennedy publicly announced a blockade of Cuba and demanded that Moscow remove its missiles from that island; on the 27th, probably the tensest day of the confrontation, Kennedy's ExComm debated whether to accept, either explicitly or implicitly, the Soviet proposal that the United States remove the 15 Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles from Turkey in return for the Soviet Union's withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba. On both occasions, U.S. actions could have started a chain of consequences leading to conflict in Europe and to general nuclear war. Article 4 of the NATO treaty calling for consultation among the allies was certainly relevant, yet the Americans did not share basic decision making with the allies on either issue. From Washington's narrow perspective, bringing the Europeans into the process would have greatly complicated the ExComm's determinations, negotiations, and military planning while compromising its secrecy. From the viewpoint of the other allies, however, Washington's unilateral actions painfully underlined the Western Europeans' helplessness and their reduction to what the pro-American commentator Raymond Aron called "protectorate nations."[21] If Kennedy officials had wanted to act on their rhetoric about equal partnership, they might have sought out the advice of experienced allied leaders and might have attempted the difficulties of shared decision making.

Instead, Kennedy kept Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, de Gaulle, and other veteran European leaders out of the deliberations. After the ExComm decided to blockade Cuba, Kennedy on 21 October informed Macmillan by telephone. While British Ambassador David Ormsby Gore, a close friend of JFK, sat in on some White House meetings, he was expected to keep information confidential from his own government. A British cabinet official

[20] Robert Estabrook interview with Elbridge Durbrow, 2 November 1962, box 1, Robert Estabrook Papers, JFKL.

[21] *Washington Post*, 20 December 1962.

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recalled that "we were kept fully informed—more fully informed than anybody else. But we were not really consulted about the actual decisions as they affected Cuba itself."[22] Evidently even the informing was partial, since Macmillan had to depend on British Intelligence to ferret out details of the crisis.[23]

Kennedy sent Dean Acheson to notify de Gaulle and Adenauer a few hours before the 22 October speech announcing the blockade. De Gaulle greeted Acheson with the premier question: "In order to get our roles clear. . . . [H]ave [you] come . . . to inform me of some decision taken by your President—or have you come to consult me about a decision which he should take [?]" When Acheson replied, "I have come to inform you," de Gaulle dropped the issue of consultation, but he did not forget it.[24]

Britain and France lacked many of the defense capabilities necessary to act with independence in such a crisis. "We were incapable of doing anything about" the threat of war, one British minister remembered.[25] Similarly, when Acheson showed de Gaulle the aerial photographs of the missiles in Cuba, the French leader looked impressed and asked, "from what height were these taken?" When the American replied "65,000 feet," the proud general started to say, "We don't have anything. . . ." Then he caught himself and remarked that he was not familiar with photography. De Gaulle agreed with Acheson that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev probably was bluffing and would withdraw the missiles.[26] The available records of this meeting diverge on a matter of deep significance. According to Acheson's version, de Gaulle unequivocally reaffirmed French acceptance of U.S. leadership: whatever happened "France will support [Kennedy] in every way in this crisis."[27] In contrast, de Gaulle's account to Pierson Dixon, the British ambassador, emphasized that if the crisis spread to Europe, there would have to be a more equal sharing of decision making; France would expect "immediate and continuous consultation" with the U.S. and Britain.[28]

De Gaulle was not the only allied leader perturbed by the Americans' failure to consult. Acheson informed the NATO council of the crisis only a few minutes before Kennedy made his 22 October speech, a move that a U.S. diplomat acknowledged as "consent-building notification after the fact."[29] The Dutch representative to NATO reported that his British, West German, Italian, Canadian, Belgian, and Turkish colleagues all resented the short notice.[30] The Belgian representative also "complained strongly" to Acheson that Supreme Allied Commander

[22] Nunnerly, *Kennedy and Britain*, 76.
[23] Ibid., 84.
[24] Dean Acheson oral history interview, JFKL.
[25] Nunnerly, *Kennedy and Britain*, 80.
[26] Dean Acheson oral history interview, JFKL.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Pierson Dixon to Foreign Office, 23 October 1962, PREM 11/3689, Public Record Office, London [hereafter PRO].
[29] Harlan Cleveland, *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 22–23.
[30] Wiebes and Zeeman, 'Holland's experience of crisis consultation in NATO,' 97–99.

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in Europe General Lauris Norstad had put NATO air forces in a "state of alert . . . without any consultation with the Alliance."[31] Although he overtly supported Kennedy, Macmillan had doubts about the president's blockade and recounted with frustration that "it seemed impossible to stop his action." The British leader asserted that if the crisis appeared to be "escalating into war," he would "call a conference on my own, or [do] something of the kind, to stop it."[32]

Later, after the emergency, administration officials stressed the problem of security leaks if the allies had been consulted before Kennedy imposed the blockade. At a then-secret U.S. Senate hearing, Rusk said that making the Cuban crisis a NATO affair would have aggravated the danger of the Soviets moving on West Berlin.

However a close reading of the transcripts of the ExComm meetings suggests two other fundamental reasons why Kennedy officials did not attempt consultation: they had a low estimation of the value of the allies' perspective and they believed that the allies had little right to participate in the life-and-death decision making. During an ExComm meeting, Bundy commented that if the United States brought the problem of Cuban missiles before the NATO nations, the allies would make "noise . . . saying that they can live with Soviet MRBMs, why can't we[?]"[33] "Noise" connoted discordant, unintelligent clamor; something to be quieted, ignored, and kept far away.

Another Kennedy official expressed disdain for the value of allied viewpoints: "I would not have wanted to have seen either De Gaulle or Macmillan informed any sooner than they were, because both of them would have wanted to get into the act."[34] The "act" had to remain America's show; as Rusk later testified, it would have been risky to consult the Europeans on how to respond to the Cuban missiles, because "we could not be sure *in advance* what the response of our NATO allies would be."[35] ExComm members seem never to have thought that they might have benefited from the advice of and discussion with the allies. Rusk explained to the U.S. Senate that rather than ask the Europeans whether they "agree[d] with American actions," it was "simplier" and "easier" to poll them: "Do you in this situation of danger support the United States?"[36] NATO leaders said yes, but they resented being shut out of the decision making.

Consultation and the Jupiter Missiles in Turkey

The Turks had a further grievance when the Kennedy administration, particularly the president and his brother, made crucial decisions about the fifteen Jupiter

[31] Sir P. Mason to Foreign Office, 23 October 1962, PREM 11/3689, PRO.

[32] Macmillan to David Ormsby Gore, 22 October 1962, PREM 11/3689, PRO.

[33] "Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, October 16, 1962," presidential recordings transcripts, 16, JFKL.

[34] Nunnerly, *Kennedy and Britain*, 76–77.

[35] U.S. Senate, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1963*, 15 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1986), 6–7. (Emphasis added.) Kennedy often used Prime Minister Macmillan as a sounding board, but the decision making remained in Washington.

[36] Ibid.

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missiles in Turkey without attempting serious consultation with the Ankara government.[37] The published transcript of the 27 October ExComm meetings and the testimony at the conferences of missile crisis participants and historians in 1987–1989 at Hawk's Cay, Florida; Cambridge, Massachusetts; and Moscow underscore two points. First, the president and his brother readily accepted the idea of trading the removal of Jupiter missiles in Turkey in return for the withdrawal of Soviet rockets in Cuba. In contrast to the account in Robert Kennedy's *Thirteen Days*,[38] recent evidence indicates that the Kennedy brothers were willing to swap the Turkish missiles in a secret deal and were reluctant to press the Soviets with an ultimatum. Acting on Rusk's suggestion, the president instructed the secretary of state to establish a contingency plan to contact through an intermediary UN Secretary General U Thant, and ask the latter to propose a mutual withdrawal of U.S. missiles in Turkey and Soviet missiles in Cuba.[39] Kennedy and his advisers realized that such a deal signified, as Bundy recalled, "our selling out Turkey because of a problem in the Western Hemisphere."[40] "Some thought that would have been the end of the [Western] alliance," Bundy added.[41]

The second point concerns the response of the Kennedy administration to this threat to the alliance. Preoccupied with their own management of the crisis, ExComm members were unwilling or unable to accept the legitimacy of allied perspectives on the crisis. In the transcripts of the ExComm meetings, the discourse used by American officials to refer to the allies was often patronizing. Kennedy administration officials viewed the Turks and the other allies not as fit partners but as emotional or obtuse clients to be manipulated into accepting America's wiser judgment. "We decided *not* to play it directly with the Turks,"

[37] The best accounts of the Jupiter missiles issue in the crisis are Bernstein, "Reconsidering," 55–129; Nash, "Nuisance of Decision," 1–26; and Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy*, 241–44, 248. Focusing on decision making within Kennedy's circle and on U.S.–Soviet negotiations, Bernstein demonstrates that Kennedy and not President Eisenhower deployed the Jupiters in Turkey. He argues convincingly that if the crisis had grown even more dangerous, Kennedy probably would have accepted a public deal involving removal of the Jupiters from Turkey. Nash shows how alliance and domestic political considerations dominated the Kennedy administration's decision to deploy, to keep, and to pull out the Jupiter missiles, but he does not discuss how Washington officials during the crisis considered the Turks as objects to be manipulated rather than as vitally-affected alliance partners that might share in the decision making. Trachtenberg focuses on the role of the Jupiters in the overall nuclear confrontation of the crisis. For the installation of the Turkish missiles, see "Attempts to Equate Soviet Missile Bases in Cuba with NATO Jupiter Bases in Italy and Turkey," 10 October 1962, box 226, NSF, JFKL. For outdated but still useful accounts, see Barton J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (Spring 1980): 97–125; Donald Hafner, "Bureaucratic Politics and 'Those Frigging Missiles': JFK, Cuba and U.S. Missiles in Turkey," *Orbis* 21 (Summer 1977): 307–33.

[38] Robert Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969). Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 518–25 acknowledges Robert Kennedy's readiness to deal with the Soviets on the missiles in Turkey.

[39] Blight and Welch, *On the Brink*, 83–84; Bernstein, "Reconsidering," 127–28.

[40] Blight and Welch, *On the Brink*, 83.

[41] Ibid.

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Bundy reminded the president.[42] From Ankara, Ambassador Raymond Hare explained that although the Turks' "steadfast, even stolid courage" was "their greatest asset to US" as an ally, this solidity created a "psycho-political" problem: the Turks "do not understand concept or process of compromise."[43] This judgment probably would have surprised those people who had bargained with the Turks over the previous millenium.

Early in the evening of Saturday, 27 October, at the height of the crisis, Robert Kennedy acting on the president's instruction, offered to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin a secret deal involving removal of the obsolete, liquid-fueled Jupiters in Turkey in return for withdrawal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. According to Bundy's and McNamara's recollections, the attorney general's offer was not contingent on obtaining the agreement of Turkey.[44]

Dobrynin's recollection that the Kennedys were eager for a trade was corroborated by a revealing statement by Theodore Sorensen at the 1989 Moscow historical conference. Sorensen, who had edited Robert Kennedy's published memoir of the missile crisis, admitted that he had distorted the attorney general's diaries to make it appear that Robert had issued a tough ultimatum demanding that the Soviets pull out their Cuban missiles. In changing the original text, Sorensen had downplayed Robert Kennedy's emphasis that the United States was willing to sacrifice the Turkish missiles as part of a deal.[45]

Sorensen's decision in 1969 not to reveal the extent to which the Kennedy brothers had sought out a trade involving the Turkish missiles was probably an after-effect of a deep concern among many ExComm officials. During the crisis, the president and many of his advisers feared that Turkey and the other NATO allies would bitterly resent Washington.[46] After all, the Americans were trying to safeguard U.S. security by agreeing to Soviet pressure to remove Turkish-owned missiles (whose warheads still belonged to the United States). Ankara's representative to NATO emphasized to his American counterpart, Thomas Finletter, that "Turkey regards these Jupiters as symbol of alliance's determination to use atomic weapons against Russian attack on Turkey."[47]

[42] Ex Comm Meeting Transcript, 27 October 1962, 39, presidential recordings, transcripts, JFKL. (Emphasis in original.)

[43] Hare to Secretary of State, 26 October 1962, National Security Archive, Washington, DC. My thanks to Thomas Paterson for sharing this document with me.

[44] Bernstein, "Reconsidering," 94–96.

[45] Blight and Welch, *On the Brink*, 340–41; Nash, "Nusiance of Decision," 10–16.

[46] Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, 434–36. A quarter century after the missile crisis, Bundy thought that probably NATO could have successfully handled an open discussion of the Turkish missile issue. The security issues here were complex; when the Cuban crisis seemed about to explode into war, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara suggested disarming the missiles in Turkey so as to protect Turkey from being an attractive Soviet target. See McGeorge Bundy (transcriber) and James G. Blight (editor), "October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm," *International Security* 12 (Winter 1987/88): 72–75.

[47] Thomas Finletter to Secretary of State, 25 October 1962, box 226, NSF, JFKL. This arrangement of mixed ownership of the Jupiters underscored one of the alliance's central, and enabling, obfuscations. While Americans sought to maximize their control over Western nuclear forces, they also encouraged

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The ExComm's unwillingness to share decision making on this issue was heightened by the realization that although some NATO allies would favor removing the missiles from Turkey in return for eliminating those in Cuba, other allies, including the Turks, would oppose the swap. Yet the point remains that despite the ritual rhetoric about democratic and multilateral governance of the Western alliance, at the testing point of crisis American leaders showed little faith in joint decision making. The Kennedy administration viewed the allies as too fractious and too emotional to be capable of arriving at a sensible, cogent policy on a matter that threatened annihilation for Western Europe as well as the United States. Bundy expressed this near disdain when he told the ExComm that the allies' fear that Washington would sell out Western Europe's interests was "irrational and . . . crazy, but it's a *terribly* powerful fact."[48]

On the 27th when a surface-to-air missile shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane over Cuba, heightening the danger of general war, a worried Kennedy decided that "we'd better have a NATO meeting tomorrow." The president was not thinking of a conference in which the allies would together work out a policy for NATO. Rather, the language he used connoted a meeting to reassure nervous clients: the conclave would "take the temperature"[49] of the Europeans, give them "an up-to-date briefing," encourage them to "feel that they're a part of it . . . feel that they know," and warn them that the Soviets could attack in Berlin or elsewhere.[50] In characterizing possible discussions with the European allies, Bundy again used the revealing word "noise."[51] Rusk told the ExComm that "we'd genuinely like to consult Europe," but the one-way direction of the talks that he envisioned was suggested in his next breath when he misstatedly conflated the United States with the alliance. Trying to refer to *NATO* he said *we*.[52] Rusk understood consultation within the NATO council to mean only that the United States would take allied views "into account before we decide what *has* to be done here in this Hemisphere."[53] Although Washington officials would listen to the wishes of the allies, they saw no reason to give allied sentiment much weight in U.S. decision making.

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the Turks and other allies to "feel some assurance in having [nuclear] weapons on their territory and somewhat in their hands." The gap between the feeling and the reality became clear when Finletter discussed the implications of replacing the Jupiters with Polaris missiles deployed on U.S. submarines off the Turkish coast. He pointed out that although the Turks "really would have no say in the use of Polaris in time of crisis . . . Turks really have no say over Jupiter use now because of custodial arrangements." Ibid.

[48] Bundy and Blight, "October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm," 39. (Emphasis in original.) Bundy aide Robert Komer believed that in contrast to U.S. officials who considered the Jupiter problem in a "rational and logical" manner, for the "Turks, Italians, and others," it was "high in subjective emotional content." Komer to Bundy, 12 November 1962, box 226, NSF, JFKL.

[49] Ex Comm Meeting Transcript, 27 October 1962, 71, presidential recordings transcripts, JFKL.

[50] Bundy and Blight, "October 27, 1962: Transcripts of the Meetings of the ExComm," 71–72, 83.

[51] Ex Comm Meeting Transcript, 27 October 1962, 72, presidential recordings transcripts, JFKL.

[52] Ibid., 68. (Emphasis added.)

[53] Ibid., 69. (Emphasis in original.)

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When Rusk suggested telling the NATO representatives in Paris the ExComm's preferred strategy for dealing with the missiles, the president cautioned that "even if we want them [the NATO allies] to end up that way, we don't want to look like that's where we urged them." Kennedy understood that manipulation of the allies had to be subtle, since clumsy efforts to "steer" them could spark recriminations if the crisis "goes bad, which it [might] well" do.[54] Determined to preserve the NATO alliance as a postcrisis asset, Kennedy and his advisers were anxious to give Western Europeans the appearance and the "feel" of consultation. Although the Americans did consider allied interests, unavoidably they did so from a U.S. perspective, and unfortunately they did so without perceiving their own bias. Washington officials did not trust the allies enough to consider serious consultation; as McNamara put it, "they may split up, and you may have chaos."[55] The failure to consult was underscored in Ankara, where the Turkish foreign minister on the 27th "said he assumed [that the] US would do nothing which concerned Turkey without consultation," while Ambassador Hare himself, unaware of the secret missile trade, could inform Turkish officials only by "passing on information as received via V[oice] O[f] A[merica]."[56]

Then suddenly, on 28 October, Khrushchev eased the terrible tension by agreeing to withdraw the missiles from Cuba on the basis of a secret deal that provided for removal of the Turkish missiles. The planned NATO war meeting had become unnecessary. In a remark that reflected the strain on the leaders of both super powers, Rusk reported "that the comrades in the Kremlin had probably been pulling guns on each other during the last 48 hours."[57] Although Western Europeans also breathed easier, many felt deflated by their limited say in this life and death crisis. A top British diplomat observed that "the lesser Powers, to which we . . . belong, have little influence on the policies and actions of the nuclear giants. Cuba made that very clear."[58] Prime Minister Macmillan, who based much of his foreign policy on a special relationship more special to Britain than to the United States, still tried to remain close to that giant. The Americans also wanted familiar ties with the British; as Rusk explained in December 1962, "we have to have *somebody* to talk to in the world . . . we can't talk to DeGaulle . . . or Adenauer."[59]

Consultation and Skybolt

Yet despite its need for such "talk," the Kennedy administration matter of factly excluded London from participating in the November 1962 decision to cancel

[54] Ibid., 68–69.

[55] Ibid., 72.

[56] Hare to Secretary of State, 29 October 1962, National Security Archive.

[57] Ormsby Gore to Foreign Office, 28 October 1962, PREM 11/3691, PRO.

[58] Wiebes and Zeeman, "Holland's experience of crisis consultation in NATO," 100.

[59] Richard E. Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau American Policy-Making and Anglo-American Relations," 15 November 1963, box 323, NSF, JFKL, 71. (Emphasis in original.)

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further U.S. development of Skybolt, an air-launched missile. In 1960, in return for allowing the United States to base atomic submarines in Holy Loch in Scotland, President Dwight Eisenhower had promised to continue development of Skybolt and to sell the weapon to Britain. Macmillan prized Skybolt, which would extend the useful life of Britain's V-bombers, as a relatively cheap way to maintain an ostensibly independent nuclear force. The timing and evolution of the Kennedy administration's decision to cancel Skybolt illustrated the American tendency to decide first and consult with the allies later, and then only on secondary matters. On 7 November 1962, Kennedy and his principal advisers tentatively approved McNamara's suggestion to save $2.5 billion by scrapping the Skybolt development program, which had had some problems in testing, and, more importantly, which now seemed superfluous to U.S. needs because of the success of the submarine-launched Polaris missile. McNamara and Rusk advised Kennedy that scuttling Skybolt would thrust upon the pro-American Macmillan a problem "so serious as to make the [British] Government fall."[60] Kennedy decided to "warn" the British "now and consult with them *once we were done* with our decision making, three weeks hence."[61]

McNamara dissembled when he gave the warning to Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft. He told Thorneycroft that because Washington would not make a final decision before 10 December, "consultation" with London "would probably not be advisable before November 23rd." As Richard Neustadt noted in his study of this affair, however, "December 10 was actually *not* the date when McNamara foresaw an American decision. November 23 was when he hoped for final clearance from the President." The secretary of defense had told Thorneycroft 10 December was the decision date because that is what he calculated as the "probable leak-date," after the Joint Chiefs had gotten the word.[62]

After Kennedy on 23 November gave final approval to canceling Skybolt, McNamara went through the motions of consulting with Thorneycroft on 11 December. Before McNamara left Washington for this meeting, Undersecretary of State George Ball cautioned "that we must not seem to have decided first and then consulted."[63] Less concerned about British sensibilities, McNamara publicly announced upon his arrival in London, even before he met with Thorneycroft, that "all five flight tests [of Skybolt] attempted so far have failed and program costs have climbed sharply."[64] The British press and many officials were outraged. By denigrating Skybolt, McNamara had made it difficult for the British to decide on any course other than to abandon the missile project upon which they had staked their future as a nuclear power. Thorneycroft stormed: "We have canceled

[60] Ibid., 16. In March 1963, Kennedy asked sometime adviser Richard E. Neustadt to write a comprehensive analysis of the Skybolt crisis based on classified U.S. documents and on interviews with Washington and London officials. Neustadt's 132-page report was declassified in full in 1992.

[61] Ibid., 17. (Emphasis added.)

[62] Ibid., 19. (Emphasis in original.)

[63] Ibid., 73.

[64] Ibid., 62.

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other projects, we have made ourselves absolutely dependent upon you."[65] Of significance here was not just Washington's exercise of superior power, but the unpartnerly way in which the Kennedy administration had failed to consult with its closest ally.

With Skybolt scotched, the British had several choices: to endure the expense of building their own missile or endure the pain of giving up a modern nuclear deterrent; to pursue nuclear cooperation with the French, a course that de Gaulle hinted at when he met with Macmillan at Rambouillet on 14–16 December and that would infuriate Washington; or to ask the Americans to sell the Polaris submarine-launched missile, an option that would extend the life of Britain's independent deterrent, while underscoring its dependence on U.S. weaponry.[66] Characteristically, Macmillan decided on the last choice and at the previously scheduled Anglo-American summit of 18–21 December he pressed Kennedy to sell the missile.

Within the Kennedy administration there was considerable debate on how to respond to this request and what conditions might be attached to sale of the missiles. Many Kennedy officials hesitated to sell Polaris, because they hoped that the Skybolt cancellation would pressure London to phase out its independent nuclear capability, thereby setting a precedent for post-de Gaulle France and forestalling nuclear ambitions in West Germany. McNamara and other Defense Department officials wanted to centralize management of the West's deterrent in Washington's hands, while George Ball, Walt Rostow, Henry Owen, Robert Schaetzel, and others in the State department argued that revitalizing the Anglo-American nuclear special relationship with the most modern strategic weapon in the U.S. arsenal would anger de Gaulle and endanger the already-strained Brussels negotiations on admitting Britain to the Common Market. As a close observer noted, they saw little reason to endanger the Grand Design for the sake of "fidelity to a declining ally whose defense posture" of nominal independence "was silly."[67]

Although Kennedy was not so cavalier about vital British interests, he wanted to nudge London toward eventually abandoning its separate nuclear force. In a conversation with Ormsby Gore on the plane to Nassau, the president offered to pay 50 percent of the remaining costs necessary to develop Skybolt, which would then be deployed only by the British. This solution, Neustadt later explained, would keep the British deterrent restricted to "the right side of the line between [obsolescing] bombers and missiles" and "raise the monetary cost of 'independence' to the British, which might hasten a rethinking of their whole deterrent posture."[68] But on Nassau the prime minister told Kennedy that he no

[65] Ibid., 65.

[66] For de Gaulle's hints to Macmillan, see ibid., 82–83; Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1959–1963* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978), 201–02; file PREM 11/4230, PRO.

[67] Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," 28; see also 16–32.

[68] Ibid., 87.

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longer could accept Skybolt, besmirched by McNamara's comments to the British press; "the girl," Macmillan said bluntly, had been "violated" in a public place, and he wanted Polaris instead.[69]

Despite Kennedy's reluctance to sell Polaris and so strengthen the nuclear weapons program of Britain (and indirectly that of France), there remained the fact that the United States had promised Skybolt in the context of a deal permitting the basing of U.S. submarines at Holy Loch in Scotland. More importantly, there remained the need for a pro-American, tractable government in London. When Kennedy listed to Macmillan the problems with selling Polaris, the prime minister rose up to recall what "Churchill had told him in 1940," alluded to other defiant moments in British history, and warned that if Britain had to develop its own missile, it "would lead to a deep rift with the United States."[70] Macmillan did not mention the possibility of working with the French, a threat that probably would have angered the Americans more than scare them.

Kennedy and Macmillan finally agreed to the sale of Polaris missiles in a complex arrangement that attempted to satisfy conflicting opinions within the American and British governments and to leave open future options by providing for several contradicting commitments. The British made vague promises to assign their Polaris missiles to NATO and to some "multilateral force" of the future while retaining the right in a supreme crisis of using those Polaris missiles on their own.[71] This Nassau accord offered satisfaction, at least for the moment, to those American officials who wanted to centralize nuclear management in Washington, multiply the ties that bound the British "independent" deterrent to NATO, and build up the Multilateral Force as a future container for French and German nuclear ambitions. Moreover, the agreement pleased those Britons like Macmillan who were content with a nuclear force independent in symbol even if not in fact.[72]

According to witnesses, when de Gaulle learned of this deal at Nassau, he flew "into a tremendously violent temper," directed mostly at the British, whom he denounced for "betraying Europe" and as "no longer worthy of being considered a free country."[73] His temper was not soothed when he concluded that Kennedy's post-Nassau offer of a "similar" Polaris deal for France did not include the required submarines or warheads (which Britain already had and France did not) and was intended by the Americans to "entangle" Paris in a long negotiation, in the Multilateral Force, and in other webs of integration that would make France a more tractable ally."[74] Embittered by Britain's hard negotiating in the Common

[69] Ibid., 89.

[70] Ibid., 90.

[71] Ibid., 94; file PREM 11/4229, PRO.

[72] Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," 95–102.

[73] Memorandum on de Gaulle, enclosed in David Klein to McGeorge Bundy, 18 April 1963, box 72, NSF, JFKL.

[74] Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," 100–09; Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle Le souverain* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986), 365–66.

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Market talks and Macmillan's obvious preference for a nuclear special relationship with Washington rather than with Paris, de Gaulle decided that Britain was too insular and too Americanized to join uniting Europe. In January 1963, the general dramatically torpedoed British admission to the Common Market, and with it the Kennedy administration's Grand Design.

De Gaulle's actions demonstrated that Europeans, too, could play the game of nonconsultation. And the French leader certainly sought for France a position superior to that of West Germany and the other continental allies. But the general's bid for consultation and independence also reflected a yearning among many Western Europeans, including many who disapproved of de Gaulle's tactics, for a more independent European voice.[75]

Conclusion

The Kennedy administration's reluctance to share real power over decision making reflected America's historic difficulty in actually treating the European nations, even Britain, as equal partners—instead of just talking about such equality. The frustration of independent-minded Western Europeans in making good on their ambitions and the quarrels between Macmillan and de Gaulle illustrated another historic difficulty—the problems the allies have had in mobilizing the power necessary to deal with America as an equal. Meaningful consultation in times of crisis can never be easy and free of risk or discord. If the United States wants the European allies to act like responsible partners, it has to be consistent in treating them as such even when, from Washington's perspective, a crisis seems too pressing or too important to risk bothersome noise.

What David Bruce described as the vicious circle of American predominance, European dependence, and mutual resentment operated for a half century. In the 1990s, the Western allies emerged from the cold war with diverging strategic interests and with too little experience in how to share decision making in serious and meaningful ways. Although the Clinton administration at times appeared more willing than its predecessors to seek a genuine consensus within NATO before acting, it remained unclear whether future U.S. administrations would not return to a more unilateral stance.

Scholars have largely ignored the issue of allied consultation in October 1962, because they have accepted as adequate the accounting by Kennedy administration officials. But among the many lessons to be learned from this most-studied crisis is the reminder that both policy makers and analysts bring to any issue their

[75] Some American analysts realized that de Gaulle's emphasis on a more independent Western Europe had widespread appeal on the continent, even among those who disliked French diplomatic policies and methods. See especially Assistant Secretary of State for Europe William R. Tyler to McGeorge Bundy, 12 March 1964, box 169, NSF Country File, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas; Zbigniew Brzezinski to Arthur Schlesinger, 7 May 1963, box 66, President's Office Files, JFKL; Thomas L. Hughes to Secretary of State, "Possibilities and Limitations in Dealing with De Gaulle," 6 April 1963, box 72, NSF, JFKL.

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preconceptions, prejudices, and sense of precedent: that is, their usually unexamined view of what is "proper" and "natural." In October 1962, these blinders made it easy for Kennedy administration officials to miss the possible advantages of gaining a broader perspective and of strengthening the alliance as they deliberated on how to respond to a dangerous crisis. So too in November–December 1962, Kennedy officials could talk about "consulting" with London while having no intention to share the decision making on a matter affecting vital British interests—and while having few pangs about their failure to consult. Meaningful consultation can never be easy or free of risk and discord.

Analysts can often deepen their understanding by considering policy questions that were closed off before they could be directly addressed or options that were excluded before they were explicitly considered. One tool in such deeper analysis is close reading of the diction, syntax, and tropes used by policy makers. Nuances in the language used by decision makers to speak and write about policies and about other persons and nations often reveal ideals and predilections that condition those decisions while remaining unacknowledged.

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

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Book Reviews

The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War *by Raymond L. Garthoff. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1994. 834 pp. Cloth, $44.95; paper, $19.95.*

The post-1945 cold war faded away, but the arguments over the reasons for its death will never end. Since 1990, conservative hardliners, as Raymond L. Garthoff calls them, have argued that the Soviet Union disappeared because only they, under the leadership of Ronald Reagan, understood the evils of communism and built up American defenses—especially budgets for such technology as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—until the Soviet system collapsed from the strain of trying to keep up with capitalism.

Garthoff, a former high official in the State Department and CIA, has another view: "The West did not . . . win the Cold War through geopolitical containment and military deterrence. Still less was the cold war won by the Reagan military buildup and the Reagan Doctrine. . . . Instead, 'victory' came when a new generation of Soviet leaders realized how badly their system at home and their policies abroad had failed" (p. 753). SDI's impact was "significant," but wildly overstated by its advocates' expectations that the "initiative would bleed the Soviet economy." Instead, SDI only added "to growing tensions . . . and made more difficult the pursuit of arms control and the normalization of relations" (pp. 516–517). Reagan's policies, which Garthoff sharply criticizes, were the "dominating" reasons for the tensions in the early 1980s, but after 1985 Mikhail "Gorbachev's initiatives" toward détente and internal reform "were of primary importance" (pp. 768–769).

Garthoff's highly knowledgeable analysis of both U.S. and Soviet policy making is a superb overall view of the 1981 to 1992 years, a worthy complement to his widely noted *Détente and Confrontation* that covered the 1969 to 1981 era. He makes a fundamental point in both volumes, but especially the more recent, that should inform debates over the cold war's end. Garthoff notes that especially from mid-1982, when George Shultz became secretary of state, the clash among U.S. officials was not whether to contain Soviet "encroachments," as Shultz termed them, on U.S. interests, but whether to threaten U.S.–Soviet ties, dangerously frayed as they were, over revolutions in such regions as the Middle East and Central America, or to understand that these revolutions were largely outside Washington's and Moscow's influence and should not be allowed to threaten the superpower relationship (pp. 107, 548–549). The hardliners' great flaw, Garthoff believes, in a superb dissection of policies in the Third World, was their blind insistence on seeing revolution as a monolith, while

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Shultz's more informed approach created the channels through which both sides operated to end the cold war.

Less impressive than several other recent accounts in sorting out the internal division over policy on each side, Garthoff's work is stunning in its analyses of the negotiations (and their results) on arms control, Third-World revolutions, Afghanistan, the post-1945 summits, and the Bush-Gorbachev relationship. His work is much less concerned with Boris Yeltsin's role, although important in suggesting why the cooperative Yeltsin turned into a more uncooperative nationalist after 1992. This is a major contribution that will have to be closely studied by all who are seriously concerned about the causes and consequences of the cold war's decline and death.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House *by Bob Woodward. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994. 352 pp. $24.00.*

In the tense tango that veteran Washington reporter Bob Woodward exquisitely details, one message is inescapable: Candidate Bill Clinton breathlessly moved from the 1992 campaign to the White House without asking whether Candidate Clinton's successful electoral strategy and message would well serve President Clinton. Through extensive interviews and original documents, Woodward tells of themes and people who fit uneasily together in governing. The book is at once a dramatic case study of the administration's 1993 effort to craft its economic program and a richly detailed character study of the actors.

There is the quartet of campaign political advisers, guided by Stan Greenberg's ever-present polls and James Carville's never-failing rapier wit. There are the established Washington hands, eager to grab the reins but rusty from years out of office. There is the constant sniping between these two camps, and there is the First Lady, often sitting sphinx-like but in crisis proving to be the president's real chief of staff. There is even Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, wondering in whispers from offstage about whether "Clinton would be like Hamlet, afflicted with the problems of the thoughtful" (pp. 70–71). And, of course, there is Bill Clinton himself playing the lead through alternating fits of rage and policy wonkishness. The plot has enough twists and turns to satisfy any theatergoer, and Woodward certainly does know how to spin a good yarn.

On one level, the book explores the critical if sometimes unnoticed transition from the campaign's promises of a middle-class tax cut and investment program to a campaign to slash the budget deficit. The transformation came through the ability of old capital operators like Lloyd Bentsen, Leon Panetta, and Alice Rivlin to seize the opportunity the transition presented, but it certainly did not come easily. Woodward, for example, details an ongoing effort by political consultant Paul Begala to shove Office of Management and Budget Deputy Director Alice Rivlin off the stage. Begala curses and plots yet fails to force Rivlin's ouster; her credibility with the Washington community proved more important than blind followership of the campaign's themes, at least as Begala defined them.

On a deeper level, the book is an elegant character study of Bill Clinton himself, the politician with an insatiable taste for policy details. Woodward's Clinton becomes so fascinated

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yet overwhelmed by the arcanae of policy that he cannot bear to choose among competing options. Because he cannot make crisp decisions, Clinton continually stumbles into tough scrapes, which provoke epic presidential rage.

To say the least, the book is an engrossing read, more important for its overall tone than for the spotlight it puts on individual actors. The readers, however, can scarcely view the play without worrying about how its effects were created. Woodward employs his now-famous methodological melange of deep-background interviews, cross-checked sources, and leaked (or lent) memos to fill the stage. That sets up an irresistible parlor game of "guess the source" for intriguing quotes.

As Woodward admits, the result is an uneasy middle ground between journalism and history. He constantly presents the reader with dialogue (including direct quotations of profanity) and emotions ("Stephanopolous felt") that strain credulity. Nevertheless, his research quite obviously was exhaustive, and his characters move and speak in ways that ring true. But as the action gallops along, there is always the nagging question of how much of the story is actually what happened, and how much is a remarkable but perhaps fictional reconstruction.

Woodward and his method are one of a kind. They are scarcely models that others could—or should—follow. But Woodward's engrossing real-time drama undoubtedly leaves a far richer base from which political scientists and historians can begin in putting the Clinton presidency in broader context.

DONALD F. KETTL
University of Wisconsin-Madison
The Brookings Institution

On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency *by Elizabeth Drew. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994. 462 pp. $24.00*

This book by the veteran Washington observer, Elizabeth Drew, is a chronologically organized account of the first year and portions of the second year of the presidency of Bill Clinton. Like many of the author's earlier works, it is essentially a journal. Drew's sources, she reports, are her interviews with "every high official in the Clinton White House" and with elected officials and staff members on Capitol Hill, "whose angle of vision and expertise could shed light on the Clinton Presidency" (p. 438).

The book derives its title from the remark of one of Drew's respondents that Bill Clinton "has always lived on the edge, personally and politically." Rather than explore that intriguing insight (or any other) in depth, however, Drew is resolutely pointillist, moving from episode to episode, and providing the reader with scant connecting narrative. She begins with Clinton's inauguration and flashes back to the transition, but otherwise furnishes so little background that to the uninitiated reader Bill and Hillary Clinton might well be extraterrestrials descended upon 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Drew's prose is sparse and sharply etched. As the spirit moves her she tosses off *apercus*, many of them illuminating, some of them merely opinionated, and a few of them sufficiently mordent to have persuaded reviewers that the book is an attack on Clinton. In fact, it lacks much of a point of view. Still, because Drew is perceptive and well connected, her book is of value, at least to the specialist.

On the Edge invites comparison with the other investigative account of the Clinton presidency by a major Washington reporter, Bob Woodward's *The Agenda: Inside the Clinton*

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White House. Woodward's prose is more vivid than Drew's, and he lays out the background of the Clinton presidency and its cast of characters in a workmanlike manner. But his analytic passages (to the extent that there are any) are weaker. And his singular emphasis on Clinton's anticlimactic economic program makes his book far less instructive than Drew's, which covers the broad spectrum of domestic and foreign policy.

Both books provide massive confirmation of what already was widely held to be the case when they appeared. The Clinton presidency is maddeningly accident prone. The president has boundless energy and enthusiasm, but he squanders these resources by the uneven allocation of his time. He is indecisive in the extreme. His White House is an organizational shambles. It is underendowed with Washington-wise professionals and overendowed with amateurs. Yet the Clinton presidency has accomplished much for which it has not received credit, to a considerable extent because its failures (such as health care) and its lesser contretemps (nanny-gates and $200-haircuts) are deemed more newsworthy than its genuine achievements.

Students of the presidency will be particularly interested in Drew's treatment of the oxymoronic Clinton White House organization. She presents no continuous discussion of the topic, but it is instructive to string together several of her passing observations (particularly so because the book's otherwise excellent index lacks an entry for William Jefferson Clinton).

> Clinton gave his aides conflicting signals. He would tell one aide that he wanted more issues committed to papers and another that he did not. He would express frustration about the loose management of the White House and invite kibitzing by people inside and outside his administration. He complained about an overloaded schedule and urged that events be added. A close adviser said, "He likes a loose structure until there's a screw up. Then he gets upset" (p. 241).

> The Clinton White House didn't fit any of the traditional models: no spokes in the wheel (Kennedy), no hierarchical model, as Republican administrations had. [David] Gergen and [George] Stephanopoulos were freelancers, getting into nearly anything they wanted. [Bruce] Lindsay was freelancing as well. A senior official said, "There's still no structure to the meetings. It's just everyone talking to him. . . . He just takes it in, but you don't know what he is taking in. Therefore, a lot of the time there is no decision or we revisit a decision, because no one knows what happened" (p. 348).

> In Bill Clinton's White House, the Vice President and the First Lady were formidable powers, with their own staffs and their superior access to the President. That made the life and role of a Chief of Staff far more complicated than usual. With a President who was so prone to change his mind, it made staff work hellish. People had difficulty understanding how Clinton wanted the White House run, because Clinton had conflicting, even confusing, ideas of how he wanted the White House run. But what it seemed to come down to was that he didn't want any one person, other than himself, to have a great deal of power. It was Clinton's White House. Even his friends weren't sure whether he represented how Clinton wanted it to work or his confusion over how he wanted it to work (p. 349).

Those who find such comments instructive would be advised to dip into Drew's book. I conclude with one of her asides, which seems to me to be a telling commentary on a promising, but to date strangely flawed, presidency: "Things that went wrong because of Clinton's loose, lax governing style distracted him and his staff and drew public attention away from his substantive efforts" (p. 419).

FRED I. GREENSTEIN
Princeton University

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The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War's Last Chapter *by Mark P. Lagon. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1994. 208 pp. $49.95.*

The appraisal of realist explanations of foreign policy is one of the most important tasks facing scholars, yet these appraisals are extremely difficult to conduct, in part because of the elusive nature of realist concepts. Mark Lagon's book attempts to compare the relative merits of structural realist and elite belief explanations of the Reagan Doctrine. Based on interviews of numerous officials of the Reagan administrations like Jeane Kirkpatrick and Edwin Meese, as well as speechwriters and influential outsiders like Charles Krauthammer, Lagon tries to infer whether the Reagan Doctrine was a product more of the realities of power in the world of the 1980s or of the ideology of a Republican elite.

He concludes that the latter is more correct, being persuaded by the argument that a Democratic or even a moderate Republican elite would not have come up with the policy in the same situation. The logic of this argument is so overwhelming that much of the interview material is not really necessary, even though the quotations from the interviews provide the most interesting reading and the original contribution of the book. This is a rather ironic outcome, and it raises the methodological question of how interview evidence can be used to infer conclusions about an elite belief explanation of foreign policy.

One of the things Lagon could have done to make the study more rigorous would have been to specify exactly what kinds of statements he would have expected the interviewees to make if the Reagan Doctrine had as its source power concerns or ideological ones. The most obvious place where this could have been done would be to press interviewees to see whether they were actually motivated by attempts to balance power and specifically what they meant by that.

Even without asking these kinds of questions, Lagon finds serious flaws in structural realism's ability to explain Reagan's foreign policy. First, the "ambiguity of the concept of the balance of power" makes it "a difficult concept to appraise as an objective set of facts. Decisionmakers saw the equilibrium in different ways . . ." (p. 83). Second, he concludes, "The national interest is obviously a slippery concept, requiring leaders to interpret it in practice. And, they often disagree what it is when doing it" (p. 84). If the leadership of the Reagan administration, which more than most U.S. administrations had a fairly clear and coherent foreign policy ideology, could not agree on the nature of the balance of power (sic) (that is, the distribution of power) it faced or more importantly on the nature of the national interest, then in what sense can realism provide an adequate guide to or explanation of foreign policy?

Lagon is unwilling to pose the question as sharply as this; nevertheless, he does say that structural realism may identify what is possible in foreign policy, but that it cannot provide much guidance as to which of the many possible policies and options a decision maker will select. Here is where elite beliefs and ideology play their critical role. Elites, for Lagon, become "the arbiters of the national interest," and on this basis he argues for a synthesis of the two approaches. For a book that was probably a dissertation and is still written way too much in that stilted style, this is a safe conventional conclusion. It is unclear from the analysis of the book, however, exactly what contribution realism makes to understanding the Reagan Doctrine that could not be made by minor modifications to the elite-belief explanation or by combining the elite explanation with other nonrealist mid-range theories.

JOHN A. VASQUEZ
Vanderbilt University

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The American Presidency: An Intellectual History *by Forrest McDonald. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1994. 516 pp. $29.95.*

"Vast as the body of writing on the presidency is," the author of this volume claims, "there has been no satisfactory general history of the office in modern times." Forrest McDonald, a Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Alabama, attempts to "fill that gap" with a long treatise on the "history of the idea of the presidency" (p. viii). McDonald takes the reader from the thirteenth-century legal commentator, John Bracton, and the sixteenth-century political philosopher, Nicolo Machiavelli, to Bill Clinton; and he does a masterful job of synthesizing the intellectual sources and history of the American presidency into a compelling, if troublesome, story.

The prevailing theme of McDonald's narrative is that the American president is obligated, or condemned, to play the role of "king-surrogate" (p. 459). Although the architects of the Constitution, following thinkers such as John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu, had sought to make executive power safe for democracy, McDonald's story keeps returning to Bracton's concept of *gubernaculum*– meaning that in "certain areas the king's power was absolute" (p. 18). The broad outline of powers and duties of the executive in Article II of the Constitution encouraged ambitious and gifted presidents to pursue "extensive and arduous enterprises," as Alexander Hamilton put it in the *Federalist Papers*–to attempt to overcome "the various checks and balances and establish in effect a presidential government" (p. 185). By the twentieth century, in fact, as national administrative power expanded in the service of domestic and international security, presidents were routinely expected to frame and pursue bold plans. With Franklin Roosevelt's presidency, especially with the powers he accrued during World War II, McDonald exclaims, "executive power had come full circle, back to what Bracton had called *gubernaculum*" (p. 403).

McDonald's observation that the American presidency is a thinly disguised monarchy is not especially novel, but he makes it amid a rich historical narrative that lends drama, even a touch of foreboding to this familiar argument. Those who have studied McDonald's work on the early history of the republic will not be surprised to find that he embraces the institution of the presidency–he is rather an unreconstructed Hamiltonian, who looks to executive prerogative to temper the people's aversion to face the unwelcome necessities that threaten the national welfare. Similarly, the author tends to be harshly judgmental of even the most thoughtful partisans of constraining the constitutional potential of executive power. For example, McDonald's rendition of the classic debate between Pacificus (Hamilton) and Helvidus (Madison) peremptorily dismisses Madison's criticism of unilateral executive action in foreign affairs as "scarcely the most persuasive argument Madison ever made" (p. 238). McDonald does his reader a disservice by failing to explicate more fully the best of many debates to come on the appropriate scope of executive power in American constitutional government. Indeed, at times, McDonald seems more devoted to denigrating critics of executive power than in making understandable to the modern reader their thoughts and deeds.

To be sure, McDonald's celebration of executive power is not complete. He finds particularly unsettling the way in which the "idea" of executive power, properly understood, has been perverted by mischievous populism. The "monarchical perquisites available to presidents mask a harsh reality: the vast gap between expectations and the capacity to deliver." The frustrations that arise when presidents are held responsible for situations they are not able to manage, McDonald offers, torment the "presidential psyche" and arouse, unfairly, a sense of betrayal among the citizenry (p. 466). It follows logically, the author suggests, that candi-

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dates and presidents are tempted to seek the devotion of the American people in order to manipulate them. In a striking condemnation of popular elections, McDonald claims that the selection of presidents reduces to the art of "image-making," which is indifferent, if not avowedly hostile, to governing principles and character. It is as pointless to ask why Americans care about such farcical rituals, he avers, as "it is pointless to inquire why ancient Romans accepted unquestionably the divination of soothsayers, or why tribal peoples believe in their totems, or why pentecostals have confidence in their healers" (p. 433–434).

It is ironic that a book on the intellectual history of the presidency includes an entire chapter on "Images and Elections," but has scarcely a word about rhetoric. As Thomas Pangle has observed, through rhetoric, "the wisdom that is politically possible and the consent that is politically necessary are combined, under the distant guidance of political philosophy." Of course, the conversation of American democracy has not always reached such heights, and it has been all too rare in recent decades. But it is hardly absent; indeed, the caliber of rhetoric that is evident not only in Lincoln's speeches but in those of Jefferson, Jackson, FDR, and Reagan as well, suggests that presidents to be successful must have the capacity and willingness to take the American people to school. Perhaps, presidents must aspire not to be "king surrogates," as McDonald asserts, but "first citizens."

The American Presidency is an impressive achievement in narrative history—McDonald displays an extraordinary command of the theoretical background and political necessities that have shaped the presidency. But this volume disappoints as a work of intellectual history; in the end, it fails to do justice to the ideas and philosophical disputes that gave birth to and shaped the development of the American Presidency.

SIDNEY M. MILKIS
Brandeis University

Race and Culture: A World View *by Thomas Sowell. New York, Basic Books, 1994, 352 pp. $25.00.*

Sowell challenges the so-called social science doctrines that imbue the "surrounding environment [as] the shaper of groups' behavior and institutional decisions the arbiters of their fate." He holds that groups have "their own internal cultural patterns, antedating the environment in which they currently find themselves, and transcending the beliefs, biases, and decisions of others." Sowell believes that the grand theories based on the supposed "objective conditions," "economic forces," or "social structures" that condition the success or failures of groups, are incorrect. In an almost Hegelian manner, he suggests that the human capital of groups and its use explains the "advancement of particular groups, the societies of which they were part, and ultimately the human race" (p. xii).

Sowell's methodological problem was to define "group" as his unit of analysis. He uses "group" in "the broad social sense in which it is applied in everyday life to designate ethnic groups of various sorts—by race, religion, or nationality." For him, groups based on "religion" or "nationality," are self-evident, but he felt that a more scientific definition of "race" had little "relevance to the human beings currently inhabiting this planet, after untold centuries of racial intermixtures." Why then use "race" to designate any group? Sowell's point is that it does not matter whether "race" or the other characteristics of groups are real since their consequences are real (p. 159).

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Sowell has less difficulty defining "culture" as those characteristics "which provide the material requirements for life itself—the specific skills, general work habits, saving propensities, and attitudes toward education and entrepreneurship—in short, what economists call 'human capital.'" Possessing and using culture is so crucial to a group's fate that Sowell sharply criticizes "cultural relativists" for allegedly denying that "some cultures are better in some respects than others, that they are more effective for particular purposes" (p. 4–5). The truth is that while relativists recognize that steel axes are superior to stone axes for cutting trees, they warn that culture traits be judged within the context of their cultures. Moreover, they would agree with Sowell that his Hegelian-like "culture" moves with time, and that the conquerors of one era become the conquered of another.

The methodological and damaging flaw in Sowell's book, especially to anthropologists, is his insistence on comparing "race" with "ethnicity," "religion" and "nationality." With all sorts of caveats, he attempts to show how these entities acquire and use the cultural capital that conditions their positions in space and time. For him, "a Jew is anyone who is socially regarded as a Jew, whatever the religious or biological realities may be." What he finds significant is the differences between Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews based on their divergent histories. What this shows, according to Sowell, is that the "role of a particular people's cultural equipment or human capital is much clearer in an international perspective than in the history of one country" (p. 1).

The problem here is how groups accumulate the valuable human capital. Sowell cites migration, wars of conquest, biological survival, and cross-cultural borrowing. Economics is important, but Sowell is skeptical, since the applications of economic principles in a racially and culturally heterogeneous population introduce complications beyond those found in the analysis of economic transactions in homogenous populations. He feels somewhat the same way about intelligence, since given today's genetically mixed populations, this relationship is "ever more elusive" (p. 6). Nevertheless, attempting to bell that particular cat, Sowell is intrigued by data showing international differences even among the same racial groups. He distrusts the importance of conclusions from the United States, "where large educational differences between the races have long existed" (p. 159). But here again, Sowell's caveat is that the question is not whether these differences are cultural or genetic in origin; the sociological consequences are real.

Readers will not be surprised that Sowell's basic argument is that for various reasons, groups have different degrees of human capital that influence their fate. He reflects: "It is difficult to survey the history of racial or ethnic relations without being appalled by the inhumanity, and viciousness of it all. There is no more humane and moral wish than the wish that this could all be set right somehow. But there are no more futile or dangerous efforts than attempts to redress the wrongs of history" (p. 250).

Sowell appears to be asking too much of humans who rail against the sins of the past by suggesting that "there is no justification for taking out those frustrations on living human beings—or for generating new strife by creating privileges for those who are contemporary remainders of historical guilt" (p. 250–51). Sowell believes that "History is not destiny. Much of it consists of mistakes which need not be repeated and crimes which need not be tolerated again" (p. 224). Those who disagree with him, shout: "NEVER AGAIN!"

ELLIOTT P. SKINNER
Columbia University

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Mandate of Heaven *by Orville Schell. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994. 464 pp. $25.00.*

For people who are concerned with U.S.–China relations and watch events in China closely, this is a timely and much welcomed volume on contemporary China. Although much has been reported or written about what has happened in Beijing in the summer of 1989 and since, there are surprisingly few well written accounts and analyses of the events that took place in China in the past five years or so. Now Orville Schell once again makes a valuable contribution to fill that gap. This is an absorbing book observing and documenting the political, social, economic, and cultural events since the 1989 crackdown on the student demonstrations. As he has done many times, Schell recounts these latest developments with the sharp eyes of a seasoned China watcher, showing his profound knowledge of Chinese history and telling the story with great clarity and style.

Unlike many books about contemporary Chinese affairs, this one seems to have avoided the pitfall of either painting an overly depressing or overly encouraging picture of the current reforms in China. Nor does the author try to make, as many are tempted to do, predictions about China's future. He simply did what he does best—make detailed, vivid, and at times humorous observations of what has occurred since June 1989. His depictions are accurate and his comments are compelling.

The fate and views of Chinese intellectuals have always been a focus of Orville Schell's previous works. This book is no exception. Schell again shows great concerns over the post-1989 Chinese intellectual community. He echoes some Chinese intellectuals when he writes that China may be losing not only its intellectual but also spiritual soul when the society is being swept by the tide of market and materialistic forces (p. 419). While this is a real concern shared by many, one has to be cautious when taking the author's point without reservation, for this book tends to reflect more the views of the liberal intellectuals than those of ordinary citizens.

This book makes some penetrating observations of the tensions existing in contemporary Chinese society. One of them is a salient one: the booming economy, which boasted a 13 percent annual growth in 1993 and the stagnate political structure and process. It points to the deep tension between the needs of Leninist state and its dependence on market. It reflects Deng Xiaoping's pragmatistic approach to reform—"whatever the color of the cat may be, as long as it catches mice, it is a good cat," a "keep the Chinese essence and learn the Western technology"—which finds precedents in Chinese history.

More significantly, *Mandate of Heaven* reveals another contradiction in Chinese society that has often escaped the eyes of visitors. This is the coexistence of a repressive state that keeps a close watch on not only foreign journalists but also its own citizens on the one hand, and an increasingly defiant society that uses the "second channel" and "black route" to get things done, on the other. The coercive Leninist state sometimes renders itself powerless and impotent in controlling some aspects of life, even if it intends to do so, as shown in the case of regulating home-use satellite dishes owned by private citizens.

The author does not elaborate on why such contradictions and tensions exist in China today. Perhaps it is not what this largely narrative book intended to accomplish. But as we read, it becomes clearer that the communists are no exception to a perpetual historical pattern of cyclical development in China. Whether such an historical interpretation of contemporary events is convincing is up to the readers to judge. On the whole, though, this is a good book for both academics and the general public to read.

XIAOBO LU
Barnard College

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Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia *by Bogdan Denitch. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1994. 229 pp. Paper, $17.95.*

Bogdan Denitch is remarkably well qualified to write a book about the break-up of Yugoslavia. A professor at City University of New York Graduate Center, he is also an American son of Serbian parents, an antinationalist, a democrat, and a veteran observer and activist in the Yugoslav context. As Yugoslavia was falling apart, he won enormous respect for his efforts to link democratically-minded intellectuals and politicians in all six republics. His book, born out of frustration at the failure of that effort and the efforts of others, has an acuity and bite to it that won't be found in other academic treatments of this tragic subject.

Denitch explains, better than anyone else has so far, how nationalism challenged and then destroyed the multinational character of Yugoslavia. While he finds negative elements in Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and even Muslin nationalism, he mainly blames the Serbian leadership headed by Slobodan Milosevic for starting the process of Yugoslavia's disintegration. Since many observers think Milosevic stood for the unity of Yugoslavia, Denitch's rebuttal is worth attention. He is also scathing in his criticism of the Yugoslav army and argues convincingly that it was its deeply communist orientation that led it to try to hold Yugoslavia together by force.

There is a major lesson in the efforts by both Serbs and Croats to create ethnically pure states out of Croatia and Bosnia: such attempts not only are antidemocratic in themselves, but, if translated to other parts of the world, would produce chaos. Denitch brilliantly analyzes the damage that would attend the triumph of ethnic nationalism. He registers the fate of such multinational states as Belgium or Switzerland if the Serbian view that all Serbs should live in one state became a global prescription. At the same time, he describes the absurdity of granting self-determination without rigorous standards; India, Pakistan, Turkey, and dozens of other states would be torn apart.

Denitch is particularly skillful at exploding myths that have become obstacles to an understanding of Yugoslav developments. He demonstrates that the internal borders of Yugoslavia were not artificial, as Serbian and Croatian nationalists both allege. And he argues persuasively that nationalism in Serbia and Croatia did not come from a popular upsurge but rather from the manipulations of nationalist leaders. He notes, for example, that 85 percent of the reservists called up in Belgrade for the war in Croatia refused to serve.

Denitch is an unabashed advocate of multiethnic democracy. His recommendations for postwar reconstruction include: mutual recognition of all states emerging as independent, a free-trade zone, a nonaggression treaty, an agreed human rights code, a sharing of some diplomatic and consular services, and a free press. These points, all desirable, unfortunately make him something of a Puritan in Babylon. The fact that not a single one is anywhere near attainment illustrates the gulf between Western-style democrats like Denitch and the nationalist demagogues he deplores.

Denitch's book, though choppily organized, is a masterful dissection of the essence of the Yugoslav tragedy. Its combination of first-hand expertise, crisp analysis, and passionate advocacy makes it a must for those who want to go beyond outrage.

WARREN ZIMMERMANN
Former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia

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Self-Inflicted Wounds: From LBJ's Guns and Butter to Reagan's Voodoo Economics *by Hobart Rowen. New York, Times Books, 1994. 447 pp. $25.00.*

Long a leading economics reporter, Rowen deploys his formidable journalistic skills in this depiction of economic policy making since the early 1960s. Weaving telling anecdotes with a sharp awareness of key facts, Rowen bring what could be a dry narrative to life. The theme of his treatment is abundantly evident in the book's title and in the chapter headings, variously titled "Blunder," "Mismanagement," "Drift," and – for the 1980s – "Greed." Rowen believes economic policy making since 1965 has been just plain bad and explains why in abundant detail. Given his wealth of evidence, it is difficult to disagree with his main point.

Most of the book consists of chronological narrative, marching us from the 1960s through the 1980s. The last and best chapters address important economic policy problems of the present, such as trade with Japan, deregulation, and Third World debt. In these chapters, Rowen provides much good evidence in support of his positions on protectionism (against) and deregulation (against). Rowen makes clear throughout who he believes are the heroes and goats. Liberal Keynesians like Walter Heller and Arthur Okun receive repeated praise, while nary a good word is related about supply-side economics.

Rowen, unfortunately, doesn't always provide adequate argumentation to back up these evaluations. For example, he praises the Heller tax cut of the early 1960s but fails to note how LBJ's reluctance to raise taxes as inflation picked up indicates that Keynesian remedies sometimes may not be possible. He also repeatedly praises wage and price controls without seriously addressing the mainfold objections to them voiced by economists.

According to Rowen, Ronald Reagan and George Bush are almost totally to blame for the mushrooming deficits of the 1980s. The truth, however, is quite a bit more complicated. Joseph White and Aaron Wildavsky in *The Deficit and the Public Interest* demonstrate that growing entitlement costs would have produced large deficits in the 1980s regardless of Reagan's tax policies. Rowen also blames Reagan and Bush for growing income inequality. Their role in promoting this was dwarfed by international changes in wages, producing greater income inequality in all capitalist nations since 1980.

At the conclusion of his book, Rowen predicts that we are in for a decade or two of fiscal conservatism due to our big deficits. Ultimately, the book doesn't explain well why we have landed in the fiscal soup. Reagan and Bush fiscal policy are part of the story, but much more could be said about the role of Social Security and entitlements in producing the present fix. Searching the index, one finds only one mention of Social Security and none at all of Medicare, Medicaid, or entitlements. Also, at no point does Rowen step back from the policy story to explain how the world economy has altered since he started covering economics decades ago.

This book is valuable for its wealth of good reporting and some dazzling anecdotes. The Texans – Lyndon Johnson, John Connally, and James Baker, in particular – receive colorful treatment. Rowen also contributes some good arguments in particular policy areas. Still, the national and international big picture deserves more careful attention here. Perhaps Rowen will write another book that fills in the broader canvas that provides the context for the events he covers so well in this book.

STEVEN E. SCHIER
Carleton College

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Presidential Lightning Rods: The Politics of Blame Avoidance *by Richard J. Ellis. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1994. 271 pp. $29.95.*

In an age where an intrusive media dig into every conceivable political and personal element of a president's life, where no piece of minutia is too small to place under the harsh glare of investigation, it should not surprise us that presidents are compelled to spend more and more time in efforts to deflect criticism and avoid blame. Richard J. Ellis attempts a systematic examination of presidential use of lightning rods in their efforts at blame avoidance, and he has produced a compelling study.

Ellis asserts that "it behooves a president to position members of his administration on the front lines to absorb blame for unpopular policies. Presidential advisers might thereby function as 'lightning rods,' deflecting criticism away from the president and onto themselves" (p. 2). There is a long tradition of scapegoating for the president, as no political leader wishes to be seen as the cause of problems or hardship. Where possible, leaders usually attempt to shift the blame onto others. But as Ellis recognizes, there are limits to this strategy.

"The lightning rod concept," Ellis writes, "is premised on the assumption that behavior of leaders affects how the public perceives and attributes responsibility" (p. 4). And the "use of advisers as lightning rods is only one of a number of blame avoidance strategies a president can pursue" (p. 6). Ellis defines the role of adviser as lightning rod "as a relationship in which an unpopular adviser deflects criticism away from the president" (p. 7). It has two components "attraction of criticism" (to the adviser) and "deflection of criticism" (away from the president) (p. 8). It is predicated on the hypothesis that if the public blames the underling, the president may avoid responsibility and criticism. "Unknowns," Ellis reminds us, "cannot function as lightning rods." To be effective the lightning rod should be fairly visible, and somewhere in the line of fire.

Do these lightning rods really attract criticism to themselves and thereby deflect criticism away from the president? Ellis investigates this question via a series of solid case studies, looking at Eisenhower's relationship with his Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, Ronald Reagan and Interior Secretary James Watt, and the propensity of presidents to use their Secretaries of State (John Foster Dulles, Dean Acheson, and Henry Kissinger) and the Chiefs of Staff (Sherman Adams and John Sununu) as lightning rods. Ellis also examines the limits of the lightning rod strategy with the case of Eisenhower, Attorney General Herbert Brownell, and southern whites over the civil rights issue.

While this is a very solid work, several questions remain unanswered. The author recognizes this when he writes, "What then have we learned about lightning rods and blame avoidance in the modern presidency?" The lesson is "to approach the lightning rod concept with caution" (p. 146). Often, he writes, talk of lightning rods is "little more than administration officials attempting to put the best gloss on a bad situation" (p. 146). Ellis adds "the rhetoric of lightning rods is often little more than a way of covering up failure, from oneself as well as from others. Rather than opening up inquiry, the lightning rod label can become a way of closing it off, of wrapping oneself or others in a righteous mantle of self-justification while ignoring the damaging consequences of provocative or inept behavior. That political actors try to portray themselves in the most positive light is hardly remarkable. Most surprising is that journalists so frequently and uncritically repeat these claims. Conventional wisdom is made, unmade, and remade with such startling rapidity because its empirical underpinnings are so slight and its conceptual foundations so sloppy" (p. 147).

Left unresolved as well is the question of the impact of blame avoidance on democratic

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accountability and responsibility in a system of separated but shared powers in which it is already difficult to assess blame and responsibility.

MICHAEL A. GENOVESE
Loyola Marymount University

The Constitution in the Courts: Law or Politics? *by Michael J. Perry. New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. 277 pp. $35.00.*

This excellent book makes the dramatic argument that originalism, properly understood, can lead to progressive applications of the Fourteenth Amendment, based upon the invocation of the antidiscrimination principle in the privileges and immunities clause in equal protection and substantive due process cases. Courts may question laws when they operate to define and burden members of a group, explicitly or implicitly, in terms of a trait irrelevant to their status as human beings. Most importantly, Perry severely criticizes Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia for their failure to differentiate between the interpretation of the indeterminate language of constitutional text and their minimalist role for the Supreme Court. Perry argues that there is no good reason to marginalize the antidiscrimination principle, because "Our historical experience . . . suggests that *our ordinary politics has been particularly ill suited to decide what traits are relevant to a person's status or worth as a human being*" (p. 179). For Perry, conservative originalism "Can be seen for what it is: a vigorous and engaging polemic, but ultimately a shallow effort, clarifying little, obscuring much, and likely to mislead the underinformed" (p. 10).

Perry argues that when there is no violation of the antidiscrimination principle, a reasonableness standard and a minimalist Court role are in order. Thus, *Griswold v. Connecticut* was rightly decided because it violated a reasonableness standard given the availability of condoms; affirmative action and the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect women and homosexuals are supported.

Perry implies that his progressive originalism is more "originalist," because unlike the originalism of Bork and Scalia, the decision as to whether courts or elected bodies are to decide constitutional choices follows primarily from an interpretation of the rights language in the Constitution, not from views about the Court role that are not in the Constitution. However, to far greater degree than is suggested by Perry, questions of individual rights and Court intervention are related to the interpretation of polity principles in the Constitution. When the Founders of the Constitution and the Civil War Amendments thought about the need for fundamental rights, they did so in terms of their expectations about whether elected bodies could be trusted to protect such rights. Therefore, conservative originalists should be viewed as misinterpreting not only Fourteenth Amendment antidiscrimination principles, but also the Founders' (of the Constitution and Fourteenth Amendment) need for courts to be counter-majoritarian when rights are denied. As in his previous books, Perry continues to rely on instrumental concerns, not constitutional principles, when arguing that courts, not elected officials, should decide questions of human rights.

This problem is most evident in Perry's position on the right of abortion choice. Perry argues that "restrictive" abortion laws, defined as those which do not allow abortions for victims of rape and incest or for women contemplating the birth of a seriously deformed child, violate the antidiscrimination principle, because they are the product of the selective

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sympathy and indifference of men to women. Perry admits this antidiscrimination argument is counter-factual. If this is so, there is no principled way to draw the line between permitting abortions in situations of incest, rape, and the possibility of a deformed child but not in other situations. Perry's antidiscrimination principle is too much like the differences approach which seeks to protect women (and other subordinated groups) only when they engage in behaviors similar to those of dominant groups. Rights-based constitutional theories, such as Perry's antidiscrimination principle, need to be supplemented with far more complex theories of polity malfunctions for subordinated groups. This book is must reading for both jurisprudes and Court followers.

RONALD KAHN
Oberlin College

The Supreme Court and Constitutional Theory: 1953-1993 *by Ronald Kahn. Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 1994. 320 pp. $35.00.*

Ronald Kahn takes legal culture seriously. On one level, this book is a comprehensive and effective treatment of the central political ideas that have dominated scholarly and political discussion of the Court for the last forty years. Kahn considers each of a large number of influential theories about the role of the Court, from the pluralist politics of Robert Dahl, through a detailed treatment of work by John Ely, Martin Shapiro, Sanford Levinson, Mark Tushnet, and Larry Tribe, among others, to recent writing about the role of civic republicanism. He finds each of them wanting in explanatory and practical power. In their place—and arguably present all along—Kahn offers a dialogic framework built upon two key elements. The first is a dialectic of polity (for example, where decision-making power should be located) and individual rights as the implicit framework of at least the last four decades of conceptual theory and actual case-by-case decision making by the Court. The second is an acknowledgement that this constitutive dialogue takes place within the specific context of a particular interpretive community (for example, the scholars, politicians, lawyers, journalists, and others who are the central consumers of the Court's work). In the jurisprudential and practical framework that sets the terms of the dialogue here, Kahn argues, law and ideas matter at least as much as politics. In the process, Kahn takes serious issue with the conventional instrumental theories typically associated with Dahl and others that the Court is best understood as another type of political body with a framework for decision making only superficially altered from that at work in the openly political branches of government. In effect (and in what amounts to an unstated contribution to modern centrist legal theory), Kahn takes both critique and legalism seriously and argues that the juxtaposition of critique and legalism is not only possible but necessary. For this reason, the argument is an important one worth even more elaborate development.

On another level, using this analysis, Kahn takes issue with the received wisdom of the dominant understanding of the Warren and Burger Courts. The conventional wisdom characterizes the Warren Court as one dominated by rights and informed by a clear, conceptually coherent jurisprudence; while the Burger Court is typically presented (in Vincent Blasi's words) as "the counter-revolution that wasn't," hampered by a shallow, undistinguished, and less principled jurisprudence. Kahn argues that both characterizations are misconceived. He argues that the Warren Court was far more simplistic and less removed from the apologetic

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pluralistic perspective ascendant among political scientists at the time and that the jurisprudence of the Burger Court involved a more sophisticated and consistent understanding of polity versus rights than that used by the Warren Court. As a secondary, but important point, he also argues that the dominant interpretation of the Warren Court as rights-based and the Burger Court as political is linked ultimately to the explanatory and theoretical difficulties inherent in the instrumentalism and interest group politics that dominated political science discourse during those periods.

Perhaps this could have been two books rather than one, and perhaps there could have been a deeper entry into some of the wealth of recent legal theory work. But that is a small matter that ultimately underscores the potential potency of the argument.

DONALD H. GJERDINGEN
Indiana University—Bloomington

America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century *by Tony Smith. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994. 455 pp. $24.95.*

For political scientists, some have said half in jest, history ended in 1945 and international relations began. Tony Smith points out that World War II also led political scientists to isolate international from national politics; and he says, not at all in jest, that the results have been bad both for them and those they would influence. Students of international relations ignore domestic politics both as potential cause and consequence; students of comparative politics ignore international pressures on political development. Marxists have avoided the separation, but are hampered as usual by a refusal to take states' desires for physical security as seriously as those for profits.

Smith would reconcile the studies of internal and external politics by illustrating their interaction in twentieth-century American foreign policy. He argues that most U.S. leaders have genuinely tried to spread liberal democracy to foreign countries because they believe a democratic world safer for America. He argues that democratization has often been successful, most notably in the postwar liberalizations of Germany and Japan. Finally, he argues that the United Stages ought to carry this Wilsonianism into the twenty-first century, albeit with more skill and humility.

Smith will doubtless draw the ire of those who consider Wilsonianism dangerous sentimentality, veiled imperialism, or capitalist hypocrisy. Yet he is highly persuasive. He teases out a bright thread that runs through the policies of McKinley, Taft, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, toward such nations as the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Iran, Vietnam, Chile, Grenada, South Africa, Germany, and Japan. American leaders talk and act as though they believed democratization vital to U.S. security.

Where Wilsonianism has failed, Americans have typically misunderstood local conditions, especially the need for land reform, and have been reluctant to alienate antidemocratic elites. They (and their critics) have also overestimated America's power to shape foreign polities. Most notoriously, they have opposed true democrats who seemed too sympathetic to communism. Smith might have explained this paradox more clearly by reiterating that democratization has been a means to the end of national security rather than a pious end in itself. It was

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thus easily trumped by anticommunism, a more compelling means during the cold war, and one itself partly motivated by liberal ideology.

Propositions that would contradict Smith—that U.S. leaders care nothing for democracy, that they have had no impact, or that liberalism makes no difference in the international system—begin to look flimsy in the face of Smith's massive evidence. Still, the book would be more persuasive had Smith explicitly considered what such counter hypotheses would lead us to expect to find in his cases. Furthermore, although Smith is careful to define liberal democracy, he leaves us puzzled as to why a "constant" would lead to such variable policies, for example, from Carter's human rights emphasis to Reagan's stress on free markets. Also puzzling is his exclusion of Lyndon Johnson, the president who sought to remake the Mekong Delta into another Tennessee Valley. Finally, Smith's normative attachment to Wilsonianism seems premature given his slight attention to the consequences of its main competitor, realism. The Nixon/Kissinger détente and opening to China suggest that realism may have normative attractions of its own.

Yet the main puzzle is why scholars have paid so little attention to America's democratization campaign. Smith holds the academic division of labor responsible. He makes a case that this division keeps us from understanding a central political event of our time, the global spread of democracy. It is a case that political scientists simply can no longer ignore.

JOHN M. OWEN
Stanford University

Planning for Change *by James Vestal. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 232 pp. $38.00.*

Very few topics in the Japanese political economy have received as much attention and controversy as industrial policy. On the one extreme are the neoclassical economists, who have argued that Japanese industrial policy was at best neutral, but probably detrimental to Japanese economic development. On the other extreme are the political scientists, who essentially maintain that without industrial policy Japan would still be a developing country. The truth, as always, lies somewhere in between, and James Vestal's study, more than any other, convincingly argues the middle ground.

Vestal's thesis is the following. Between 1945 to around 1965, industrial policy helped growth industries such as steel and automobiles achieve international prominence and helped declining industries such as agriculture and textiles maintain employment. The maintenance of employment was important in buying the political consensus necessary to subsidize the high potential growth industries.

Gradually, the delicate political economic balance started to fray. By the early 1970s, the long-suffering Japanese consumer could no longer be ignored. Government sanctioned cartels that raised the prices of basic household goods such as heating oil and toilet paper were attacked by the media. Industrial policy was blamed for pollution, excessive urbanization, and international trade conflicts.

Vestal argues that between the 1960s and the late 1970s, industrial policy was mainly reactive. New policy initiatives were designed to control pollution and to ease Japan's transition from a reliance on heavy to knowledge-intensive industries. The author gives negative marks to policy in this period. Not only were the policies ineffective, but they probably

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prolonged the survival, at a high cost to Japanese consumers, of noncompetitive industries such as agriculture, textiles, and shipbuilding.

Vestal thinks that the much scaled-down policy initiatives of the 1980s were on balance slightly positive for Japan. The research and development consortia promoted by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) probably helped Japanese companies catch up with America's world leaders.

The book should be accessible to those with almost no training in economics. Basic theoretical concepts necessary for evaluating industrial policy are aptly reviewed with a minimum of jargon in the second chapter. Readers with graduate economics training will probably yearn for more econometric results and statistical tables that support the author's assertions. In recent years, many econometric studies have been performed to test the efficacy of Japanese industrial policy, including some by Vestal himself. Taken together, the studies have been inconclusive, but some summary of the studies could have been useful.

Vestal's story is already well known to the most thoughtful observers of the postwar Japanese economy. As the author describes in his chapter on the lessons for developing countries, industrial policy will only succeed in the right institutional setting, which includes bright honest bureaucrats, a national consensus for rapid economic growth, and companies capable of absorbing technology at the world frontier. Vestal has told the true story of Japanese industrial policy well.

ROBERT DEKLE
Federal Reserve System

Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics *by James G. Richter. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 263 pp. $45.00.*

Richter offers a distinguished contribution to two questions: the development of postwar world politics and the interaction between international change and domestic politics. A state's flexibility to adjust its foreign policy in response to changing international circumstances, he hypothesizes, depends on the pre-existing range of alternatives with advocates in the decision-making process. The availability of foreign policy options depends in turn on the principles legitimating the state's rule. If national leaders fail to design strategic models of world politics that reconfirm the principles around which the broader ruling elite coalesces, they risk displacement by rivals who give the ruling elite more convincing reasons to think its principles of rule will be successful. Consequently, a leader cannot achieve more than tactical innovations in foreign policy unless he or she converts the regime to new legitimating principles at home. Richter investigates these hypotheses by carefully examining Soviet foreign policy during the Khrushchev years 1953–1964, plus a chapter about his successors.

The longstanding question about Soviet foreign policy under Nikita Khrushchev has been how to explain his wild swings from confrontation and bluster around Berlin and Cuba to cooperative initiatives exemplified by Camp David and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Richter persuasively locates the reasons for these swings in the contradictions of Khrushchev's domestic political strategy that led him to innovate in response to the emergence of a new international condition—the danger of nuclear annihilation.

Khrushchev gained ascendancy in the leadership by offering a foreign policy that combined reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence with a promise that foreign communists could

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mobilize mass opposition to the belligerence of capitalist governments abroad. These strategies manifest two of the three legitimating principles that Richter identifies in Soviet domestic politics: a military principle that legitimated Soviet rule among the broader bureaucratic elite (not the populace) by reference to victory in the civil war and over Hitler; and a transformational principle that legitimated by pointing to the party's capacity to mobilize.

Khrushchev maintained ascendancy by incorporating the third principle: a managerial principle emphasizing economic expansion. In order to fund economic expansion, he sought to cut back the military investments that he had promoted during his pursuit of ascendancy. This decision, though forced upon him by the logic of preventing new challenges to his rule, introduced a strain between his ruling coalition. He resolved the tension in two ways. One was to seek military triumphs on the cheap—brandishing tanks in the hope of consolidating communist rule in East Germany and secretly deploying missiles to Cuba to redress a worsening strategic balance, protect Cuba, or evict U.S. missiles from Turkey. The other way was to demonstrate, by negotiating visible agreements with the United States, that economic growth at home and the popular appeal of socialism abroad could compel NATO to behave more cooperatively. When the United States resisted the military pressure and proved unwilling to make more than very ambiguous commitments to cooperation on Khrushchev's terms, Soviet elites withdrew their reluctant and conditional assent from Khrushchev's attempt to innovate in response to the nuclear standoff.

As Richter persuasively argues, the Soviet Union may have collapsed, but Russia still can be governed only by defining new legitimating principles that must find echoes in new strategic models of the world order. The spectrum of legitimating principles in contemporary Russian politics explains why Boris Yeltsin tries both to cooperate in economic issues and to obstruct U.S. policies in Bosnia and Eastern Europe. Thus both Richter's creative theoretical argument and his sound empirical methodology retain their relevance beyond the collapse of the political institution to which they are addressed.

RICHARD D. ANDERSON, JR.
University of California, Los Angeles

Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe *by Hans-Georg Betz. New York, St. Martin's, 1994. 266 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $18.95.*

This study provides a helpful introduction for those struggling to make sense of the dramatic recent growth of far right-wing political movements in Western Europe. Betz offers an exhaustive discussion of recent electoral studies, polling results, as well as a concise electoral history for each of the main populist right-wing parties in West Europe (including the French National Front, German Republicans, Austrian Freedom Party, Flemish Block, northern Italian Leagues, and the various Scandinavian antiwelfare state parties). Although Betz curiously ignores the significance of some far-right movements (most notably: the Italian MSI and German DVU), no other volume known to this author offers such a convenient summary of the rapidly expanding body of empirical research on the West European far right; this makes the study especially useful for undergraduate-level courses in European politics.

But Betz intends to do more than provide a survey of recent empirical research: he also hopes to offer a novel interpretation of the ongoing expansion of the far right. In the process, he offers a number of insightful observations. American readers in particular should find

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Betz's account of the economic ideals of the European far right provocative. Betz shows how far right parties early on effectively tapped into antiwelfare state resentment and a resurgent sympathy for a radical brand of economic liberalism. Crucial elements of the economic program of the far right are strikingly reminiscent of the knee-jerk antistatism and free-market liberalism that has since gained a wide following among mainstream conservatives throughout the West; the influence of the far right thus extends well beyond its immediate electoral base. Betz also describes why some far right parties have recently distanced themselves from the rugged economic liberalism they originally sponsored: as approaches at times akin to those originally endorsed by the radical right have become governmental policy (and many voters consequently have suffered), far right parties have followed their demagogic instincts and found it more useful to exploit xenophobia. This has allowed many of them to maintain a relatively diverse electoral base, including a significant number of working class supporters. According to Betz, all far right parties contain elements of both national populism and neoliberal economic populism, but in recent years most (with the notable exception of the Italian Leagues) have found the former to be of greater electoral merit.

Most ambitiously, Betz attempts to explain the rise of the far right by focusing on the ongoing emergence of postindustrial capitalism. This process is characterized in his account by global economic liberalization; profound shifts in the structure of the labor force (the emergence of a bifurcation between well-paid, relatively secure jobholders and those whose position is ever more insecure, as well as a growing proportion of technical, managerial, and professional workers); the growth of the service and information sectors; and a premium on flexibility and entrepreneurship. In response to these trends, an increasing segment of the population of the advanced countries suddenly faces "deteriorating prospects with regard to their life chances" (p. 32), and the resultant unease has provided ample fodder for the far right. Immigrants and refugees—in the minds of many, a concrete symbol of economic uncertainty and the ongoing globalization of economic processes—have functioned effectively as political scapegoats.

Unfortunately, these more ambitious aspects of Betz's agenda need to be better sketched out; too often, he simply refers to the latest buzzword from contemporary sociological theory instead of developing and explaining his provocative claims. But perhaps that will be the task of a future volume.

WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN
University of Pittsburgh

Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States *by Michael Shafer. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1994. 270 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $14.95.*

Shafer has written a book that is very hard to criticize, but not for the standard reasons. The book *can* be faulted on the usual grounds: the posited relationship between independent and dependent variables is not fully demonstrated; the causal story linking those variables is wanting. But Shafer himself acknowledges these limitations in such a beguiling way that it takes utmost callousness to proceed with the task of critical evaluation. This book makes a bold, imaginative argument that begs for more careful and thorough theoretical specification and empirical evaluation.

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"What determines," asks Shafer, "which states, under what conditions, will be able to do how much to further development and improve their standing in the international division of labor" (p. 251)? His answer draws on insights about the benefits of production flexibility, introduced so boldly by political scientists Charles F. Sabel and Michael Piore over a decade ago. According to Shafer, successful developmental states emerge in countries where the leading sector of the economy facilitates risk management by market actors and state assistance in this task.

There are four independent variables, each a sectoral characteristic: capital intensity, scale economies, production specificity, and asset/factor specificity. These predict the success of state-guided economic restructuring, defined as a high degree of alteration in state-society relations and reallocation of resources in society. There are eight observations of attempted restructuring, including four failures: Zambia 1964, 1980s; Sri Lanka 1960s, late 1970s-1980s; and two successes: Korea 1960s–1970s, Costa Rica 1950s–1960s; and two possible failures: Korea 1990s, Costa Rica 1980s–1990s. High/low capital intensity and scale economies explain the failure/success.

The four independent variables co-vary. One must assume that Shafer did not try to mitigate the "too many variables, too few cases" problem by collapsing independent variables because of doubt about which variables are doing what causal work. The number of intermediating variables is symptomatic of confusion about the dominant causal mechanism. On the way from sector characteristics to restructuring ability are at least nine factors including tax structure, and collective action barriers facing labor and capital, and state control of the channels of interest representation. This complexity presents a serious empirical and theoretical challenge. For example, there are many different reasons for cross-national variation in direct/indirect tax revenue ratios or patronage politics beyond the sectoral characteristics identified. There are cases—Thailand, for example—where sectoral characteristics are arguably propitious, but indirect tax revenues and levels of patronage politics are high while restructuring was successful. In a probabilistic world, one countervailing case means nothing, but when the case domain is hundreds, eight confirming cases means little more. My hunch is that the soundest empirical ground lies under the connection between sectoral characteristics, collective action, and restructuring.

One is left wondering about alternative, and more parsimonious lines of argument: could an explanation based on the size of the state/parastate sector, as a function of the leading sector, explain as much variation in restructuring success? Could instability of foreign exchange inflows explain the observed variation more parsimoniously? Intrasectoral variation in restructuring outcomes (evidenced in the difference between Costa Rica and El Salvador) raises the question of whether there might be something else about the organization of production doing the explanatory work in more parsimonious fashion, with more generalizability, while escaping debate about the existence of optimal sectoral organization.

This book has important strengths. Each of the four country chapters addresses alternative theories about restructuring in that country; this makes the book appealing for upper-level undergraduate teaching. The book should be very popular for graduate-level courses, also. It could be compared with any number of other sectoral "theories" (Helen Milner, Bernard Frieden, Ronald Rogowski). By introducing yet another variant of "sectoral theory" Shafer's book suggests a need to refine that label. For students of comparative political economy the book also demonstrates the important methodological point that countries are not single observations.

SYLVIA MAXFIELD
Yale University

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The Return of the Dangerous Classes: Drug Prohibition and Policy Politics *by Diana R. Gordon. New York, W. W. Norton, 1994. 316 pp. $29.95.*

Diana Gordon sets herself an ambitious goal: explaining the persistence of unsuccessful drug control policies in the United States. The tenacity of the current prohibitionist approach, Gordon posits, can be understood by examining what she calls its shadow agenda: an agglomeration of opportunities, fears, and needs, which have created a consensus about the proper parameters of drug control, to the detriment of rational cost-benefit analyses of alternative policies. As a backdrop to her argument, Gordon includes five case studies of drug control policy politics at the local, state, and national levels. The book proceeds to a section examining the political use made of drug control by politicians and activists alike, the nature of "drug-speak" (the language of the drug control issue, which legitimizes the zero-tolerance policies) and, finally, a comparative exploration of European drug policies, focusing on trends in Germany and Italy.

The dangerous classes to which the title refers are those segments of American society perceived as unruly and threatening to the social order. Their primary characteristic is that they are seen as uncontrollable. The vagueness of this criterion allows a variety of groups to fit into the category, depending on the perspective of the observer. Broadly, however, the dangerous classes consist of racial and ethnic minorities, authority-flouting youth, recent immigrants, and those liberals who hold permissive attitudes on a range of issues. Personifying the dangerous classes are drug users, street gang members, and welfare mothers.

The shadow agenda operating beneath the surface of the drug control issue is motivated by cultural and economic fears, which find a focus in the dangerous classes. Gordon argues that the desiderata of this unstated agenda militate against rational appraisal of alternative drug policies and serve to distract attention from the underlying structural problems in the American economy and society. The shadow agenda's "aim is regimentation" (p. 127), and it functions as a tool for staking claims to economic and political gains. For financially strapped cities and states, drug control provides a way to compete for scarce resources. Politicians at all levels of government find a costless way of scoring points with the public by manipulating the issue of drug control; witness the strong bipartisan support for tough drug laws.

One of the problems with this book is the presentation, as evidence to support the argument, of the very things which should have been demonstrated by the author. For example, Gordon classifies as rhetorical excess and gratuitous demonization of drug dealers the claim made by Charles Rangel, the longtime Democratic Congressman from Harlem, that drugs have claimed more American lives than communism has. While this is used as proof of a shadow agenda in action, it is not apparent that Rangel's assessment is inaccurate. The presentation as support for the validity of the overall argument of material which is by no means self-evident is a problem that runs throughout the book, and ultimately undercuts its persuasiveness.

At another level, a narrow focus on the issue of drug control obscures important insights that would emerge from considering shadow agendas in a broader context. Gordon notes that the war on drugs bears similarities to anticommunism during the cold war, but does not develop the point further. But as far back as the 4th century B.C., Aristotle suggested in the *Politics* that the creation of a sense of danger and threat could serve as a tool for state stability; and the need for an identifiable enemy to crystallize generalized discontent and anxiety has been a recurrent theme throughout history. In this connection, the contrasted cases of European drug policy are cast within a limited framework of analysis. Gordon finds that drug control does not serve as a lighting rod for fear and hostility about dangerous classes to the same

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extent as in the United States; however, the narrow analytic scope leads Gordon to neglect the shadow agenda which lurks behind the contentious debate over border controls and immigration in the European Union: fears of terrorism, resurgent nationalism, and concomitant anti-immigrant violence. Europe has dangerous classes of its own, as the growing racism and attacks on immigrants and refugees will attest.

Gordon effectively demonstrates that the war on drugs shows signs of playing a symbolic role. The drug problem has not been solved by the existing policies. The difficulties encountered by needle exchange programs intended to limit the spread of the AIDS virus by intravenous drug users illustrate the fact that this is a question deserving to be studied, albeit in a less polemic and more rigorous manner.

SANYA POPOVIĆ
Barnard College

The Case against the General: Manuel Noriega and the Politics of American Justice *by Steve Albert. New York, Charles Scribners' Sons, 1994. 456pp. $25.00.*

The U.S. trial of Panamanian leader General Manuel Antonio Noriega offers a unique and captivating story. In *The Case Against the General*, Steve Albert traces this story from the 1987 decision to indict Noriega on charges of narcotics trafficking to his 1992 conviction and sentencing. The author introduces readers to the key legal players in the drama, explores the difficulties encountered in bringing the general to court, and recounts the trial itself. In sum, the book provides an engaging account of the judicial process that enmeshed Noriega. However, the mode of analysis and the form of presentation make the work more suitable for the general public than for academic purposes.

Albert's approach uses the testimonies of different participants to draw out the key issues of the trial, rather than formulating his own arguments. Yet his investigation is quite suggestive. A key question regarding the Noriega trial involves why it ever occurred: was the 1989 invasion of Panama actually motivated by Noriega's purported criminal activity, or did issues such as the Panama canal play the primary role? The book offers sparse coverage of the larger political context, thus prohibiting a balanced assessment of possible grounds for the invasion. Albert leans, therefore, toward an interpretation that coincides with the book's focus on the judiciary. He presents the Justice Department's case as independently motivated by the battle against narcotics and initially obstructed by government agencies such as the CIA—apparently an interesting case of bureaucratic competition. Nevertheless, Albert suggests that, in the end, political motivations moved to the forefront. Through quotes, he implies that the president was only concerned with getting Noriega out of power, adding: "The indictments were a tool, after all" (p. 56).

An equally compelling and related question is whether Noriega actually committed these crimes. Again, Albert does not provide his own hypothesis, providing instead considerable information from which to draw one's own conclusion. The testimonies of witnesses both for the prosecution and for the defense led jurors to conclude, as Albert recounts, that even though testimonies conflicted and not all the pieces fit, "[a]ll you had to do was to look at the overall picture" (p. 431). But Albert provides other pieces—concealed from the jury—involving Noriega's collaboration with the U.S. government. The book also reveals the difficulties the defense encountered in obtaining both witnesses (alive) and funds. Overall,

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the picture of Noriega that emerges is that of a corrupt dictator, cooperating with whomever would prove most advantageous. Whether he in fact cooperated with Medellin cartel, or whether he did so more than with the CIA and Drug Enforcement Agency would be difficult to ascertain.

In essence, the *Case Against the General* is about this search for conclusive proof, in the face of enormous obstacles, that General Noriega had or had not committed the crimes of which he was accused. The great irony of this book, however, and its greatest weakness is that the author provides little evidence to back up his own case. Throughout the book, the author recounts dialogues he could not have heard, and he even attempts to depict the thoughts of the judge, lawyers, and jurors. It is difficult to assess whether the author imputed these thoughts or whether they were reconstructed from later interviews. The references to official documents and interviews in Albert's acknowledgments suggest that the book may have been based on solid research; however, without specifying the sources of his information throughout, there simply is not sufficient evidence to be sure. As in the case of Noriega, the reader can only draw his or her own conclusions.

DEBORAH L. NORDEN
Colby College

The City Builders: Property, Politics, and Planning in London and New York

by Susan S. Fainstein. Cambridge, MA, Blackwell, 1994. 298 pp. Paper, $21.95.

Susan Fainstein, who is professor of urban planning and policy development at Rutgers, began this study in the early 1980s, when downtown real estate development was beginning to surge in both London and New York. She had planned to investigate the social, political, and economic factors that led developers to make the decisions that she could see were shaping the form of both cities. Before the end of the 1980s, however, the real estate boom abruptly collapsed on both sides of the Atlantic. Undaunted, the author also analyzed the bust, and the book is more interesting for that, since the tale of how vast projects went awry is a story that can't fail to fascinate.

What gives the book its structure is the striking parallel the author finds between events in London and New York. In the 1980s both cities adopted growth strategies based on real estate development. In both cities huge projects—Battery Park City in New York, Canary Wharf in London—conceived before the collapse of the property market, were undertaken to satisfy the appetite for up-to-date office space of the financial service sector and the large multinational corporations. Both projects aimed at "creating a new address" at the periphery of the central business district or, in the British case, a bit further off. Battery Park City, in which the Canadian firm of Olympia and York became a major player, has been an economic and design success, while Canary Wharf, which the same firm attempted to carry out somewhat later, now stands largely empty and has helped to drive its sponsor, once the world's largest property developer, into bankruptcy.

In both cities what the author describes as massive land-use changes were proposed for business sites on occupied land near the center—Times Square in New York and King's Cross in London—but both were put on hold after the collapse of the property market. Likewise, in both cities attempts were made to develop new centers in underutilized commercial areas surrounded by poor, minority-occupied neighborhoods. The MetroTech center in downtown

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Brooklyn, helped by massive, mostly indirect subsidies from the city, opened for occupancy in 1990 and has apparently fostered revitalization in a relatively run-down area. In London's East End, an office and retail project proposed for the former site of the Spitalfields produce market had not yet received final approval by the end of 1992. The failure of Olympia and York, together with the now vast excess supply of office space, made it unlikely that anything would soon be built.

As Fainstein points out, there are important differences between the political environments in London and New York. In New York City power is highly centralized in the hands of the mayor. Greater London, on the other hand, comprises thirty-three autonomous local authorities. The Greater London Council, which served as a metropolitan government, was abolished by Margaret Thatcher in 1986. Thereafter, responsibility for overall planning in London shifted to the Department of the Environment (DoE), an arm of the national government. Although in the 1980s the Koch administration in New York and the DoE in London shared a commitment to property development as a growth strategy, the means of stimulating development differed sharply. In New York and other large U.S. cities, negotiated local property tax reductions were the chosen instrument. Under Thatcher, deregulation was the principal stimulant, and the requirement under the old land-use regime to obtain "planning permission" from the local authorities had been so restrictive that when it was somewhat relaxed at the urging of the national government, developers rushed in to seize their opportunities.

In a short review it is impossible to do justice to the many insights into the politics and economics of planning that Fainstein provides. Let me cite just one: she points out that in the Time Square, King's Cross, and Spitalfields schemes the developers were to pay for benefits to the local community, such as low-income housing or improvement to subway stations, out of their net revenues from development. These were sought by the local government as seemingly free gains; they were assented to by developers as a way of buying off potentially fatal local opposition. The result was that the projects had to be "sufficiently large—to create a financial surplus." Their large size unfortunately would have made them "strongly discordant with their surroundings" (p. 154). No doubt, fear of that outcome contributed to the delays that thus far have prevented these projects moving ahead.

JAMES HEILBRUN
Fordham University

Power, Trade, and War *by Edward D. Mansfield. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994. 278 pp. $35.00.*

This book evaluates systemic approaches to international relations by exploring empirically the relationships between patterns of international trade, the distribution of power, and war, with a focus on the determinants of war. Mansfield finds that systemic analyses, which examine the impact of the system's structure on global outcomes, are correct in using the distribution of power as the key determinant of patterns of war and trade, but that they have clear limitations. For example, his data suggest that such approaches overemphasize the importance of polarity as a feature of the distribution of power, and that the concentration of power as a feature of the distribution of power has more influence on the outbreak of wars and trade patterns than polarity.

His data also show that the relationship between the concentration of power and the incidence of wars differs from that suggested in other systemic analyses. While balance of

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power theories suggest that the probability of war rises as power becomes increasingly imbalanced, and power preponderance theories maintain that wars will increase as the distribution of power becomes more uniform, Mansfield finds an inverted u-shape relationship between the concentration of power and war—that is, both the highest and lowest levels of concentration give rise to the lowest incidence of wars, whereas intermediate levels contribute to the frequency of wars. Similarly, contrary to much existing theory, he finds a u-shaped curve relationship between concentration and the level of international trade—that is, both the highest and lowest levels of concentration lead to the highest levels of trade, whereas intermediate levels lead to the lowest levels of trade.

Mansfield is to be commended for going beyond most systemic studies by including process-level factors, such as the level of international trade and the business cycle in his analysis. He finds that the business cycle and whether the trading system is open or closed has no impact on the outbreak of war, but that the level of trade is inversely related to wars. He concludes it is necessary to consider both process-level and structural factors to understand why wars occur.

Like most books, this one has limitations. Mansfield does what he sets out to do very well, and his results are undoubtedly important to refining systemic theories of international relations. But those who think the relationships between power, trade, and war are much too complex to be distilled into a few system-level variables and run through statistical tests will be disappointed. Even Mansfield appears unconvinced by his own approach, as reflected in numerous qualifications of his conclusions and repeated acknowledgments of critiques of systemic approaches. He acknowledges the study "has only scratched the surface of the historical record," and that further research is needed to compare his results with the detailed record of the past two centuries (p. 251). Admittedly, it is hard to get excited about conclusions such as "both political and economic effects shape patterns of international trade" (p. 185); "both the distribution of power and the level of international trade exert substantial influences on the incidence of war" (p. 31); and "both structural and process-level factors help to explain patterns of war and trade during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (p. 31). Mansfield is right that the relationships among trade, power, and war are of critical importance. But his conclusions would be more powerful had he also included in his analysis the impact of nation-state-level variables such as domestic political economic institutions, policy, and ideology.

MARIE ANCHORDOGUY
University of Washington

Edited for Television: CNN, ABC, and the 1992 Presidential Campaign *by Matthew Robert Kerbel. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1994. 246pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $18.95.*

This book examines a huge body of data, the presidential campaign coverage by ABC's "World News Tonight" and CNN's "Prime News," from 1 January through election day, 1992. The author, a former television newswriter, did a content analysis of every statement made on those shows about the election. He also interviewed forty-four members of the CNN and ABC election news units before and after the 1992 election. He was interested not only in the nature of the coverage but also in the question of whether there were significant differences in coverage between the cable and regular networks.

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The result of this comparative study is useful in several ways. Most prior studies of television news coverage have focused on the regular networks; Kerbel is one of the first to examine the role of cable in political news. The book is laden with informative tables and charts reporting his data, making it a valuable reference; for example, he compares what the networks talked about, the percentage of statements they aired in the first newscast segment in different stages of the campaign, the number of character references they made by week, and the negative and positive evaluations of debates. The combination of methodologies gives added weight to the book's discussion, as the reader sees the campaign both through the content analysis of the programs and the words of the correspondents, producers, and news executives who made the programs.

The author finds few differences between the ABC and CNN coverage in the programs studied (although noting that CNN provided much more specialized election coverage than ABC in their afternoon program, "Inside Politics"). Both programs stress the role of individuals rather than institutions in the campaign; both organize their stories around the candidates' schedules; both emphasize the horse race aspects of the campaign. Campaign coverage on both networks is of a personal, political, and nonideological nature.

The author's thesis is that this sameness in coverage is due to the similarity in the newsworkers' orientations. Their perspectives on what political television should be are cut from the same cloth. Though they almost universally agree that more issue coverage would improve the quality of television news, their common focus on life inside the bubble of the campaign itself allows little time for such attention.

There is some sympathy for the plight of the newsworkers in this book, portraying them as trapped within the rigid rituals of event-driven coverage. But the author also has an edge in his voice, particularly when he explains how much more time it takes for reporters to prepare stories on substantive issues, when polls and the horse race are easy and comfortable to cover. He also laments the effects of coverage that deprives the viewers of other conceptualizations of the campaign, such as a clash of institutions, parties, or interest groups.

The book's television-is-everything perspective ignores other important media, and the definition and role of image deserve more attention. But overall, the book provides an ambitious and careful examination of the nature of and reasons for television political news decisions, expanding our knowledge by including CNN as well as ABC.

KATHLEEN E. KENDALL
State University of New York at Albany

The Gilded Dome: The U.S. Senate and Campaign Finance Reform *by Greg D. Kubiak. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1994. 294 pp. $27.95.*

This uneven memoir by Gregory Kubiak, legislative assistant to former Senator David Boren (D-OK), combines the legislative history of campaign finance reform legislation in the United States Senate from 1983 to 1992, advocacy for a package of funding reforms, analysis of the political forces and motives that surround the issue, and personal reflections on the legislative and political process. Various chapters broach a framework for the congressional struggle about campaign finance reform, detail Kubiak's program for reform, trace his odyssey from schoolboy campaigner to Senate aide, and describe the principal players outside Congress—especially interest groups and the press. The core of this volume, however, is five

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chapters that trace the discussions, negotiations, staff and senatorial interactions, committee consideration, legislative maneuvering, and floor action in the Senate in the 98th through the 102nd Congresses.

Boren's first effort to bring campaign finance legislation to the floor—a ban on PAC gifts as a nongermane amendment to an obscure bill—was repeatedly delayed by majority leader Robert Dole, ultimately commanded huge majorities, but was killed by a parliamentary objection by Senator Jesse Helms. Renewed efforts in 1987 were blocked by a Republican filibuster marked by eight cloture votes (a 71-year record), a three-day continuous session to break the filibuster, an orchestrated Republican boycott on the Senate floor to exhaust the Democratic quorum, and the dramatic "arrest" of Senator Robert Packwood to make a quorum. These detailed descriptions of floor maneuvering, together with reports of dozens of meetings, conversations, memos, and other interactions among senators, their staffs, interest group representatives, and the press, are Kubiak's book at its best.

Kubiak is a partisan. He is quick to point out the hypocrisy of senators who speak and vote for campaign finance reform but privately maneuver for revisions to shelter their own financing practices. He rejoices when opponents of reform are caught in financing scandals. He delights in pointing out that Senator Dole and President George Bush opposed public financing of congressional campaigns but readily accepted public financing of their presidential bids. Along the way, Kubiak adds troubling anecdotes to the mounting evidence that political contributions directly or indirectly influence the legislative process.

Kubiak's partisanship often leads him astray. He scoffs at the argument that campaign expenditure limits are an infringement of free speech, a position consistently supported by the Supreme Court. More troubling, he and Boren argue that expenditure limits help challengers despite impressive social science evidence to the contrary, about which Kubiak seems unaware. Incumbents' expenditures do little to help their campaigns, because their voter recognition is already high; but increased challenger spending advances their electoral fortunes by making them more familiar to the electorate. Kubiak's acceptance of public financing through tax credits ignores the previous failure of such state and federal tax preferences.

David Boren remains an enigma. An intelligent, decent public official, he waged his own campaigns in a heavily one-party constituency without accepting PAC contributions. But we are left to wonder why a moderate senator from a conservative state, who sat on no committee with jurisdiction over any aspect of campaign finance reform, became the principal sponsor and proponent of sweeping campaign finance legislation that would impose expenditures limits, provide public subsidies for congressional campaigns, strengthen the Federal Election Commission, and ban PACs. At a meeting with representatives of Common Cause, Boren suddenly embraced a broad reform agenda with the unelaborated comment: "Well, it seems like the only right thing to do." But why this improbable and sudden conversion?

Kubiak's personal memoir does not offer the theoretical insights of the scholarly participant-observer study, such as Ralph Huitt's powerful discussion of Senate norms and roles, or of the scholarly legislative biographer, such as Richard Fenno's extraordinary study of Dan Quayle. His writing is often uneven and obscure (and includes enough typographical errors to embarrass the publisher). In the end, the value of Kubiak's book, especially his graphic portrayals of the legislative process, only slightly outweighs its significant shortcomings—and then only for patient readers.

DAVID ADAMANY
Wayne State University

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A Woman's Place Is in the House: Campaigning for Congress in the Feminist Era *by Barbara C. Burrell. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1994. 211 pp. $37.50.*

One question dominates Burrell's meticulously researched book: Why even today do we find so few women legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives? To answer that question she "examines the experiences of the women who have run for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1968 through 1992, the feminist era, and compares their presence and performance with that of male candidates" (p. 4). Her examination includes all aspects of the process, beginning with the decision to run through the entrance into a party primary, the campaign process itself with all its ramifications, and, most important in the next to the last chapter, what women actually do in the House once they are elected.

Each chapter is devoted to one distinct phase of that process, beginning with a woman's attempt to enter a party primary. Burrell generally starts with reviewing all the extant and often contradictory "evidence" on the topic and then examines in great detail which previous assertions meet the test of evidence. In the course of that enterprise she discovers that "most of our conventional ideas about women's campaigns are myths, which can be laid to rest" (p. 183). Her methodical interment of some of our most time-honored stereotypes about women candidates is one of the most interesting and important contributions the book makes. In the first substantive chapter (chapter two) she documents that it is not true that the majority of voters are biased against women politicians. If anything, she asserts, it works to their advantage in that they are perceived as outsiders and as more concerned and honest. Nor do women do much worse than men in open primaries (another myth). The trouble instead is that there are (or were prior to 1992) so few open ones. Nor is there much substance to another myth, namely that the parties deliberately discourage women from entering primaries. She goes over well established ground to show how the parties' diminished control over nominations actually should work to women's advantage, if only women were to avail themselves of the opportunity. She probably underestimates somewhat the advantage men derive from their more extensive prior political experience and more numerous professional contacts.

Another myth Burrell lays to rest is that women cannot raise money as effectively as men. Nor are women too shy or too averse to solicit money from PACs (another myth), but the PACs that support them are different. She gives details of the ways women have learned to form their own PACs dedicated to supporting women for public office and to help prepare them for such offices, and she describes at great length the origin and current work of one such PAC, Emily's List. This may make for very interesting reading for the uninitiated but is probably well known to most readers familiar with the literature on women and politics. One might have wished that she had chosen instead to expand her coverage of the very real difference women's presence in the House has made. Chapter eight presents an important overview of the ways in which women have affected policy and even have shaped the agenda of Congress. It no doubt will be cited frequently in classes on women and politics.

Burrell's marshalling of evidence is solid, careful, and convincing. She has a tendency to give almost equal weight to all aspects of the campaign process rather than highlighting the most crucial ones, but far more important is that she makes a good case for her thesis that women and men have about the same chance of getting elected to the House but that one "of the major reasons that relatively few women have held office is that relatively few women have run" (p. 184). The results of the recent midterm election support her thesis. Notwithstanding that the newly elected Congress is staunchly conservative, the number of

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female representatives has held steady. Encouraging though that may be, we should not forget that the number is still a mere forty-seven!

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
Rutgers University

Elections at Home and Abroad *edited by M. Kent Jennings and Thomas E. Mann. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1994. 336 pp. $49.50.*

This is a *Festchrift* for Warren E. Miller, whose work has to an uncommon degree proved useful to others. While pursuing a full scholarly agenda, mostly as an analyst of survey data on various electorates, Miller has carved out for himself a special place in the history of the social sciences as a builder of institutions fostering empirical investigation of voting and elections: The Survey Research Center, the Institute of Political Studies, the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, and the National Election Studies, all based at the University of Michigan. Only a few of the legions of scholars worldwide making use of these facilities and of the data they have generated have contributed to this rich and interesting volume. But they represent very well a sentiment of gratitude more widely felt throughout the profession for Miller's salutary influence on the intellectual progress of one of the most well organized and fruitful branches of social science, the study of elections and voting behavior.

An interesting feature of the voting behavior literature is the extent to which empirical exploration leads in the first instance only to ad-hoc theorizing. This is understandable in light of the strong practical usefulness of knowledge about how and why voters behave. But as further empirical exploration unearths anomalies, more elaborate attempts at theory are required and begin to enter the literature. Many of the best essays in this book illustrate a second or third wave of thinking grounded in survey materials.

I suppose the heart of the collection is the set of three essays on party identification (by Sören Holmberg; Max Kaase and Hans-Dieter Klingemann; and Richard A. Brody, David W. Brady, and Valerie Heithusen) which extend and criticize the basic idea of party ID as a determinant of voting choice under especially challenging and somewhat anomalous circumstances: in what amounts to a newly enfranchised electorate in the former East Germany, in various European countries (where there are multiple parties), and in split-ticket voting in the United States.

Much of the early theoretical work on electoral studies was dominated by Anthony Downs and his successors applying rational choice constructs that attempt to explain not only the partisan direction of the vote, but more mysteriously, why people turn out to vote at all. Raymond Wolfinger's essay in this collection—which counts as a third-wave contribution—is a clear-headed critique of rational choice explanations of turnout.

Heniz Eulau is at his discursive best in an essay on the dimension of time in survey research, covering issues of causation and of historical sequencing. Anthony King and Ivor Crewe contribute an essay appraising the extent to which British elections are becoming more presidential in the minds of British voters—that is, the extent to which opinion about party leaders influences parliamentary elections, even though party leaders are themselves not on most ballots. Leon Epstein reviews the evolving literature on national party conventions

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and rather remarkably discovers a rationale for continued scholarly attention to these utterly transformed and increasingly decorative institutions.

In all, twelve essays comprise this collection. Like Warren Miller's own work, they range between technical and political concerns, frequently throwing light on both.

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California at Berkeley

Divided We Fall: Gambling with History in the Nineties *by Haynes Johnson. New York, W. W. Norton, 1994. 431 pp. $25.00.*

Haynes Johnson believes America is in desperate shape. In this survey of the nation in 1992, based on a trip through fifteen states and talks with hundreds of people, he concludes that the American dream is in serious danger. Everywhere he went, he found signs of growing decay—rising racial tensions, growing class consciousness, fear of a declining standard of living, increasing crime and drug use, and above all, a sense that what divides Americans is becoming more powerful than what unites them.

The accuracy of Johnson's report on America in the early 1990s is open to question. One suspects that he set out from Washington already convinced that the nation was on the wrong path; it is hardly surprising then that he was able to find many people who agreed with him and helped him document his concerns. Certainly many of the developments he describes reflect serious social problems and flaws, yet he rarely pauses to contemplate the enduring strengths of the nation. Typical is his chapter on illegal immigration and the failure of the melting pot; nowhere does he try to understand why so many millions of people in other countries still view America as the golden land and are willing to endure great deprivations to share in what they believe is the best way of life on earth.

The most disappointing aspect of the book is Johnson's biased political analysis. The trouble with America, he repeats again and again, is that the greed and selfishness symbolized by the 1980s and Reaganism put the nation on a dangerous downward course symbolized by the rapid growth of the national debt. An heroic Bill Clinton, who alone seemed to sense the magnitude of the crisis and offered to make the changes the nation so desperately needed, failed to alter the course of history because of his own tendency to vacillate, because of the entrenched power of lobbyists and special interests, and because of the refusal of the American people to pay the price in higher taxes and greater community effort.

Johnson's view of recent history is badly flawed. He ignores many of the centrifugal forces unleashed in American society in the turbulent 1960s, as well as the devastating impact of the energy crisis and the great inflation of the next decade. If there was a golden age in post-World War II America, it was in the 1950s, when American affluence and abundance were at their height, prior to the economic resurgence of Japan and Germany and before the cumulative cost of waging the cold war began to take its toll on the American economy. The economic and social problems facing the United States today reflect the changes that have been building up over the past thirty years, rather than simply being the product of unwise departures in the 1980s. The combination of the end of the cold war and the onset of a periodic downturn in the business cycle added a sense of urgency, but hardly constitute the kind of crisis in national life that Johnson compares to the Civil War in the nineteenth century and the Great Depression in the twentieth.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

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The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq: How Peace-making Changed *by Cameron Hume. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1994. 269 pp. $29.95.*

The changing political atmosphere among the permanent members of the Security Council in the final years of the Iran-Iraq war led them to "rediscover" the Council. Until then, practically paralyzed and reduced to a stage for superpower bickering, it became the main diplomatic instrument for creating a political framework that would lead to the settlement of that conflict. Hume, a career U.S. diplomat, was privy to many of those discussions and negotiations as a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations between 1986 and 1989; and he presents a wealth of information, some from unpublished documents.

Hume compares this case to previous incidents concerning Iran and Iraq, which had been unsuccessfully dealt with by the Security Council—the occupation of Northern Iran by Soviet troops in 1946; Iraq's 1961 claim to Kuwait; Iran's territorial and hegemonic ambitions in the Gulf; and the festering conflict between Iran and Iraq for the control of the Shatt waterway. Those incidents had certainly revealed the marginality of the Security Council during the cold war. However, despite the efforts to reach a consensus in 1987, the multilateral management of the Iran-Iraq conflict through the Security Council, reviewed in the central chapters of the book, is not very encouraging for what it achieved. In fact the permanent members ("P-5" in UN jargon), while displaying unity in New York, continued to pursue unilateral and largely antagonistic policies in the Gulf, often dictated by the interests of their industries. Even after the adoption of Resolution 598 (1987), which took six months to negotiate and in which the Council acted under Chapter VII in requesting a cease-fire, the parties went on fighting for one more year, and the Council was unable to enforce its decision. After a cease-fire was finally established in August 1988, the P-5 lost interest in the conflict and did not support the efforts of the secretary-general to achieve a meaningful settlement.

The importance of the attempts by the permanent members to bring an end to the war through the Council, as Hume underlines, lies mainly in the fact that they began in those years to work together and coordinate their policies to achieve concrete goals, and to gather experience about how to do it within the United Nations. They also learned to value the power that their unity and the potential of the Charter could give them and the collective legitimization it offered to their policies.

The effects brought about by that change have been stunning in the case of the UN's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The author reviews, at the end of his book, the crucial months leading to Desert Storm and highlights the swiftness with which the Security Council became an essential instrument for rallying and maintaining a strong political consensus in favor of drastic measures—economic sanctions and military enforcement—which proved unattainable in 1987–1988.

Hume provides a great number of details on the negotiations among the permanent members and the sequence of events. This does not always make for light reading; the book could have been more concise on the narrative without losing its focus. One would have also appreciated more developed final considerations as to the implications of the trend analyzed in the book for the future of the United Nations—especially in view of the growing marginalization of the General Assembly in favor of a Security Council, which until recently has been practically dominated by three states. Even with these minor shortcomings, Hume's contribution to the analysis of this crucial period will be of great help to scholars and diplomats, providing as it does a lucid insight in the intricacies of multilateral decision making.

GIAN LUCA BURCI
United Nations

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

Bosnia: A Short History *by Noel Malcolm. New York, New York University Press, 1994. 340 pp. $26.95.*

Congressional Quarterly's Desk Reference on American Government *by Bruce Wetterau. Washington, DC, CQ Press, 1995. 349 pp. $39.95.*

Criminal Justice in Israel: An Annotated Bibliography of English Language Publications, 1948–1993 *compiled by Robert R. Friedmann. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1995. 224 pp. $75.00.*

The Diplomatic Record, 1992–1993 *edited by Allan E. Goodman. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995. 310 pp. $65.00.*

Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations, and Parties *by Janusz Bugajski. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1994. 493 pp. $75.00.*

The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process *by Allen Schick. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1995. 223 pp. $15.95.*

The Multilevel Design: A Guide to Annotated Bibliography, 1980–1993 *by Harry J. M. Huttner and Peter von den Eeden. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1995. 288 pp. $69.50.*

Parties and Politics in American History: A Reader *by L. Sandy Maisel and William G. Shade. New York, Garland Publishing, 1994. 278 pp. Cloth, $44.00; paper, $18.95.*

The SIPRI Yearbook, 1994. *New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. 841 pp. $79.00.*

The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948–1994, with an introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Blue Book Series, Volume I *by the United Nations. New York, United Nations Publications, 1995. 565 pp. $29.95.*

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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